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Love does not call for a certain kind of thinking, or for a thinking of love, but for thinking in
essence and in its totality. And this is because thinking, most properly speaking, is love.
Jean Luc Nancy

For my daughter, Kate.
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ABSTRACT

Kathryn A. McFadden

INDEFINITE OPENNESS: THINKING LOVE IN ART

What happens when someone confronts a work of art—the inexplicable connection to
something brought into the world by an artist? Might we call this moment love? If so, how
does this love differ from other loves, like eros or philia? Love originating in the
interconnectedness of viewer, artwork and artist resists conventional positions; art is in fact a
philosophy of love in action.
I argue the primary action for love in art is thinking. Thinking about art is a manifestation of
love when the viewer is overcome by wonder when contemplating a work of art. This love
arises from a movement—yet something beyond the semblance of logical movement—that
occurs in the viewer and artist. This conveyance offers the potential of a rupture, a burst that
takes place in the between, a theoretical zero space of love. As a space of pure potential, the
between allows for the connection necessary for thinking love, a love that asks unanswerable
questions. Love in art offers indefinite openness because it initiates endless possibilities for
what a subject can feel or know.
Love as I define it is not necessarily dependent on empathy, struggle, hierarchy or
equivalence; it is not dogma, ideal or truth; it is neither rational nor irrational. It is not to be
desperately sought and located; it is a matter of presence and duration. Love in art waivers
between understanding and ignorance; it is embodied, immeasurable, generous, fleeting and
vi

erratic. It is a manner of thriving in the expansion of self. With this paper I stake a claim for
the importance of love in contemporary aesthetic practice.
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Figure 0.1. Valérie Oka (left) at In her presence performance in 2011 at Lagos Centre for
Contemporary Arts Photo: Valerie Oka Flickr page.

Introduction
The Progress of Love

Let us consider the subject of love, specifically in the context of works of art. What
happens when someone experiences an inexplicable connection to something brought into
the world by an artist? Might we call this moment love? If so, how does this love differ from
other loves like eros or philia? If it is not comparable, is it possible that love in art stands
outside the Western canon of conventional notions of love? How does art explain, connect,
and participate in love? What is art’s role in the act of thinking? To begin to take on these
questions and by way of example, I commence with a particular contemporary artwork that is
both performative and collaborative in nature. This work was included in an expanded
exhibition titled The Progress of Love.
1

In late 2012 through early 2013 three art exhibitions with the shared title The
Progress of Love were concurrently mounted in three cities across two continents: The Menil
Collection in Houston, Texas, the Centre for Contemporary Art, in Lagos, Nigeria, and the
Pulitzer Foundation for the Arts, in St. Louis, Missouri. The exhibitions included artists from
Africa, Europe and North America. The title The Progress of Love indicates a curatorial
intent within a cross-cultural context to examine reforming aspects of love expressed in
contemporary art. Kristina Van Dyke along with co-curator Bisi Silva displayed the
representation of love in art in terms of time and space, a notion affected by history.1
Each exhibit locale had a different thematic emphasis. The Houston show was the
most dogmatic in that it examined how a digital episteme of globalization informs notions of
love. The St. Louis location contemplated the loss of love, while at Lagos the exhibit
focused on how love is performed between subjects. By offering a dialogue between the
exhibits and the viewers, Van Dyke aspired to “a possibility of self-identification”2 that
would robustly engage onlookers who attended the venues.
Enacted at the Lagos venue (and subsequently performed in sites beyond The
Progress of Love) was Valérie Oka’s3 performance In Her Presence. [Figure 0.1] The
performance comprises a dinner table set for twelve guests including Oka; all participants
partake of a three-course meal while sharing in conversation. This conversation specifically
concerns “Love, Fear and the point between the two where each of us has the illusion to be.”4
At the conclusion, each participant is invited to use what is left on the table to create an
image, write a sentence or act out something representative of a lived emotion. Their
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“artworks” remain on the table in the gallery for seventy-two hours so that subsequent
visitors to the Centre see the remains of the performance. [Figure 0.2]

Figure 0.2 Samples of artworks by participants in Valérie Oka’s performance In Her
Presence (2011). Image: Oka’s Flickr pages.

Oka’s creative prompt for the dinner guests to make representations of experiences
provides a measure of intimacy within the group. It also prods the participant to specifically
articulate or illustrate thought, and to share the role of artist. In Her Presence5 is a relational
and interactive work that—like the noun/verb love—is contingent on the subject, the other,
and the agency of connection. In the particular vehicle of Oka’s art performance, links
between people are formed via conversations that reflect upon love and other feelings in the
subject’s emotional-experiential landscape.
Love, as subjects experience it, is shaped to varying degrees by cultural, social,
economic, political, historical and religious contexts, all of which are in constant flux. Love
is commonly argued as a universal noun/verb, meaning that virtually everyone feels it;
3

however, it is not a ubiquitous experience in that how love is experienced and felt is
contingent on a subject’s singular response in the face of receiving, giving or losing love.
What I respond to in Oka’s performance is her straightforward and sincere concept of having
individuals connect over the commonplace and familial format of a meal, which is part of
every day life. Also, she also fosters her collaborators to explore their connections in a fairly
organic method that culminates in a creative expression of the sharing that has occurred.
While the curators’ aim for the viewer’s self-identification was likely accomplished
by In Her Presence, I want to stress that it also summoned the viewer to think about love—a
word that is both noun and verb—in terms of origins and feelings as well as how subjects
tend to perform love. We might imagine that the guests at Oka’s dinner came away from that
performance with some new insights about intimacy as a result of conversations with others
at the table. It is also possible that the participants took leave of the experience with more
questions than answers. And if correct in that premise, then it may be said that In Her
Presence was a conduit for a particular kind of thinking. I want to emphasize here an
important aspect of art: it creates a time and space for thinking. It may be argued that many
things provoke thinking—including art—yet what I further contend is that thinking about art
is a manifestation of love that is based in wonder.
A movement of sense
In this dissertation I unpack a philosophy of love concerning contemporary aesthetic
practice. The methodology of my thesis resonates (to a greater or lesser extent) with
phenomenological6 philosophies found in the writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Martin
Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, Judith Butler and Jean-Luc Nancy. The philosophies of
4

Merleau-Ponty, Nancy and Butler are major influences on my thesis. It is significant that
phenomenology is not concerned with analysis, but description. In this way it is a manner or
style of thinking. This thesis unfolds a way of thinking about love—and about love as
something that may happen—that may be experienced and described—with a work of art.
The movement of phenomenology established by Edmund Husserl in the 20th century
is an enquiry into and description of a subject’s consciousness. Its precepts begin to unfold in
the earlier ideas of Hegel, Nietzsche and Freud.7 Importantly for my argument, a definition of
phenomenology is neither straightforward nor homogeneous. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes,
“The fact remains that it has by no means been answered.”8 He elaborates,
It is a search for a philosophy that shall be a “rigorous science” but it also offers an
account of “lived” space, “lived” time and the “lived” world. It tries to give a direct
description of our experience as it is, without taking account of it psychological
genesis and the causal explanations which the scientist, the historian, or the
sociologist may be able to provide.9
The notion of something “lived” is apposite to my dissertation, because the love that may
happen within the subjective engagement of a work of art is an experience.10 The example of
Oka’s collaborative work In Her Presence described at the onset of this chapter offers the
viewer/participant an accounting and description of feelings that are lived and therefore
become part of being’s subjective experience. It is very much an artwork with a
phenomenological construct.
Yet as something based in possibility, a thesis of thinking love in art cannot be firmly
placed into an existing philosophical structure; instead it is perhaps an “anti-structure”11—
one that bumps up against established metaphysical scholarly approaches. In his explanation
of phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty describes it as a “search” indicating an act of exploration.
5

Searches tend to be ripe with possibilities. As phenomenology seeks to account for what is
lived, I seek the potential of love and for the occurrence of what may be thought of as love in
art. This underscores something about how vital art is to life in the same way that love is also
important. In his essay on the celebrated Paul Cezanne, Merleau-Ponty stresses the
importance of the artist or philosopher’s ideas and the effects on their audience,
A painter like Cezanne, an artist, or a philosopher must not only create and express an
idea but must also awaken the experiences which will make the idea take root in the
consciousness of others. 12
Oka’s performance dinner did just this by coordinating a focused kind of thinking and artistic
expression for her collaborators. The artwork is designed to have them to think about love, to
find meaning via a mindfulness of feeling in terms of memories, to connect and share.
Art—like love—is lived. It is lived with the encounter of a painting on a gallery wall,
the artist building something in the studio or the engagement of artist and viewer within a
performance. With In Her Presence experiences of love and fear (perhaps) forgotten were
remembered and reemerged in consciousness for the subjects who participated. Oka
reenergized ideas about love and for a few hours joined together subjects to offer them a new
experience that (perhaps) would be remembered at the least and introduce new ideas at the
most.
Something else that Merleau-Ponty writes seems important here in terms of how
phenomenology influences my thesis,
The phenomenological world is not pure being, but the sense which shows through at
the intersection of my experiences, and the intersection of my experiences and those
of others, by their engaging each other like gears—this world is therefore inseparable
from the subjectivity and from the intersubjectivity which find their unity through the
6

taking up of my past experiences in my present experiences, the taking up of the
other’s experience in my own…The philosopher tries to conceive the world, others,
and himself and to conceive their relations.13
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “intersection” is not far from my idea of the between that happens
in the course of engagement with a work of art (as I explain later in this chapter.) The
relationship of a subject with a work of art or directly with an artist may be thought of as a
form of subjective-intersubjectivity in which past and present come together, also notable for
the example of In Her Presence. Oka’s actions in this work concern what Merleau-Ponty
terms “radical reflection”14 an undertaking he attributes to philosophy but certainly enacted
by art as well.
For Nancy, artworks provide avenues of thinking not conceivable in other ways.15
Nancy’s essay “Shattered Love” strongly influences my thesis.16 Writing about art with its
intersection of philosophy has been a principal preoccupation for Nancy in which he reworks
existential philosophy.17 While he does not specifically address love and art, a number of his
concepts are considered; I borrow his terminology, although expand upon or alter it for my
argument. Nancy’s post-phenomenological18 ideas surrounding how a work of art is
experienced drives a number of notions of thinking love in art. In The Fragmentary Demand
Ian James notes,
…Art, in Nancy’s thought, exists in, or as, a relation to the world, a relation to shared
finite existence, and more specifically to that movement of sense, which is, or opens
up, world-hood itself in all its singular plurality…The whole concept of art is
rethought in terms of his wider philosophical thinking of existence and his rereading
and reworking of existential phenomenology.19
The encounter with works of art is a form of relationship (however long or brief) and offers
experiences that cannot be predetermined or definite. In every sense it has the ability to open
7

us up. An artwork may spark something in us—perhaps love; it seems to “make sense” to us
in ways that other things do not. Art is an exposition of “sense” which is an important term in
Nancy’s lexicon. It is not the conveyance of meaning per se but connotes an ontological,
shared, worldly and material existence.20 Sense has a dual aspect: it is embodied and always
in relation to an artwork’s distinct presence as heard, seen, touched (the sensible) as well as
the intelligible.21 Nancy’s double meaning of sense as intelligible/sensible arises from the
ancient classical through to phenomenological studies as well as modern French thought.22
The subject’s body with its senses and sensations is the way in which meanings and
experiences of the world are accrued.23 This includes the love found in art, applicable to both
artist-maker and art audience. These senses and sensations are both heterogeneous and a
multiplicity; we cannot conceive of them in isolation—it is a “singular-plurality.”24 For
Nancy the concept of “touch”25 covers the range of possibilities as the corpus of plural and
heterogeneic senses; how a work of art is experienced is always a matter of the body.26
Therefore, love in art, as sensible-intelligible, is implicated within our embodiment as
movement of sense, which exposes us in some way--perhaps to something inclusive of love.
Yet not love in the conventional sense of completion, fulfillment or the romantic; instead this
love is a piece—a fragment—that takes us to a limit.
Finally, a third prong of my methodology involves the decentering thought of Judith
Butler, particularly her emphasis of love and body as unfinalizable or open-ended. Butler’s
writings tend toward opening up possibilities; no single consideration of construction is
viable. Love, like gender, demands to be read through multiple lenses. Love, like gender is
revisable and changeable.
8

Thriving
For Nancy thinking/thought serves as a relation to the world.27 Valérie Oka’s
performance work In Her Presence is an artwork that provokes her participants to think and
to share that thinking with others. What is it to think? Jean-François Lyotard explains,
To think is to question everything, including thought, and question, and the process.
To question requires that something happen that reason has not yet known. In
thinking, one accepts the occurrence for what is: ‘not yet’ determined. One does not
prejudge it, and there is no security. Peregrination in the desert.28

For Lyotard asking questions is at the heart of thinking; this continues the tradition of
Socrates29 who made it his philosophical practice to consistently make inquiries of his fellow
Athenians. Socrates reasoned that by asking questions a subject might determine the best way
one to ought to live; continuous querying is a key pathway to gain insight into what is
important. Also, questioning is a form of doubt, serving as an expression of humility that
negates the self-satisfied and dead-end certainty of righteousness. The Socratic model for
philosophy is to sit in a place of unknowing, or wonder, which is not the same as ignorance
since the root of wisdom is to realize how much one does not know.30
Hannah Arendt weighs in on thinking in The Life of the Mind, “The thinking
activity—according to Plato, the soundless dialogue we carry on with ourselves—serves only
to open the eyes of the mind…”31 As she further reminds us, thinking, which is the most
quintessential of mental undertakings, has the sense of vision as a metaphor.32 For example,
when a thought strikes us as extraordinary, we exclaim, “Ah, I see!” At the same time we
should not confuse, “the need to think with the urge to know.”33 Arendt advises we could
9

seek knowledge in thinking, but thinking in itself is a different sort of undertaking; it is a
search for meaning. She describes thinking is an “appetite for meaning.”34 Arendt explains
that losing the craving for meaning would,
…cease to ask unanswerable questions, [and] would lose not only the ability to
produce those thought-things that we call works of art but also the capacity to ask all
the answerable questions upon which every civilization is founded.35

Arendt’s definition of an artwork as a “thought-thing” contributes a novel concept to how a
viewer approaches an artwork, since art generally tends to be considered an aesthetic
experience rather than one concerned with thinking. And while it is also a representation of
something by an artist, the viewer thinking about it36 and questioning it in some way changes
this representation.
This likelihood for change is demonstrated in Oka’s performance work. In Her
Presence is a collaborative effort on behalf of an artist and her participants. Together the
group shared their thoughts about love, and in this framework there were changes in thinking,
perhaps not always immediately evident to the individual. Even if questions were not voiced
aloud, it is imaginable they were posed in silent consciousness—the dialogue with the self.
And here is a parallel for the practice of art and philosophy: the love of wisdom, the
exchange of ideas, the action of focused thinking. Art and philosophy share the property of
wonder.
Luce Irigaray is also on the Socratic track when she reminds us that questioning can
“awaken consciousness” 37 which allows for other ways of thinking. In other words, thinking
10

expands our cognitive boundaries by going beyond. She insists this is not a thinking that in
any way would compromise singularity, but one that allows for a subject to flourish.
Love is a manner of thriving; so is viewing art. In spirited consideration of the ideas
of many philosophical voices, this paper thinks about the interconnectedness of viewer,
artwork and artist as it concerns the phenomenon of love. Rather than Lyotard’s cognitive
desert, my thoughts and questions wander in the fecund landscape of contemporary visual
art. My project will emphasize specific works of art that include performance, installation,
painting, video, and literary practice created within the last 20 years. While I highlight
contemporary aesthetic practice, at the same time I employ artworks across history to tie
together how this theory of love is put into practice.
What happens when someone confronts a work of art—the inexplicable connection to
something brought into the world by an artist? Might we call this moment love? If so, how
does this love differ from other loves, like eros or philia? Does this particular love stand
outside the Western canon of the four Greek loves?
I suggest that a particular kind of love arises from the movement of thinking that
occurs in the subject when confronted with a work of art. This conveyance gives rise to a
rupture, a kind of burst that takes place in the between, a metaphysical space of love.
To and fro
Thinking about artwork is a manner of thriving. Nancy claims that, “…thinking, most
properly speaking, is love.”38 He acknowledges this is a challenging idea because what he
asserts here is not that love and thinking, as such, are dogma or ideal as often imagined. What
11

he proposes here is something significant: Nancy invites us to reconsider love and thinking in
a broader frame of reference. After all, we engage in “thinking” from early in life to the end
of it; thought is a universal prosaic activity. Nancy does not necessarily mean a specific kind
of love, such as romantic, or a fixed kind of thinking such as thinking about a lover. This is,
of course possible. Yet Nancy casts a wider net aiming for the existential aspect of thinking.
By way of illustration I refer again to Oka’s artwork In Her Presence; she designed the
performance to stimulate participants to consider the spectrum of love as lived emotions.
Thinking that through, collaborators may make associations, note contradictions, examine
collisions and alliances, and imagine other possibilities. They ask questions (of themselves
and others) and contemplate connections in regards to what love means and how it might be
lived. Oka leads them to wonder about love. In this way In Her Presence may be compared
to Plato’s Symposium, a text that sets the Western stage in history for thinking about love.
Both works involve a convivial party and a polyphonic discourse of the origins and
manifestations of love; both are representative of the arts (fine art and writing.)
Does it matter whether In Her Presence or Symposium actually arrives at a singular
reliable conclusion or ideology of love? No. Instead I argue that we regard art as a
philosophy of love in action. As such it is a movement—an activity—in which something
happens.
***
Nancy addresses two formulas for how love is traditionally considered. The first is
that love consists of an extraordinary action of exceeding the self towards an end. He
proposes that this idea is couched in the expression, “Love is the extreme movement beyond
12

the self of a being reaching completion.”39 Yet Nancy argues that this conventional thinking
about love is not feasible; the goal is actually contradictory. Are we ever finalized? Therefore
instead of a finalization of self or personal fulfillment, we may consider the most critical
component is reaching out for connection.
Instead of this law of the completion of being, one would want to deal only with a
moment of contact between beings, a light, cutting, and delicious moment of contact,
at once eternal and fleeting. In its philosophical assignation, love seems to skirt this
touch of the heart that would not complete anything ”40

Nancy describes here the potential love relation between beings, but what about the “moment
of contact” as it links a being and a work of art? Does something similar happen in that
instance? Viewing and spending time with an artwork does not complete us, but creates an
instance of a caress to the heart by way of the viewer’s thinking about it. What is this
thinking? It is a questioning process, a metaphysical movement. To reiterate Lyotard, “In
thinking, one accepts the occurrence for what is: ‘not yet’ determined.”41 This is important:
questions in the contemplation of an artwork do not require answers since to establish them
would be a completion or resolution that is not the necessary end. Instead, artwork and
viewer are linked in a transitory moment, which presents open-ended possibilities.
Importantly, the love located in a work of art is not a form of security as we might imagine
other kinds of love to offer.
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A second common prescription of love is that it is long
lasting and stable in nature. Yet Nancy’s further definition of
love concerns its short-lived state—what he describes as an
“incessant coming-and-going.”42 This evokes what Paul
Armstrong characterizes as the “to and fro” of interplay in
reading, which also happens in an aesthetic experience. In other
words, analogous to reading a text, the artwork makes a demand
upon the viewer to take it in, and reciprocally the viewer enjoins

Figure 0.3. Example of negative
space drawing. Image:
williara.wordpress.com

the work by thinking about it. Armstrong terms this reciprocity a “hermeneutic spiral” 43 a
capricious movement that “goes back and forth, shifting and rearranging itself.”44 Arendt also
mentions a spiral and describes it as a situation in which cyclical and rectilinear notions of
time are made congruent.45 Then I suggest that the thinking of art is akin to a helical
conveyance that involves interpretation by way of questioning. Considering the hermeneutic
spiral as the model of connection between viewer and artwork, love becomes a phenomenon
with a dynamic and chancy nature. It is completely erratic and fleeting—nothing to depend
on—but nonetheless love.
Between
Thinking as movement—as an action described as a to and fro—demands an
ontological space-time I refer to as a between. This interstice accommodates the helical
movement of thinking about art, about love in art. The between is not a definite space of
boundaries, yet it does share some aspects of the space of an interval where something starts
and stops and perhaps begins again.
14

By way of analogy consider the concept of negative space in the practice of
perceptual drawing whereby edges that border the shapes are discerned in relation to the
object being drawn. For example, the “air” between the leaves of a plant determines the
figure-ground relationship; the figure is the so-called positive shape and the ground is the
negative one. [Figure 0.3] A flipped looking at the negative is important in observational
drawing because the “nothing”—what is between—is key to capturing a likeness by the
drawer. This non-space space is in a dynamic and dependent relation to the observed object,
but its importance is often sublated to the actual object(s) under scrutiny; however, the
negative space—the between—is real and important. To apprehend the relationship of
inside/outside or positive/negative in the act of drawing serves to make a composition that is
unified while creating solid objective representations of an observed object.
There is a Chinese philosophy concerning “empty space” in representational painting
that further upholds my concept of the between. The emphasis on the void in a composition
arises from Daoist principles46 whereby such non-space space is the “beginning of myriad
things”47 in terms of the representation of perceptual forms. The Dao cosmological term qi
(chi) is the idea of formlessness, and when applied to artwork, takes on the idea of emptiness,
which is invisible like air and essential to sustaining life. Qi creates movement in the
composition, inserting a dynamism that enlivens how the artwork is experienced. In this way
what is observed holds equivalence to what is not seen. In this way the between can be
regarded as invisible harmonious energy.

15

Figure 0.4. Rachel Whiteread, Gran Boathouse (2010). Concrete. Location: Røykenviken, Hadeland,
Norway. Image: www.Skulptur-Stopp.no

Rachel Whiteread48 is an example of a contemporary artist who literally engages the
negative space of objects to create her artwork. She subverts the tradition of sculpture by
employing the byproduct of casting, in terms of the negative space of the cast, rather than the
finished object. In other words, she materializes the void around an object, such as the open
space around a bookshelf, or the space within an empty box, rather than the thing itself. A
recent work, the Gran Boathouse [Figure 0.4] is the cast interior of an old boathouse perched
on the edge of a waterway in Norway. Wooden boathouses in Norway are a common site on
shores along the water and are traditionally used to store boats and fishing gear within a
simple rectangular floor plan. Using concrete as medium, Whiteread cast the interior space of
an original boathouse that was beyond repair.
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The outer wooden framework, roof and façade were removed and the remaining
hardened concrete literally turns the structure inside out. Elin-Therese Aarseth of the
Vigeland Museum in Oslo writes, “By defining and capturing the negative space of objects,
Whiteread invites the audience to construct visions and thoughts about what is not visible.
She is creating an interaction between what we see and what we know.”49 Returning to
Arendt’s notion of thinking discussed in the beginning of this introduction, we recall that
thinking is not concerned with an accumulation of knowledge. Arendt also stresses that
thinking’s principle characteristic is not only a soundless dialogue,50 but that it is invisible as
well.51 In this way Whiteread’s use of the invisible—the negative space—is a kind of
thinking out loud.
I would argue that Whiteread’s thought-things also invite wonder about what we do
not know or what we tend not to think about such as the space under a chair or—as in the
case of Gran Boathouse—the air invisibly occupying a room. In other words, what might be
considered empty space—the open-ended, the qi. Further Aarseth’s remark about the not
visible in Whiteread’s work is cogent to my explanation of the between as a space in the
phenomenon of love found in art. It is metaphysically there, an ontological space-time
between artwork and viewer. Nancy’s explanation of his use of the “between” in the text
Being Singular Plural further supports my thesis, which requires further denotation,
This “between,” as its name implies, has neither a consistency nor continuity of its
own. It does not lead from one to the other; it constitutes no connective tissue, no
cement, no bridge. Perhaps it is not even fair to speak of a “connection” to its subject;
it is neither connected or unconnected; it falls short of both; even better, it is that
which is at the heart of a connection…52
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I propose the between is necessary as a space of pure potential or open-endedness that allows
for the contact necessary for thinking love. This is what Nancy is getting at: self as here and
now and self as possible, or “existence’s plurality.”53 The future time for the self—the plus
now—always brings unforeseen possibilities. Within this existence is love’s plurality as well;
love always concerns unseen or unexpected potential.
It seems a reasonable if not common phenomenon that love in general is not perfectly
fixed; it is full of maybe; it moves in endless effusions and diffusions; like tidewater it ebbs
and comes in again. Love appears and vanishes; pushes forward and goes into reverse;
expands and contracts; it is mediated by time. In an essay concerning G.W.F Hegel’s early
discourse on love,54 Judith Butler addresses the idea of mediation and summarizes it by
stating, “…A certain displacement in time and space constitutes the condition of
knowing…”55 The to and fro is just such a displacement; I would add to Butler’s assertion
that this displacement in time and space is much the same as the action of thinking. The
experience of love found in art is brought about by the to and fro—the movement—within
the between. This movement of thinking constitutes a change in the relationship to the
artwork, which may range (initially) from curiosity to indifference. Butler points out that the
phenomenon of love has its own logic based in a temporal unfolding; its very denotation is an
“indefinite openness.”56 This indefinite openness is true of the phenomenon of art as well
since art opens up immeasurable possibilities for what a subject can feel or know.
In his surviving fragment about love, Hegel asserts love as more than a solitary
feeling that in its multiplicity does not concern reason or understanding.57 Hegel is referring
to love between equals; any difference (otherness) is annulled by their shared love. His
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definition of love is a fixed wholeness in which consciousness of otherness disappears. This
is a very traditional and romantic view of love that is based in Christianity. In this
relationship there can be no between because it is a kind of fusion that prizes completeness
and sameness. The love found in art defies this conventional position on love. Instead it
upholds new insights and connections for the subject who remains independent; nothing is
finalized; wholeness is inconsequential. Thinking love in art is a process by which (perhaps)
a subject’s cognitive boundaries are expanded. And it must be stressed that at the same time
this knowing contains indefinite openness because the self that understands something today
may understand it differently tomorrow—or not understand it at all—and so on. Nothing is
static.
The to and fro that takes place in the between marks it as a transitional space. It is
akin to Martin Heidegger’s58 notion of “clearing,” a metaphysical interval he sees as
analogous to an opening in the forest devoid of trees. For example, a hiker in dense woods
suddenly comes upon a clearing, which might seem at first to be an encounter with nothing.59
The trees to which she is accustomed are now gone redirecting her attention to how she sees
the forest. Things appear differently; a lack of shadows, the sky and the ground are now open
to full view. Lain D. Thomson remarks upon this phenomenon,
To experience this “noth-ing” is to become attuned to something that is not a thing
(hence “nothing”) but which conditions all our experiences of thing, something that
fundamentally informs our intelligible worlds but that we experience initially as what
escapes and so defies our “subjectivistic” impulse to extend our conceptual mastery
over everything.60
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As with an encounter upon a forest clearing, the metaphysical between offers a new way of
seeing that generates questions and thoughts. In this way the nothing becomes something real
and remarkable; absence is another manner of presence.
It is within this Heideggarian clearing as transitional interval that the subject is
receptive to encountering a truth or understanding of Being, the unanswerable question of
what it means to be. Truth is defined as not concerned with correctness or facts, but a
revealing of something via an indefinite openness. This revealing works in tandem with a
concealing, in the same way negative and positive space come together in a two-dimensional
image, or in the case of Whiteread’s work, a three-dimensional thought-thing.
Thinking-with
The between is a temporal space in which a kind of movement takes place: a to and
fro energy that offers pure potential through questions that arise when thinking about a work
of art. In the between there is nothing that acts as adhesive and there is no consummation. To
reiterate part of Nancy’s assertion about love between subjects,
Instead of this law of the completion of being, one would want to deal only with a
moment of contact between beings, a light, cutting, and delicious moment of contact,
at once eternal and fleeting.61

Nancy is saying that love is exposure between subjects that is a lithesome touch, a deeply felt
caress momentary yet memorable. I suggest that love in art is comparable, and that the
contact is thinking with the artwork and/or the artist.
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Thinking is an existential action. In thinking art, the culmination of this movement
results in the moment of an inexpressible revelation whereby the artist— either indirectly or
indirectly—metaphysically touches the other who is present to the artist’s work. Karim
Benammar offers a definition of what it is to make art,
Creating art is engaging one's being beyond the limits of the self.
Writing, communicating, is displacing oneself, it is engaging one's being beyond
oneself, beyond the limits of the self; we are never freed from this ecstatic desire.62

“We” are artist-makers that take joy in their engagement with the other and our self-imposed
exile from the center. Art is made for both self and other, born—as Hegel states—from the
artist’s imagination.63 He further states that the artist is deeply attuned to her “emotional
life” as well as her internal and external experiences in the world.64 In using a combination of
creativity and feeling to make something to share with the other, the artist reaches beyond the
self. And more than that, the artist invites the viewer to think-with, to contemplate the object
or performance.
Nancy considers philosophy a “thinking-with”65 since thinking is an extension of the
self to the other. I argue that art does the same thinking-with as philosophy. In the context of
this thesis, thinking-with is at the same time a questioning-with. The undertaking of the artist
is to imagine possibilities deployed in the art medium that calls forth a thinking-with;
subsequently the viewer is thinking-with, questioning-with and being-with the artwork. She
is present. In this way an artwork performs the function of philosophy.
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Bennamar’s reference to “ecstatic desire” speaks to the great pleasure experienced by
the artist in aesthetic practice—a jouissance of creativity. By comparison Nancy locates the
joy found in love at the intersection of self and other, creating what he terms a “burst,”
To try to enter into the question one could say at least this: self that joys joys of its
presence in the presence of the other. He, she is only the presence of the reception of
the other presence—and the latter cuts across. The presence that cuts across is a burst.
To joy, joy itself, is to receive the burst of a singular being: it is more than manifest
presence, its seeming beyond all appearance—ekphanestaton, Plato said.66

In addition to the presence of another, the self may also find elation (or other strong feeling)
in the presence of art, and when this happens—when there is a crossing of self and art—there
may also be a rupture, which I redefine as the moment of contact with the artist—the heart of
the connection. This is not a rupture in a pessimistic sense. Instead it is break from absolute
subjectivity that creates the between.
Thinking love in art brings about a rupture via an artwork. This occurs through pure
presence, whether that presence is indirect—with the absence of the artist—or with the work
embodied by the artist. In either case it is a presence of being-with and thinking-with.
Thinking love is a vehemence of presence. Lyotard’s statement, “…To make seen what
makes one see, and not what is visible”67 is apropos to help the reader comprehend the
wonder of the rupture and Nancy’s assertion of “seeming beyond all appearance.”68 The
rupture is a transport to an unknown limit.
Through this greater-than—its seeming beyond all appearance—the rupture brings
about a form of transformation. Plato’s69 ekphanestaton, according to Martin Heidegger, is
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how art allows us insight in a radiant,
illuminating way.70 At the same time this
luminescence, while taken to heart, is ineffable.

Punctum
Thinking-with is an important aspect of
the love found in art for both artist and viewer. I
invite you to consider this action as an openended presence that is a rupture of our everyday
Figure 0.5. The Falling Man was a photograph taken
by Richard Drew for Associated Press on September
11, 2001. The picture was captured as he fell from the
North Tower at 9:41 AM. The man’s identity cannot
be absolutely confirmed. Image: Wikipedia

insulation, which connects the subject to art and
artist. The rupture decenters the subject; it

engages us in questioning. Every work of art we encounter offers thinking love as a new
rupture, but it is not always joyful or satisfying. It may be difficult, painful, disturbing or
mournful; it can feel like an abrasion or slap. While we normally consider love as a tender or
sweet feeling there are actually myriad possibilities for emotions experienced in love found
in artworks.
Art can deploy what Roland Barthes terms the “punctum,” a prick or wounding of
feelings.71 His description of the punctum is a perception on behalf of the viewer examining a
photograph that involves (perhaps) the viewer’s memory or a visual detail within the
composition that causes the subject to experience concern or connectedness to the image.
That feeling may range from deep care to distress. Barthes’ theory of the punctum especially
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carries import for my argument of thinking love with art in the way it holds “a power of
expansion.”72 The rupture is just such an extension or expansion of the self to ideas and
questions kindled by the artwork and the artist. By way of example, I think of the
photographs taken of people tumbling to their death from the World Trade Center Towers on
September 11, 2001 in New York City. The Falling Man [Figure 0.5] by Richard Drew,73
which captures the last moment of an anonymous living being, is overwhelming to me; he
went to work one unremarkable day and perished in a most extraordinary and unimaginable
way.
The image consists of a male figure with arms at his sides and a bent left leg,
headfirst in mid-fall in front of the tremendous structure that was the North Tower. The
façade of the skyscraper completely fills the background of the photograph. He is located at
the top half and center of the composition; this focal point lends an eerie sense of
weightlessness to his form, which is miniscule compared to the epic scale of the 110 story
tower. Another contrast is that he is in color and the building in grayscale; an orange tee shirt
under a jacket startles by hinting at the everydayness of choosing what to wear in dressing to
go to work. The falling man is the punctum in the photograph.
The image provokes questions for me: Did he make the decision to jump or was he
blown out by force? If he jumped, how was it that leaping from the tower seemed the better
option for his inescapable extinction? I consider myself in his place—what would I do? What
would my last thoughts be if this were I? I care about him at the same time his predicament
shocks and distresses me. This feeling is the punctum, a perforation of my armored heart; a
hole is made that lets the art in. Although dead for fifteen years now, the photograph freezes
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this man as perpetually alive, thinking and breathing in the measure of utter finitude. The
image makes the past present.
I think about myself at the same time I think about the falling man; in this way my
subjectivity is decentered. Nancy asserts that if thinking is confronted, then it is because it
holds meaning.74 The photograph expands my sober contemplation of impossible choices and
unknown fates. My grief becomes a thinking-with love that decenters me to consider and
question the unnamed other, the other that like me is always vulnerable to another’s actions.
Love arrives amidst the subsequent questions and thoughts in the rupture. Experienced by the
viewer in response to an artwork, the rupture has many of the qualities of Barthes’ punctum,
foremost the expansion of the self. Love arrives: feeling (shock, dismay, concern, affection,
etc.) crosses with thinking, to question everything in art.
The plus of love
The punctum in a work of art presents the viewer with a kind of emotional rupture,
which has a decentering effect. I cannot claim to love the photograph, or the photographer, or
the falling man. Yet I love. The artwork stirs up thoughts I otherwise would not have
contemplated. Thinking activates or animates an artwork, which subsequently unsettles the
viewer who may remember and reflect on it after seeing it and spending time with it. Barthes
mentions an important point about this relationship, “…It is an addition: it is what I add to
the photograph and what is nonetheless already there.”75 This aspect of an addition, a
“beyond,”76 speaks to the notion that love engendered by art is never lacking, it is always
abundance, something new to contemplate.
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As mentioned, Drew’s Falling Man reminds us of the subject’s ontological
unpredictability. As part of a historical overview of various philosophical projects,
contemporary philosopher Marcus Steinweg refers to being’s capriciousness as chaos or
abyss since we are subjects without a god in the aftermath of Nietzschean philosophy.77 He
describes this godlessness as a “fundamental lack”78; however, this begs the question: how
does the subject lack something it never truly had? (This paper will not debate the existence
of a god or lack thereof since that argument enters the arena of faith; my topic is love.) At
any rate an authentic lack is a privation of something that existed at some point (not
necessarily from a psychoanalytic point of view), or something intentionally removed from
its grasp. For example, in the former, a biological female does not have a lack because she
does not have a penis, since she is not physiologically designed to have one. As for the latter:
if a person is paid less of a salary because of gender or race-based discrimination, she has a
true lack of income. All else is a perceived or imagined lack, which is arguably not an
insufficiency at all.79
***
I love you.
But the words of love, as is well known, sparsely, miserably repeat their one
declaration, which is always the same, always already suspected of lacking love
because it declares it.80
While Nancy reasonably critiques this well-worn utterance of the subject, he offers no
alternative.
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Luce Irigaray’s re-phrasing of “I love you” is “I love to you.”81 The more common
claim or statement “I love you” is either a declaration or a reply to a question or need;
whereas “I love to you” belies the wholesome recognition of alterity. This affirmation of
otherness is also an expansion of the self. Additionally “I love to you” emphasizes love as
active as opposed to passive, as action as opposed to merely feeling. Irigaray explains, “‘I
love to you’ is an unusual turn of phrase compared with ‘I love you’ but is more respectful of
the two: I love to who you are, to what you do, without reducing you to an object of my
love.”82
Thinking love is being in relation-with an artwork and the artist that created it. The
work of art as I am framing it concerns a “listening-to” 83 by the viewer in order to stage this
relation with love. The artwork and viewer enter into a wordless dialogue, as described in the
to and fro in the movement of thinking. The artist is likely to imbue the work with meaning,
even if this meaning is esoteric; the viewer’s response to it will generate other meanings by
way of thinking. The artwork and the artist relay the idea of “I love to you” which does not
contain a lack in terms of the viewer as in need of love.
Thinking: of Love
In “Shattered Love” Nancy titles the first part of his essay “Thinking: of Love.” Yet
should we be thinking: of love or thinking love? His use of the colon indicates the idea of
“therefore” or “that is”, i.e., thinking (that is) love. The title is apt to his project: to have us
consider the myriad and heterogenetic possibilities of love, including the potentialities that
would seem adverse to love as we conventionally think of it.
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Love deflowers and is itself deflowered by its very essence, and its unrestrained and
brazen exploitation in all the genres of speech or of art is perhaps an integral part of
that essence—a part at once secret and boisterous, miserable and sumptuous. But this
reticence might signal that all, of love, is possible and necessary, that all the loves
impossible are in fact the possibilities of love, its voices or its characteristics, which
are possible to confuse and yet ineluctably entangled: charity and pleasure, emotion
and pornography, the neighbor and the infant, the love of lovers and the love of God,
fraternal love and the love of art, the kiss, passion, friendship…84
Nancy’s reframing of love is an extraordinary postmodern proposition. “Thinking: of love” is
open-ended, at once marvelous and a mess.
I have edited Nancy’s phrasing and punctuation of “Thinking: of Love” to reflect an
alternative yet sympathetic idea, that of the straightforward “thinking love.” To strike out the
preposition “of” along with the colon negates the possessive relationship between the verb
“thinking” and the noun “love.” Instead, it creates a fluid linking of verb and noun. Or, the
words might be read as two verbs, as in “I love to you” (the word “to” is an infinitive, the
basic form of a verb sans tense.) Either way “thinking love” continues to situate love as
contemplation and action as Nancy does, but thinking love is acting upon love, or even the
act of loving itself. And, as established earlier, thinking is the action of questioning, which,
like Nancy’s project, offers possibilities without certainty for answers that come to light. So
it is with love in its relation to art: thinking love is to privilege possibility over truth since to
trust a truth discourages inquiry.
***
The following chapters analyze works of art made within the last fifty years, which
serve to illustrate my thesis of thinking love. In addition to recent artworks, I reference a
limited selection of earlier works in history that are relevant to my argument. My choice of
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images aims to represent a wide spectrum of possibilities for thinking love with emphasis on
art that reaches for a limit of some kind. Along with illustrations, each chapter highlights a
key concept for thinking love in art and draws upon numerous thinkers whose philosophies
contribute—or in some way relate—to my argument.
Love is a starting point. Outside of religious law, what are the origins of possibility
for love? Chapter One (“Origins of Possibility”) surveys some of the derivations of what we
think of as conventional love. What are the mythical, physiological, psychoanalytical and
philosophical starting points of love? How do they concern a theory of love in art? The first
section of this chapter takes on (1) the role of myth, (2) Roland Barthes’ image-repertoire and
(3) Jacques Lacan’s notion of the split at birth in the formation of a sexed subject.
Myth is an influential source of how a society understands notions of love. In
Symposium, Aristophanes’ offers a story of the mythological origin of human beings in
which they are split in two as punishment by the gods. As a result humans are in a desperate
search for their “better half.” This story is an example of a notion contained in the imagerepertoire, described by Barthes as a transhistorical depository of ideas a culture has about
love such as creation stories and fairytales. Lacan also describes the split of the psyche that
occurs when a subject is born. In this moment the child is marked as a sexed individual. The
notion of what I refer to as “primordial breakups” factor into the origins of love.
How does a theory of love in art stand in relation to science and established
philosophies? In contrast to myth, I offer a short examination of brain research that deploys
current technologies to determine a physiological ground of love for the embodied subject
and reflect on Hegel’s and Levinas’ ideas regarding self-consciousness, recognition and the
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relationship to the other. The final section of Chapter One interprets Lacan’s
psychoanalytical theory of the mirror stage (a second formational split of the subject) as well
as Heidegger’s notion of anxiety with regard to the representation of the body. The radical
practices of body art performance demonstrated in artworks by Mickelene Thomas, Annie
Sprinkle, Deborah de Robertis and VALIE EXPORT place a strong psychological demand
on the viewer and incite what I call an aesthetic of anxiety. For Heidegger, anxiety as mood
discloses what it means to exist. This part of the chapter considers how these artists express
care and concern in a particular way for what it means to be human, reflecting how artists’
actions and intent are demonstrative of love in art.
The act of thinking and questioning is the bedrock of thinking love in art. Chapter
Two commences with an explanation of the theoretical “between” –the intermedius—as a
time-space in which thinking about a work of art occurs when the viewer is willfully
engaged. Where does my notion of the between originate? Diotima’s speeches in the
Symposium offer an elaborate description of love; in numerous sections she describes a
middle ground position that is not fixed and always moving. By examining a short fictional
film that tells the story of an ill-fated friendship, titled five deep breaths (directed by Seith
Mann in 2003), I explain how the between functions for love in art as well as how it diverges
from Aristotle’s notion of philia.
Much of how we define and regard general ideas of love today comes from the oldest
recorded religious laws. How do these earliest God-given mandates relate to the love found
in a work of art? The second section of Chapter Two reflects on Doris Salcedo’s vast
installation in the Tate Modern titled Shibboleth in 2007. This work is coded with meaning in
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terms of the other regarded as outsider—the opposite of friendship; it recalls the archaic
divine law to love your neighbor and the Christian concept of agape. By reviewing a few
examples of early scripture as well as Freud’s atheistic psychoanalytical position on love in
Western civilization, I clarify how love in art deviates from preexisting paradigms.
How is wonder important to a theory of love in art? Returning to the theme of myth in
Chapter Three, I emphasize wonder and thinking as keys to love in art. The first section of
the chapter looks at the intersection of art and myth by considering Nancy’s explanation of
myth and two contemporary artists who deploy singular approaches to manifesting wonder in
their work: Mariko Mori’s site specific Primal Rhythm in Japan (2011) that draws upon
ancient mythology and Wangechi Mutu’s mythopoeic collages that anticipate a future of
freedom through technology. Thinkers Haraway and Bakhtin contribute to the consideration
of their artworks.
What is the relationship an artist has with their art? Is this liaison also a manifestation
of love in art—of wonder? The second half of the chapter switches from the perspective of
the viewer to that of the artist. The practice of celebrated painter Kay Walkingstick is
contrasted with virtually unknown photographer Vivian Maier. While different in trajectory,
each artist’s work points to a critical intersection of life and art in their practice and imagery.
Bakhtin’s theory of “art for life’s sake” in concert with his assertion of answerability both
concern the response of self to other—another marker of thinking love in art. Arendt’s
explication of thinking via Plato is discussed along with Heidegger’s concept of poiēsis—the
collaborative and care-full becoming of art—are further addressed in terms of how artists
may think love in a work of art.
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Chapter Four’s heading “indefinite openness”—also part of the title of this
dissertation—refers to Judith Butler’s notion of how love is characterized by its property of
unfinalizability.85 In other words, while a performance or an interaction with a work of art
ends, its effect on the artist and viewer remains open-ended. This chapter unpacks a number
of works from the oeuvre of performance artist Marina Abramović. Her work fosters a direct
relationship with the viewer in real time. If love in art is indefinitely open, what is the limit
for an artist and a viewer in a live performance? The first section of the chapter takes a close
look at her unprecedented performance at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 2010
as a direct artist-to-viewer manifestation of love in art. The use of Abramović’s body to
extremes in her work often results in pain; in the second section I consider how an aesthetic
of pain factors into thinking love. Next, I contemplate the discursive inter-subjective
engagement vital to a loving relationship between artist-performer and viewer with a focus
on the face-to-face encounter. Finally, the bodily risk taken by Abramović in an early career
performance, Rhythm 0 (1974) is discussed in terms of reaching for a limit in risky and
spontaneous audience collaboration.
Titled “pure knowing,” the final and fifth chapter starts with the notion of an aesthetic
of joy. This phrase derives from Schopenhauer’s argument of how a work of art has the
potential to liberate the subject’s will evoking an extreme kind of experience. What does the
feeling of delight in art offer beyond enjoyment? This chapter commences with Stendhal’s
nineteenth century account of embodied ecstasy in seeing the great art of Florence. My
discussion includes ideas of embodiment and consciousness in the thinking of MerleauPonty.
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Greek erôs, as a manner of love based in desire, remains a widely considered
manifestation of love. Does erôs shape a theory of thinking love in art? How does a
representation of the nude body factor into thinking love? How does shame factor in to
images of nudity? The second section of Chapter Five considers the representation of the
nude body and includes the iconic couple John Lennon and Yoko Ono who deployed their
bodies in late twentieth century political protests. I then consider the Samoan artist Shigeyuki
Kihara’s gender-bending otherness in In the Manner of a Woman (2005). S/he uses he/r body
through a postcolonial lens in order to create images that address the rupture of gender
performance set off by Western missionaries in he/r South Pacific culture. I then review the
collaboration of Breyer P-Orridge, a project in which a married couple took radical actions
for a committed partnership; they throw into question prescribed gender roles and rethink the
representation of the body through surgeries. To address problems that come up with these
works of art I call upon the thinking of Merleau-Ponty, Nietzsche, Butler, Foucault and
others.
The third section of Chapter Five reflects on the phenomenon of artworks that
represent painful self-disclosure on behalf the artist. Multi-media artists Tracey Emin and
Louise Bourgeois create artworks that contain an aesthetic of confession. Emin’s installation
My Bed (1990) was the actual furniture used in an experience of heartbreak and Bourgeois’
sculptures express memories of her childhood; both artworks are poignantly representative of
intimate experiences. How does the autobiographical nature of an artwork figure into
thinking love in art?
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What are the choices for action the subject has in dealing with life’s gritty challenges?
In what way does the artist’s sharing of private experiences contribute to thinking love in art?
In the last part of Chapter Five I look carefully at a video by Emin titled Why I Never Became
a Dancer (1995). This work is confessional yet also asserts an affirmation of life—what
Nietzsche calls the will to power. I stress that love in art is at the same time an act of love.
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Figure 1.0 Primordial androgyny on Greek vase (2400 BCE) Image: eden- saga.com

Chapter One
Origins of Possibility
Where and when does love begin? This chapter counts some of the ways—possible
and impossible origins of love that are mythical, physiological, psychoanalytical, and
philosophical. We tend to think of love as comforting, just as we are likely to count on love
with its consolations. While love blooms it is measured, weighed and analyzed; when it dies
or abandons us we do the same. Love counts and it is of consequence. Emmanuel Levinas
asserts, “Love is originary”86—it is the starting point, profoundly bound to our roots as
human beings.87 What are the origins of possibility for love? And do these beginnings
substantiate a claim for love in art?
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In the first section of this chapter called “primordial breakups” I will take stock of the
mythical story of primal beings as told by Aristophanes in Symposium. In these narratives we
also grasp the beginnings of what Barthes calls the “image repertoire” which may be
described as a transhistorical warehouse of ideas a culture has about love. Symposium (as an
example of the image repertoire) resonates over two millennia later in how love is realized as
the search for a perfect partner, which is understood in the idiom one’s “better half.”
Something halved was once whole and in creation stories there often is the idea of a split.
The notion of an immanent fragmentation continues in concepts concerning the origin of the
human psyche.
The split is an important theory in the psychoanalytical perspective of Jacques Lacan
in the twentieth century. For Lacan it begins at the instant of human birth as the formation of
a sexed subject. What was before and what do we leave behind in that experience? A second
division occurs as a baby sees itself in the mirror for the first time. In this pivotal moment the
child recognizes the self as separate from the others that love him. What is the consequence
for this split in terms of love and love in art?
How does a theory of love in art stand with science and established philosophies? In
the second section titled “cerebral affairs” I consider the hard-wired physiology of the human
brain as a contrast to chimerical myths. What does twenty-first century science reveal about
love? Are science and psychoanalytical theory able to cohabitate? How does our embodiment
inflect our ideas and performances of love? The explanation of brain physiology raises even
more questions when considered in distinction to certain philosophical thought. Subsequently
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I briefly reflect on Hegel’s and Levinas’ ideas regarding self-consciousness, recognition and
the relationship to the other. Artists often address these ideas in their work.
Does love originate in the self or in self-reflection? In the third part of this chapter I
unpack a number of works of art by returning to Lacan’s theory of the split with elaboration
on the mirror stage. Titled “aesthetics of anxiety,” the artworks arise from a particular
standpoint of identity formation. The artists have deployed their bodies as subject matter in
unprecedented and transgressive ways—means that bring about a particular kind of anxiety
addressed by Heidegger. How do these artists express love in their work? What is the role of
anxiety in art and love? What consequences are at stake in conveying that love? How do their
viewers experience love in an encounter with the performing body or the art object?
My intention in this chapter is that by taking into account some of love’s origins of
possibility, we will begin to ask more questions about love in art. As C.D.C. Reeve points
out, the Greek noun erôs and Greek verb erôtan (to ask questions) are etymologically
linked.88
Primordial break ups
What are the origins of possibility in considering the overarching ideas and
definitions of love that continue to hold fast in the twenty-first century? Roland Barthes uses
the term “image-repertoire”89 as a theory of how subjects in their experience of love draw
upon a collective storehouse of representations. This depository of non-hierarchical cultural
representations has no beginning or end; its wide range include myths, fairytales, texts,
images, rumors or advice as well as personal experience. The image-repertoire is also a
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language structure that serves conscious and unconscious references and concocts individual
love stories by reconciling feelings and actions of love. Another way of saying this is that the
image-repertoire mediates all knowledge and experiences of love for the subject; it is –as
Barthes calls it—the lover’s discourse. Dominic Pettman writes, “Henceforth, the lover is at
the mercy of the code’s signifying system, and all subsequent emotional welfare is conducted
under the metasign of mediation itself.”90
Pettman takes Barthes’ trope of the image-repertoire and further deploys it as a
code.91 He compares it to a computer system that is designed to run a particular program; in
the case of the image-repertoire the code is love. Pettman identifies Plato’s Symposium92 (375
– 370 BCE) as one of the earliest programmers of the image-repertoire. Therefore
Symposium seems like a good place to start to begin to understand (and question) how it
relates to theories of love in art.
To briefly summarize what happens in the text, Symposium explores the topic of love
by way of a series of speeches and dialogue between Socrates and six of his male friends93
who are attending a drinking party in Athens hosted by Agathon, a tragedian. The intention
for the party is to celebrate Agathon’s success in a drama writing competition. Of note, the
dialogue contains a lone female voice, Diotima,94 introduced by Socrates as his teacher. She
is not an actual party guest who is present but “speaks” of love by way of Socrates.
(Diotima’s speech is reviewed more closely in the next chapter.)
The most fantastical oration in Symposium, and the one that relates a story of origin,
is delivered by Aristophanes, a comic playwright. He begins by noting that “Human
Nature”95 was originally a very different configuration. As he tells it: at the outset of time
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human beings were formed as three sexes: female, male and female-male (what he calls
androgynous). Each individual was shaped spherically96 (like a planet) possessing two heads
atop round necks, with four arms, four legs and two sets of genitalia all facing in opposite
directions. [Figure 1.0] They worshipped and made ritual offerings to the gods, but often
joined forces to attack them as they had an ability to move very fast in a spinning cartwheel
motion. These offensives incensed the gods. Yet since they found humans useful due to their
dedicated sacrifices, destroying them was not an option. Zeus—the king of the Greek gods at
Mount Olympus—conceived of the idea to split them in half in the manner of an egg in order
to permanently handicap their physical speed. After slicing them he instructed Apollo (son of
Zeus) to twist their heads around toward the cut half as a reminder of their punishment.
Apollo then covered their wound by stretching their skin and twisting it at what we now
locate as our navel.
Humans subsequently went about seeking to reunite with their other halves, and upon
finding each other held on in desperation, trying to fit together as they once had, yet
eventually they began to die of hunger and hopelessness in the futility of their efforts.
Concerned about their dwindling numbers, Zeus reconsidered his design and moved the
genitalia in the same direction as the face—to the front of the body. With this new
configuration, humans began to copulate and in the case of opposite-sex couples, reproduce.
This assured the gods of an ongoing reverent human population. Plato writes in the voice of
Aristophanes,
This, then, is the source of our desire to love each other. Love is born into every
human being; it calls back the halves of our original nature together; it tries to make
one out of the two and heal the world of human nature.97
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This primeval mythos justifies the origin of the subject’s enduring desire for wholeness, since
the gods never revoked the original rupture of their perfect completeness.
It is remarkable to note that Aristophanes’ myth has a parallel in the prelapsarian tale
of Adam and Eve, figures comprising the creation story in the Abrahamic religions of
Judaism, Christianity and Islam.98 Christians view this creation story of the Fall of Man as
resulting in Original Sin, passed on to all subsequent humans at their birth.99 In their
banishment from Paradise, the search for love (we may presume love was originally assured
by immanence) comes about as a punishment for bad behavior and now is an irretrievable
loss. Within Masaccio’s early Renaissance painting, the couple is notable for their anguished
expressions at their betrayal of God, of knowing human sorrow for the first time. [Figure 5.4]
Like Aristophanes’ roundlings, they suffer an irrevocable loss.
Jacques Lacan remarks upon the tale of Aristophanes and the primordial split to argue
that what is vanished is the originary part of the self.100 What he means is that as fetus prior
to birth we are in a state of suspended immortality—that is, we are not quite human, we are
not yet acculturated, sexed creatures fated—or driven—to sexually reproduce. Through birth
we are transported from this Real into the registers of experience he calls the Symbolic and
Imaginary realms.101 In this way desire is based in the forever loss of nascent self. From a
psychoanalytical perspective, Lacan considers this forfeiture the “real lack.”102 Lacan does
not mention Adam and Eve, but it seems an argument could be made that they also existed in
this “real” state of paradisiacal completeness before being ejected and forced to be fully
human and impelled by desires and drives.103
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In both the creationary stories of Adam and Eve and Aristophanes, desire is born in
wrongdoing; human beings broke god-made rules. Subjects are consequently in a position to
always wanting something they do not have. As a result love hinges on the meeting of certain
requirements. For followers of the Abrahamic God it is redemption through baptism and
faith;104 for the ancient Greeks, as told by Diotima, the demand is for goodness that is
achieved through human actions designed for immortality.105 What she proposes is that since
subjects are not deathless like the gods, they must eternally reproduce. This is done either
physically—such as having children—or via the psyche, what Diotima refers to as “pregnant
in soul.”106 Importantly, this includes acts of goodness, learning, and the creative acts of
humans. In this way she suggests that artworks (as acts of immortality and reproduction) are
generators of love on behalf of artists.
I add to this idea that viewers have an opportunity to locate love in works of art;
however, this space is not a site of desire or a drive, or space of deficit or retribution, but a
place of thriving, for thinking about the work and contemplating questions it raises. With art
there is always erôtan (to ask questions), not necessarily erôs (to desire in love.)
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Cerebral affairs
Although Lacan’s psychoanalytic theories are based on those
of Sigmund Freud107 he staked his own claims. Freud held
science in high regard because it called into question religious
beliefs; he was interested in the biological and its intersection
with psychoanalysis.108 Whereas Lacan was adamant that
science obfuscates the primacy of the Symbolic in the

Figure 1.1. Illustration of the
triune brain. Image:
theneuroethicsblog.com

subject’s life. Also, science asserts itself as a truth, which is
never stable. Throughout The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Lacan
repeatedly poses the question of whether psychoanalysis is a science. He seems to dance
around a rock solid answer, and at one-point mentions that obscurity is a property of
psychoanalysis,109 but he does make a distinction in methodologies,
…I am a bit suspicious of the term research. Personally, I have never regarded myself
as a researcher. As Picasso once said, to the shocked surprise of those around him—I
do not seek I find.110

Taking stock of love in art I want to consider multiple avenues for origins of possibility. For
the artist it is a matter of seeking and finding and seeking again. Therefore, my argument
includes a survey of current research in physiology with the further understanding that this is
not the be-all-end-all of how things are. The ground is always shifting.
In opposition to the impassioned primordial breakup narratives of Adam and Eve and
Aristophanes’ originary humans described earlier, contemporary research indicates that what
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we call love originates in the body as a disinterested biological drive. Brain studies carried
out in the twenty-first century via technology indicate that the hardwiring of love is a
physiological need like thirst and hunger. But for most of Western history, there was no
substantiated knowledge about the physiology of emotion. The Greek physician
Hippocrates111 seems to be the first to surmise that human emotion is somehow linked to the
organ of the brain. He writes,
Men ought to know that from nothing else but the brain come joys, delights, laughter
and sports, and sorrows, griefs, despondency, and lamentations. …And by the same
organ we become mad and delirious, and fears and terrors assail us, some by night,
and some by day, and dreams and untimely wanderings, and cares that are not
suitable, and ignorance of present circumstances, desuetude, and unskillfulness. All
these things we endure from the brain...112

Hippocrates situates the brain as a site of all emotional feelings on the spectrum of human
life. Ironically, the brain itself does not “feel” anything. There are no pain receptors in the
brain, in spite of the fact there are a hundred thousand miles of blood vessels traversing its
tissue. Yet Hippocrates did not have the technology to substantiate his theory, so the
exploration of love was left to creative expressions such as painting and poetry—as well as
philosophical reflections—for twenty-five hundred years.113
In the late 20th century the intangible became tangible with the discovery of the VTA
and the role of the caudate nucleus114 located deep in the brain. VTA is the term used in
reference to the ventral tegmental area, a tiny cluster of neurons (individual cells of the
nervous system), which secrete the chemical dopamine that is related to the euphoric feelings
of love. The caudate nucleus is a C-shaped area located near the reptilian brain. It is the area
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of the brain that directs movements of the body and is part of the brain’s “reward system.”
While the anatomical “heart” is most referenced in the image-repertoire utterances of love,
(for example: “She broke my heart” and “He makes my heart beat faster”) the brain is
considered the material home of this ineffable power. Love becomes astonishingly corporeal
if we have a basic understanding of its bodily home—our brain. The following generalized
and abbreviated overview helps us to understand the brain’s important architecture, its
physiologic functions and its genealogy.
The human brain reached its current modern evolutionary state about 35,000 years
ago.115 An average adult brain weighs about three pounds, is roughly the size of a grapefruit,
and is considered triune: it has three major layers all of which may play a part in the
evolution of the human species.116 [Figure 1.1] These parts do not act independently of one
another but are interactive via neural pathways that transport neurons, which are chemical
and electrical signals called neurotransmitters. The deepest and most ancient is the reptilian
brain (also known as R-complex)117 responsible for producing neurons that control the lifesustaining respiratory (breathing), cardiac (heartbeat) and digestive processes. This most
primeval part of the brain is perched at the top of the spinal cord where nerve trails link to
lower body vital organs and nestle at the base of the other two brain systems. Its role is
essential for survival and defense mechanisms such as “fight or flight” but it does not play a
part in emotional life.118 It does however contain the “primordial seeds of emotional
responsiveness.”119
Hippocrates would be satisfied to know that the next section of the brain gives rise to
myriad emotions such as love, joy, abjection and hatred. This is the limbic system—also
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associated with memory and cognition. The limbic brain is actually a set of structures that
cover the reptilian core. Its presence is the long-term result of the evolution of lizards
(currently understood as essentially non-emotional creatures) into early mammals. The
limbic brain is well developed in all mammals.120 Mammalian emotions are generated in the
limbic brain by electric and chemical upheavals provoked by responses to the external world,
in addition to memories of past events. Is that person I am passing on the street friendly or
hostile, flirty or aggressive? By collecting and sifting through rapid-fire sensory information,
the limbic brain manifests an instantaneous reaction to the external world that includes the
evaluation of the other.121
***
There are interesting juxtapositions here in terms of the philosophical positions of
Hegel and Levinas in light of how the limbic brain function assesses the other. Hegel
proposed the model of the “master-slave” dialectic in order to determine the necessary
overcoming of inequality between people. While not perfectly intelligible, Hegel’s dialectic
also seems to address the process of man’s control over living in the world via the
development of self-consciousness. He sets up the analogy of two individuals meeting for the
first time in human history: a master (or lord) representing independent self-consciousness,
and a slave (or bondsman) representing dependent self-consciousness. A fight begins in
which the master chooses to risk his life in order to achieve recognition. This struggle
initiates the movement of self-consciousness emerging through the desire for recognition of
another self-consciousness. Both must survive the fight in order to maintain selfconsciousness, because individuals are dependent on each other for recognition of the other,
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but the slave as “loser” of this confrontation becomes subordinate to the master. Now the
slave must work for the master, but his toil eventually provides the slave with enough power
to end his state of bondage since the master becomes dependent on the slave’s production of
labor. Hegel’s master-slave dialectic addresses the process of the subject’s control over living
in a world of otherness; this idea of command is to have knowledge of the world as well as
an understanding of the self as living in and comprehending it. This is to some extent
congruent with the functioning of the limbic brain, which physiologically underlies our
constant estimation of otherness.
Conversely, Levinas’ notion of the other’s face is antithetical to Hegel; he argues the
a priori lack of control in the subject’s immanent world of alterity. Levinas asserts that when
we come face-to-face with another subject we are ethically accountable for them in every
way, and this relationship is not symmetrical because the other is our master. Levinas states,
“The face is the very identity of a being; it manifests itself in it in terms of itself, without
concept.”122 For Levinas the face is understood as the impermanence of another human
being.123 He shifts the Hegelian idea of being-in-the-world as not about power or control, but
being as responsibility, passivity and obligation to the other. Levinas does not see love as a
factor. In fact, he expresses distaste for the word “love”124 preferring the action of
responsibility. This is because Levinas sees love as too narrow; it occurs between two people
to the exclusion of others; in that regard it is hierarchical. He states, “The morality of respect
presupposes the morality of love.”125 Since the limbic brain is the seat of emotions, it also
serves to negotiate the other in terms of empathy—to understand what others feel. Empathy
is a form of understanding, a moral emotion that occurs in a relationship of respect for how
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the other feels. Levinas states, “Respect is a relationship between equals. Justice assumes that
original equality. Love, essentially is established between unequals, lives from equality.”126
Thinking back for a moment to the tale of Aristophanes (and Levinas’ ethics of the
face) we recall the mandate of Zeus to Apollo to arrange the heads of the split androgynes
towards their cut side. This is a defining moment. Not only would they be able to see their
punishment but were henceforth also face-to-face for the first time. Barthes’ notes it was this
point that the beings would now, “Understand [their] madness.”127 He asks, “To
understand—is that not to divide the image, to undo the I, the proud organ of
misapprehension?”128 The “I” is split, divided, undone in an irretrievable act. Now they
attempt to understand each other, which is an ethical action of acknowledging the “we” of
being.
Love as I have defined it, specifically as it occurs in art, is not necessarily dependent
on empathy, struggle, hierarchy or equivalence. Love in art has myriad possibilities that
include the major component of connection manifested through questioning as opposed to
veneration or respect. It is not a hierarchical relationship as it is in Hegel’s model of the
master-slave.
Is our current twenty-first century knowledge of the brain described earlier applicable
to our understanding of philosophies of Hegel, Levinas and others? I suggest that as
embodied subjects who think, whatever we are able to discern about the physiology of the
body should not be discounted in an ongoing philosophical discourse. Unprecedented
contemporary developments of technology allow us insights and knowledge about our
embodied selves. It is assured that this particular knowledge will change in the future.
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Philosophy, which etymologically arises from the Greek for love of wisdom, should not
overlook opportunities to learn all we can, to consider all possibilities for the conditions of
being.
***
Finally, the limbic system mediates the information between the reptilian brain and
the neo-cortex (or cortex), which is the latest and largest element of the human brain in terms
of evolutionary sequencing. It is situated under our cranial (skull) bones directly over the
limbic system and consists of four lobes.129 It plays a role in the senses of hearing and sight,
reasoning, speaking (that is to say the symbolic area of linguistics), motor control and
coordination as well as abilities such as art and mathematics. With regard to the feelings of
love, the cortex is responsible for the thinking of love that originates in the limbic.130 The
emotions of the limbic brain and thoughts come together in this area. The two language
centers are on the left side; one permits us to understand the significance of what is being
heard and the other prompts the articulation of a verbal response.131 On the right side of the
cortex are “mirror centers” that do the same thing for the emotional content of speech. One
permits the recognition and understanding of the emotional essence of speech—such as
tenderness or sarcasm—and the other to convey it by way of the tone and inflection of the
voice. So while the limbic brain generates the feelings of love, the cortex endows us with the
ability to communicate it positively in the most efficacious way possible to our babies, lovers
and friends.
As humans we share the common denominator of needing to express love as an
operation of survival. In the twenty-first century, a scientific claim is staked that love is a
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hardwired physiological phenomenon. The brain plays a role in how artists express what is
called love in their work and that viewers connect with artworks in ways that feel like love as
commanded by areas of the brain. On the other hand, with psychoanalysis, love sits outside
of physiology whereby an artwork is a manifestation of an artist/viewer’s psyche, an
unacknowledged desire that may be uncovered in analysis. In Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory,
a work of art serves as an act of sublimation: a deep unconscious desire transformed into
cultural representation.132 Levine asserts, “We want the work of art to confirm us in the
wished-for unity of our being, we want the work of art to appear to want us to be its ideal
viewer.”133 Alternatively love in art stakes no absolute claim. I define this love as not
exclusively or necessarily rooted in physiology, philosophy or psyche. It is always in the
between: the physical and the psyche, the artist and the artwork, the artist and the viewer, the
viewer and the artwork. It is a changeable and ephemeral movement not fixed in any place or
concept.
Aesthetics of anxiety
Does love originate in the self?
The arts and other genres have a running discourse about love and sometimes, a
correspondence of ideas becomes apparent. For example, Aristophanes’ legend of a
primordial split in the subject finds a parallel in the twentieth century psychoanalytical
school of thought of Lacan. He asserted a sense of identity for the subject is not innate; in
fact identity of the self is an illusionistic formation.
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By way of an abridged explanation: the reflection seen in a mirror creates the original
sense of self. As a baby (before the age of six to eighteen months) the subject cannot
distinguish itself from others. Within that early age span, it discovers delight in recognizing
itself in the mirror as a unified whole, a separate individual from its mother and other
admiring subjects. Lacan refers to this revelation as the “mirror stage” and is analogous to
Freud’s establishing of the subject’s ego, the “I” of the self.134 Yet this occurrence of the
mirror stage (what Lacan calls the Imaginary dimension of experience) is at the same time
misrecognition because of a split that
happens when the self is reflected back to
the subject. (Lacan uses S as the signifier
of this split.) This fracture is the conscious
and unconscious components of the
subject: the former as the awareness of
the self and body and the latter as the
drives and instincts that function
Figure 1.2. Mickalene Thomas, Origin of the Universe I
(20), mixed media on canvas. Image: brooklynrail.org

subliminally.

In other words how we appear in the mirror is not all of who we actually are. Kaja
Silverman notes, “And because the subject’s identity will continue to be propped upon
external images, its battle-to-the-death with its own mirror image is only the first installment
in a life-long war between itself and everything else.”135 The self we see is the Imaginary
other, the ideal ego.
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An example of a contemporary work of
art that confronts an aspect of the mirror stage is
Mickalene Thomas’136 painting Origin of the
Universe I. [Figure 1.2] It is a large painting of
the artist’s own nude mid-to-lower torso, legs
spread, crotch exposed and pubic hair rendered
with glittering rhinestones. To create the work

Figure 1.3. Gustave Courbet, L’Origine du monde
(1866), oil on canvas, 18” x 22”. Image: Wikipedia

she used a photograph to capture her mirror
reflection. In other words, the camera acts as her modern looking glass. The pose is a
calculated appropriation of Gustav Courbet’s137 controversial nineteenth century oil painting
of a woman’s pudendum titled L’Origine du monde138 (Origin of the World) [Figure 1.3]—a
painting that Lacan owned—now in the collection of the Musée D’Orsay.
Both paintings engage the double gaze of artist and viewer. Courbet directly observed
his model to render the image and he did not deviate from its essential perceptual
representation. In this way the painting’s content becomes the obvious act of the male gaze139
upon the (anonymous) female sex, loaded with implications for the artist and viewers in
terms of an asymmetry of gender that emerges in patriarchal power. Courbet’s painting arises
from a long tradition of male artists and their exploitation of the female body. In an art
historical context, what is radically different about this work is Courbet’s “full frontal”
emphasis on the female genitalia. Thomas remarks that she reclaims the pose using her own
body in her painting. She states,
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The mirror is a powerful tool because it forces you to deal with yourself on a deeper
level. Conceptually, paintings are like mirrors. They are an expression from the artist:
This is how I view the world—I’m presenting it to you.140

The mirror/self portrait for Thomas is an affirmation of existence; it becomes a sort of origin
of the self as Lacan describes it for the baby’s experience. It is also an expansion of self and
as such is an expression of love on behalf of Thomas. Her title reflects this enlargement; she
increases the scope of “origin” in the title (The Origin of the Universe I) in comparison to
Courbet’s The Origin of the World. Her reach is mightier.
The reflection of identity in paint offers not only a self-definition, but also access to
“other.” To further consider the artist’s context, the prurient male gaze is not interesting to
Thomas who is lesbian; therefore, the female gaze for her audience (and herself) is of erotic
significance. Thomas overturns gender roles and assumptions; she invites all of us to be
voyeurs and thus levels the playing field. In an essay regarding female self-portraits Whitney
Chadwick writes,
…A belief in the visuality of feminine self-identification, and the power of the image
to mediate between art object and human subject, continues to endow the self-portrait
with its power to work on our imaginations.141

In affecting our imagination many questions arise: How does this image function in terms of
a singular female subjectivity? In what ways is femininity expressed in terms of “the
beautiful,” sexuality and the body? Within love in art, questions are formed in the imagining

52

and thinking manifest in the between. These serve as radical points of connection; these
(possible) connections are a condition of love in art.
In another interview Thomas elaborates further,
The mirror part comes from my reading about Lacan’s mirror stage and the sense of
validation and ego development that seeing your own reflection in a mirror provides.
I’m so interested in this idea of being seen and seeing yourself, and how that
relationship is developed. We all want to be validated and recognized in some way.
This also relates to the power of the gaze in my work. When I take a photograph, that
gaze is forcing the viewer to see my subjects—to recognize them.142

The painting of Thomas’ body in Origin of the Universe I is not intended as the body she
inhabits, but its ego ideal, an interior image that one strives for in order to meet a standard
imposed by society. This self-portrait—the Lacanian Imaginary—is more than what meets
the eye. It reveals elements of her Symbolic and Real being.
The focus of the painting is on Thomas’ genitals, one of the sources of embodied
pleasure for herself and her lover. Thomas admits taking on this particular pose was difficult
because she felt vulnerable.143 This plays out in the manner of how she represented pubic
hair, which is rendered opulent with rhinestones, an imitation of diamonds. Thomas states her
use of rhinestones alludes to indigenous art traditions and Haitian voodou art.144 In this work,
I also see their use as related to the glittering of stars in the night sky, perhaps alluding to the
largely
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unknown and unexplored visible universe. The effect in the painting is to create a textured,
iridescent effect of her genitalia, which is dramatic and sensual, inviting both gaze and touch.
Yet rhinestones are hard-edged objects; their use provides a subversive texture that indicates
other (possible) meanings. To kiss or fondle them would be a bit menacing. This
confounding representation of genitals in terms of touch recalls Meret Oppenheim’s145
famous surrealist Object, [Figure 1.4] which is a teacup, saucer and spoon covered in fur.
This work is much more puzzling in representation, yet like Thomas’s painting speaks of
desire, female sexuality and identity; however, in contrast to Origin of the Universe I uses the
tactic of indirection. Object employs domestic
mundane tea implements that are made
unfamiliar with a fur covering to provoke the
imagination and the unconscious. Anxiety in
the viewer is often aroused by the use of
subversive texture in design of an artwork. A
Figure 1.4. Meret Oppenheim, Object (1936), furcovered cup, saucer and spoon. Image: MoMA.org

cup (or vase) is generally read as a long-time
signified concept for the vagina, the spoon

denotes the phallic, and fur insinuates pubic hair. Like Object, The Origin of the Universe I is
not what it seems and we cannot be sure what it means. A fur-lined tea set is as irrational as a
rhinestone mons.
Since we are not certain what Thomas’ painting denotes in the manner of its
appropriation, design and media it may incite many questions for the viewer. Note that while
I offer the reader information Thomas provides in terms of making and thinking about the
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work, generally when a viewer encounters an artwork in a gallery or museum, they do not
have such facts and quotes at hand. It may be argued that this is a more ideal situation in
which to view an artwork (as “unadulterated” experience) or that having such data provides a
fuller understanding. I am not convinced that having knowledge about the artist’s process,
choice of materials and inspiration inhibits questions on behalf of the viewer; perhaps it
generates more of them. Even with the facts questions remain abundant. With or without, it
does not affect the potential for love in art.
The Origin of the Universe I makes a strong psychological demand for the viewer
because of the artwork’s conflicting nature. The willing viewer enjoins the work to think
about it. While the image is the body, the subject is love, particularly love of erotic self. How
is it to photograph and paint the self in such an exposed position? I stated earlier that love in
art opens immeasurable possibilities for what the viewer can feel or know. Love also
encompasses inestimable potentials for what the artist can experience or understand.
Thomas deliberately took a calculated risk as evidenced by her feelings of vulnerability in
producing the work. In light of this she may have experienced the punctum as the prick of
feelings, an immeasurable dread of the unknown of what may happen in the aftermath of her
gamble with exposure.
Thomas approached a personal limit—not without reservation, and without assurance
she would not fail. From the psychoanalytical perspective the painting addresses loss, yet it
can also be said that Thomas finds something else in terms of expanding herself. She
validates herself and perhaps hopes the viewer will too, although not necessarily; should the
viewer support her it would only be a further expansion. The Origin of the Universe I is a
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metaphysical work in that (in the manner of Oppenheim and unlike Courbet) Thomas
oversteps the truth of visual perception to reveal other ideas. Thomas’ work discards notions
of psychoanalytical lack and visually declares Irigaray’s affirmation of “I love to you” a
wholesome, robust recognition of otherness. This seems to me a radical notion uniquely
located with love in art.
Origin of the Universe I brings to mind another artist who twenty-two years earlier
staged an extremist work we might consider a “live self-portrait.” Annie Sprinkle146 is a
performance artist; her practice is
grounded in sex-positive
feminism, an ideology
championing the notion that sexual
freedom is critical to women’s
equality and inclusive of the
complete range of human
Figure 1.5. Annie Sprinkle performing in Public Cervix Announcement
(1990). Image: artperformance.org

sexuality. Her performance titled
Public Cervix Announcement147

[Figure 1.5] consisted of a semi-reclining Sprinkle, clad in an erotic costume, inserting a
gynecological speculum into her vagina and inviting the audience to view her cervix with a
flashlight. This allowed the viewer to directly see the intimate space of her gendered body in
real time. In Sprinkle’s performance, a part of the female body ordinarily invisible and off
limits was made visually accessible to the audience. Like Thomas, Sprinkle took her body to
a limit.
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Compared with the traditional artist’s plane mirror, the speculum148 is another type of
mirror. Neither flat nor anamorphic but concave, it is an instrument typically implemented by
health care professionals to physically dilate the elastic genital tissue for a visual inspection
(or tissue sampling) of the vaginal cavity and cervix. By re-contextualizing the use of a
speculum in an art performance, Sprinkle brings into play another kind of self-reflection—
one that is singularly “ocular-eccentric” in that only one viewer at a time is privileged to
survey Sprinkle’s genitals.149 In this way she constructs a kind of intimacy not located in
Thomas’ Origin of the Universe I or Oppenheim’s Object because paintings and sculptures
are objects on walls or pedestals that indirectly connect artist and viewer. In contrast,
Sprinkle as artist is directly interacting with another being. Her body along with the
speculum and flashlight comprise the media. The viewer is straightforwardly in contact with
Sprinkle’s anatomy, in a manner that would normally be considered socially inappropriate.
How does this breach of an imposed boundary serve as love?
Love in art cannot be measured, but it is comparative because the media (materials
that comprise the artwork) and design elements affect the viewer in various ways. For some
viewers an object (like marble or paper) provides a benign distance; for others the face-toface of performance elicits some amount of unease in the viewer. Reponses to medium are
subjective. Since love in art is not concerned with comfort or security, anxiety is a defensible
and valuable tool in the artist’s toolbox. It is manifested in various ways and to greater or
lesser extents in illustrations discussed thus far in this paper: Drew’s Falling Man,
Oppenheim’s fur-covered teacup, Thomas’ rhinestone pudendum, and Sprinkle’s
transgressive performance.
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Simon Critchley150 calls anxiety “the philosophical mood par excellence.”151 What he
refers to is Heidegger’s notion of the function of anxiety with regards to Dasein,152 which is
being-in-the-world. For Heidegger “world” is not the physical realm of existence on a planet,
instead it is “something we find ourselves in.”153 Barbara Bolt explains, “Where we
understand our world, we know what to do, how to act or comport ourselves.”154 Being-inthe-world then is to be amidst a cohesive structure of relations in which we function. As
such, the subject is occasionally disposed to moods and emotions, the latter always in
response to a specific situation. Heidegger describes anxiety not as emotion but as mood.155
Anxiety as mood discloses what it means to exist. For Heidegger, this is not a
particular anxiety, but a vague one that is experienced when the subject becomes conscious
of an idea of meaninglessness.156 Much of the time subjects are thrown into the world of
life’s hustle and bustle and do not contemplate their place in the world.157 At face value the
world is a meaningful place that is accepted as is. At other times the subject becomes
unanchored from life’s flow and an acute self-awareness of meaninglessness pervades as
mood. The world subsequently becomes an uncomfortable place—at least temporarily. At
these moments anxiety becomes a disclosure of being-in-the-world; the subject is anxious for
Dasein.158 Heidegger asserts it is just this singular situation of self-consciousness manifested
in anxiety that lends itself to the authentic self. The authentic subject is individualized when
self-aware, when true to the self and not to the demands of others in the world.
There are two considerations of anxiety as it relates to love in art. First, anxiety
experienced by the artist in making the work is a manifestation of love. One example might
be the situation of admitted anxiety Thomas felt in photographing and subsequently painting
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herself in a highly vulnerable position to create Origin of the Universe I. Doing so endowed
her with an expression of an authentic self by way of opening up possibilities. This not only
benefits an essential truthfulness to herself, but she also models it to others/viewers as a
viable potential. In this way, her act of authenticity is compounded. Although as viewers we
don’t always have knowledge of an artist’s anxieties in creating the art unless that
information is shared with us, it does not diminish the genuineness of the artist’s selfawareness. Second, anxiety as a calculated part of an artwork’s design is a manifestation of
love in art. When art brings forth anxiety in viewers it calls them to the freedom toward a
more authentic self. This does not occur when taking a work of art at face value, but asking
what are more than likely to be unanswerable questions. The artwork makes a demand upon
the viewer to take it in and reciprocally the viewer enjoins the work by thinking about it and
asking questions: How is the idea of drinking out of a fur-lined cup akin to a sexual
experience? What were the falling man’s thoughts as he tumbled through the air? How am I
to understand Thomas’s use of rhinestones? What would it be like to publically allow
strangers to have access to my cervix? The act of asking questions in the face of anxiety
expands the viewer by presenting endless possibilities for feelings and understanding—an
indefinite openness. These possibilities located in an artwork constitute a more authentic self
as a beyond what is.
To experience anxiety for the viewer is one manner of thinking-with and being-with
the artwork or artist. Love in art is to privilege possibility. Love in art is manifested in
presence and absence. Love in art is revealed by asking questions. Love in art is always
abundance in having something new to contemplate.
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Sprinkle raises other innumerable questions with Public Cervix Announcement: Who
gets to look at the body? What does it mean to have that privileged position? How does
looking change the viewer’s ideas or feelings? These questions are not new in thinking about
art, but they are asked anew in works of art that concern the body. Importantly, viewers do
not have the same gaze in the here and now of performance art that they have with paintings
and sculpture. In artworks like Public Cervix Announcement looking for the viewer is a
critical transgressive quality since it is an immediate experience. Reproductions of the
performance documented in photographs cannot possibly convey the profound immediacy of
taking the proffered flashlight and directly viewing Sprinkle’s live anatomy.159 Yet, these
images can nonetheless compel the viewer to ask questions related to the artwork. Both direct
and indirect exposure to an artwork can trigger the movement of love in art.
A further manifestation of love in art is how artists create works that question
previous standards of how art functions. This in itself is another avenue of formulating an
aesthetic of anxiety in a work of art. Sprinkle’s performance of Public Cervix Announcement
contributes to un-demonizing the visuality of the male gaze in her eroticized performance.
She holds control in the meaning of the viewing relationship of the audience, determining all
aspects of what specifically is seen on her body, where it is seen, and for how long. Her
viewers are anyone of any gender identification or sexual orientation. In this way Sprinkle’s
art practice erodes the ever-weakening binary of patriarchal structures within gender
formation. This destabilization substantially began in the 1960’s with a growing number of
female performance artists who implemented their bodies as performative acts, such as Yoko
Ono (Cut Piece, 1965), Carolee Schneemann (Interior Scroll, 1975), and Marina Abramović
60

(Rhythm 0, 1974) [Figure 4.10]. In addition to anxiety as a call to authenticity, love in art
facilitates an incessant movement of change within the practice of art.
The number of artists contributing to revisions of art practice and who address
problematic issues within exhibitions and art history continues to thrive. Recently a young
artist called attention to the well-worn issue of the sexualized gaze in a manner that arguably
provoked some amount of anxiety owing to the fact that her performance was an ambush
upon an unsuspecting audience. This is a marked departure from most performance art,
which is conventionally carried out within
an invitational framework whereby the
viewers have voluntarily engaged with the
artist—such as in the artists and
performances previously mentioned and
ones that will be addressed in upcoming
chapters.
Figure 1.6. Deborah de Robertis in the Musee d’Orsay while
performing Mirror of Origin in May 2014. Image: Pinterest

In early June 2014, a video160
circulated on the Internet in which

performance artist Deborah de Robertis161 walked into the Musée d’Orsay and sat on the
floor in front of Courbet’s iconic Origin of the World. She lifted her gold dress and spread
her knees up and apart to expose her genitalia to the surprised visitors in Room 20. Intending
to show even more anatomy than Courbet’s painting, she pulled her labia aside to allow for a
stark view of her vaginal opening.162 After some moments, a number of the onlookers broke
into a polite sustained applause. (It would seem that for these individuals a connection was
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made between de Robertis’ action and the masterwork hanging above her head.) As seen in
the video, de Robertis holds this position until forcibly removed by museum security.
Although she posed no concrete threat to her audience, as an unauthorized performance in a
museum her actions were not tolerated by security. The artist titles this performance Mirror
of Origin. De Robertis makes this statement in an interview,
There is a gap in art history, the absent point of view of the object of the gaze. In his
realist painting, the painter shows the open legs, but the vagina remains closed. He
does not reveal the hole, that is to say, the eye. I am not showing my vagina, but I am
revealing what we do not see in the painting, the eye of the vagina, the black hole,
this concealed eye, this chasm, which, beyond the flesh, refers to infinity, to the
origin of the origin.163

There is much to be said about various meanings within her statement, but I want to stress
that Mirror of Origin [Figure 1.6] is an act of love in art. De Robertis’ critique of Courbet’s
canvas is compelling in that it offers her audience (like Sprinkle) a literal perspective as well
as an opportunity for a new looking. By seeing anew the subject is given a broader frame of
reference, a fresh chance for thinking. How does this act function as art? What is art
supposed to “do”? What does the artist show us? What do we see? What do we want to see?
What is the difference between real and represented? What is the difference between a living
female and a painting of one? How do we connect to the “real thing” as much as the beloved
painting? Is this offensive? Why?
All of these questions are demonstrative of love in art as the movement of thinking.
De Robertis prompts questions for the viewer like these in her performance at the expense of
her own privacy—and perhaps safety—as well as the offense of breaking the law. In other
62

words, de Robertis—like all the artists I have discussed in this chapter—broaches a new limit
with herself and with her audience. And at that limit is the origin of possibility for anxiety as
being towards authenticity. It may also be considered another form of thinking love in art.
Art with the anxiety and questions it brings forth is one of the ways we come to
understand what it means to be human, what it means to be. Heidegger regards art and
philosophy as conduits for “movement in thought.”164 He sees thinking as not necessarily
rational (a means to an end), but a process of being thought-full. Thought is something we
can inhabit in the sense that it invites the thinker to presence.165 At the same time it is not a
static presence, it moves (Heidegger uses the term “withdraws.”) To fully think we must
pursue the thoughts, even as they retreat. His description of thinking’s withdrawal brings to
mind the act of drawing. To draw—pencil on paper—we must erase and draw again. The act
of drawing can be as much erasing and re-drawing as drawing. A mark is made, it is unmade;
a mark is made again, and so on. It is a push-forward pull-back, a revealing and unrevealing.
Drawing like thinking is pursuit. Drawing like thinking is learned by doing. Thinking, like
drawing is something to be learned and mastered throughout life.166
Heidegger writes,
The matter of thinking is always confounding—all the more in proportion as we keep
clear of prejudice. To keep clear of prejudice, we must be ready and willing to
listen.167

Heidegger offers the reader advice. How do we avoid prejudice? The word in verb form
means to prejudge, an action not taken in the act of reason. As a noun it is a form of harm,
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the act of being unreasonable. To be prejudiced is to not think, it is to have an opinion not
based in reason or actual experience.168 To not be prejudiced is to act in the best interest of
self and others, an ethical command. Then, how are we ready and willing to listen? If we use
Socrates as a model, as Heidegger does, then it seems to be that we must be ready and willing
to listen; we need to be present. Socrates manifested presence in carefully listening to his
interlocutors and asking them questions.
Certainly to be ready and willing to “listen” to a work of art we need to be present.
This is most obvious in the intent of de Robertis and the impact on her audience. It separates
out what might be spectacle from art that denotes a daring expression of love. Her
performance prompts questions from her viewers in a more dramatic way than an object, but
perhaps the message is in the medium.
I have previously noted that thinking about art is a manifestation of love based in
wonder. The act of intentionally looking at art is also grounded in wonder. By wonder I
mean the act of speculating, not necessarily that what one sees engenders admiration or
amazement. Certainly there are situations in which the viewer responds to a work of art with
surprise or even astonishment such as in case of de Robertis. Certainly artworks can be
downright wonder-full. Others take on different forms of appreciation. But for the purpose of
my argument regarding love in art, I want to clarify the notion of wonder as an expression of
curiosity, contemplation or interest. How the artist moves a viewer to wonder is on a kind of
spectrum. In the case of de Robertis, her work vehemently prods the viewer to wonder about
the actual vagina and the represented one. For other artists, like Thomas, perhaps it is more
of a nudge.
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***
What happens when the Heideggerian mood of anxiety deployed in art becomes fear?
De Robertis’ unauthorized and startling performance brings to mind an earlier, more
audacious act that took place in Germany almost fifty years ago. In 1968, Austrian artist
VALIE EXPORT169 went into an art house cinema in Munich dressed in a sweater and pants
with the crotch cut away and carrying a machine gun.170 The unsuspecting patrons were there
to see a pornographic film and were unaware of EXPORT’s intention to stage an art
performance. She walked among the seated audience in such a manner that enabled them to
gaze directly at her exposed genitals while she pointed the gun at people’s heads.
This performance ruptured the expectations of an audience in the midst of the
voyeuristic act of watching an erotic film, an act that employs a phallocentric cinematic gaze
upon disembodied sexual organs. By offering the cinemagoers a ‘real’ fully embodied, and
contextualized sexual organ, EXPORT not only exposed the fetishization at the heart of the
viewers’ fantasies but also subverted the structure of patriarchal subjectivity located in
pornographic media.
However, EXPORT also told the audience that her actual genitalia were available and
that they could do with it as they pleased. In an interview ten years later, she said:
I was afraid and had no idea what the people would do. As I moved from row to row,
each row of people silently got up and left the theater. Out of film context, it was a
totally different way for them to connect with the particular erotic symbol.171
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EXPORT employed a guerrilla-style confrontation and transgressive tactic of exhibitionism.
She gave permission for anyone to do anything to her pudendum, presumably including (at
worst) bodily harm. While she admits to feeling vulnerable, her use of a gun placed the
audience in an even more defenseless position since no one could have been certain that the
gun was not real and that she would not deploy it. From a critical standpoint, the gun, a
loaded phallic symbol, challenges and risks undermining EXPORT’s threat rather than
augmenting it. Her reflection on what she did merely communicates her intention of using
her feminist body as an implicit and explicit menace.
Heidegger maintains a distinction between fear and anxiety. The former is always the
subject’s fear of something, whereas with the latter the subject cannot pinpoint the source of
their anxiety. Heidegger notes, “…What anxiety is about is the world as such.”172 Fear is a
response to the threat of harm—something specific—a way of knowing how something is, a
disclosing. It is more than likely the subjects in the Munich theater initially felt fear at the
sight of EXPORT’s gun. It was not a moment of indefinite anxiety existentially evoked. I
cannot conceive how in that moment these men had access to love in art as I describe it. It is
possible in a later reflection about their confrontation with EXPORT they eventually felt
anxiety, but this is merely speculative since no witnesses are accounted for.
The argument of love becomes a challenge in championing a work of art that employs
a threat of violence that most would construe as an unethical act. How is love in art
reconciled in the display of such fierce aggression to the other? Here we return to Nancy’s
definition of love,
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…All of love is possible and necessary, that all the loves possible are in fact the
possibilities of love, it voices or its characteristics, which are impossible to confuse
and yet ineluctably entangled: charity and pleasure, emotion and pornography, …To
think love would thus demand a boundless generosity toward all these possibilities,
and it is this generosity not to choose between loves, not to privilege, not to
hierarchize, not to exclude…Love in its singularity, when it is grasped absolutely, is
itself perhaps nothing but the indefinite abundance of all possible loves…173

I want to stress Nancy’s love as it contains an infinite generosity on behalf of both artist and
viewer.
There seems to be two promising ways to calculate the actions of EXPORT’s
performance in terms of love in art. The first concerns infinite generosity on behalf the
amenable reviewer.174 The openhandedness of the reviewer in EXPORT’s performance
means to offer unprejudiced consideration for the actions in the theatre—and foremost her
intent. What was she attempting to do and why? Like de Robertis she calls attention to the
real and represented. Is this simple? Not at all; but we must remember that love in art cannot
be counted on to be easy, safe or satisfying. When art takes aim at our fears, when it
transgresses social taboos, when it inflames high anxiety, it seems antithetical to the longheld ideas of love as consolation. Love in contemporary art will rarely be solace. It is more
likely to be a mess. Love in art is not for wimps; it may appear abusive, offensive or
irrational. If the viewer makes an effort to move beyond a personal response of fear or
abjection, he or she initiate love in art with a tenacious and generous effort to connect with
the artwork. In this connection the viewer engages in the between, the space of pure potential
and open-endedness. Love in art arrives upon the questions it raises as expansion of the self.
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How can we understand EXPORT’s work as generous in this performance? A
synonym for the word generous is care and therefore the theatre performance can be framed
as an expression of care. Specifically her mindfulness concerning the exploitation and
objectification of the female body as it is deployed in the industry of sexual images
controlled by males. Heidegger addresses Sorge (care) what he considers the subject’s
fundamental way of being in the world. This care is an “ontological structure”175 in which the
subject as being-in-the-world expresses itself within life’s circumstances. He writes,
The multiplicity of these kinds of being-in can be indicated by the following
examples: to have to do with something, to produce, order and take care of
something, to use something, to give something up and let it get lost, to undertake, to
accomplish, to find out, to ask about, to observe, to speak about, to determine….176

Art then may be understood as an expression of care. In the case of EXPORT’s performance,
she speaks about the inequality of gender and undertakes the project of feminism.
EXPORT identifies as a feminist and her art practice must be considered in the
context of late 1960s feminism. Amelia Jones, in an essay on EXPORT clarifies feminism as,
…The activist, coalitional, and theoretically informed set of debates, political actions
and modes of cultural production that have promoted a critical approach to
understanding sexed/gendered subjectivity since the Second World War.177

EXPORT ‘s staging of her body in the Munich theater178 assumes an activist position of
critique with regard to the cultural production of pornography. EXPORT’s strategy to
address this particular social injustice is to turn the performance of gender into a mirror, one
in which the alarmed theatregoers may recognize their own enactment of power (collusion
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with the pornographic cinema) at the same time they understand their inherent powerlessness
(EXPORT’s confrontational performance). One way of considering her artwork is as
dialectic of art and activism that becomes the generosity Nancy asserts as love.
***
There is a second part to EXPORT’s performance that takes her activism and love in
art further afield. A year later in Vienna, her friend
and photographer Peter Hassmann shot the iconic
black and white photographs, entitled Aktionshose:
Genitalpanik (Action Pants: Genital Panic).
[Figure 1.7] In these photographs, a young
EXPORT sits on a chair, striking a defiant glare,
wearing a black leather jacket and jeans with a cutaway crotch, holding a rifle. Barefoot with her hair
wildly teased; her legs are spread, exposing pubic
hair and labia that are centered in the middle of the
photo’s composition. These photographs were
Figure 1.7 VALIE EXPORT and Peter Hassmann,
Aktionshose: Genitalpanik (1969). Image:
0black0acrylic.blogspot.com

subsequently screen-printed onto flyers, which
were posted in public spaces and in the street.

EXPORT’s work was originally presented in the art cinema as performance, represented in a photograph, and then re-re-presented as a placard for mass viewing. Unlike De
Robertis’ video, EXPORT’s ancillary photographs and posters are not documents of the
actual event since they were created a year after the performance. Instead they act as both
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independent images and mediatory artworks, spotlighting and at the same time criticizing the
fetishistic gaze of disseminated images. Jones writes that in the 1960s the
photographic/cinematic provocation of female genitalia had the expressive power to dislocate
the organization of fetishism.179 Discussing Genital Panic, Jones explains, “EXPORT’s
project was to turn fetishism violently around, to enact the female body as a site of agency
and potential violence.”180
By using a photograph of a staged representation of blatant power and sexuality,
EXPORT calls into question the expectation of the fetishizing gaze, and prompts viewers to
realize that newer standards of looking, thinking—and loving—are possible. For example,
EXPORT’s performance demonstrates that the vagina is not a lack. Freud describes female
pudenda as a deficit in his theory of the castration complex wherein young boys learn as a
result of punishment to perceive female genitalia as castrated penises. Yet an authentic lack
is a privation of something that was possessed at some point, something that has been
removed from someone’s grasp.181 EXPORT’s work blatantly reveals the truth: that in the
female body no such lack exists. As Jones puts it, “Exacerbating its threat to the male psyche,
EXPORT’s cunt refuses lack and refuses to congeal as a fetish.”182 Aktionshose:
Genitalpanik strikes me as still relevant today in a culture that persists in fetishizing the
female body. The artists discussed in this chapter—EXPORT, de Robertis and Sprinkle—
strip away assumptions about what art should be and how the female anatomy is. By taking
responsibility and risks with their bodies they show care of being-in-the-world and offer a
connection of love for viewers. Art based in protest is not just a form of resistance it is also
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an expression of affirmation of love in the way it expresses respect for human dignity and
anticipates a change towards a more equitable world.183
Confrontations with the labial-vaginal as artistic subject matter or subtext are
common in art history. Western art textbooks typically commence with images of female
statuettes sporting emphatic vulvas from the Upper Paleolithic period. Within the last fifty
years, artists like Thomas and de Robertis snatch those images from a subtext of a patriarchal
agenda. To overcome patriarchal notions of transcendence like the Freudian lack, these artists
“embrac[e] immanence”184 by doggedly negating the long-standing image of the Venus
pudica,185 an image created and sustained by patriarchal epistemes.186 This is certainly
demonstrated in de Robertis’ performance emphasizing her specific vaginal opening, and
statement that stresses what Courbet187 did not show: the “hole,” the “eye,” the “origin of the
origin.” Artists thereby raise the question of what Judith Butler calls the “unrepresentable
absence.”188
The performances by EXPORT, Sprinkle and deRobertis, and the art objects of
Oppenheim and Thomas, are intended to be an edifying experience, or at least a critical one,
that communicate potent messages about reality and fantasy as objects of the gaze. Their
straightforward exhibitionism paradoxically negates a kind of gratification that is generally
found by viewers in an X-rated cinema, a museum or an art gallery—spaces that exhibit
suggestive images of nude bodies. These artists seem to be latter-day sheela na gigs189 in
which “the body is not only historical idea, but a set of possibilities to be continually
realized.”190
***
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Although the making of images and the act of looking are part and parcel to art, love
in art is not something represented; it is not in the compendium of the image-repertoire. This
is because love in art is an action on behalf of viewer and artist. Love found in art is a
movement in thinking. The primary movement deployed in love in art is asking questions
that arise within the nexus of art, artist and viewer in which cognitive boundaries are
expanded. The paradox is that these questions do not require answers.
The perception of loss is situated in both primordial myths about human origins and
psychoanalytical theory. Yet love generated by artists in their work is not made in a space of
deficit, desire or drive, nor in a space of retribution. Artists create in a place of thriving and
thinking that is shared with viewers (or reviewers) who in turn thrive by thinking about the
artwork. The sharing of love between artist, artwork and viewer takes place in the between,
an energizing unfinalisable transitional space. The between is pure potential that offers a
possibility for love.
While humans are hardwired to love both emotionally and physically, love in art is
not fastened to any biological mechanisms. The brain plays a physical role in that its
processes in the neocortex enable us to think love; however, love in art is not necessarily
rooted in the body; it stakes no claim on philosophy or the psyche. The love located in art is
not about struggle, empathy, hierarchy or equivalence but connection.
In conventional love we are connected to others or things in which we find pleasure,
security and consolation, but love in art is not solace. Art can disturb the status quo.
Sometimes it deploys aggression as a weapon of social change. It may intend to provoke
anxiety about what it is to be human. Yet at the same time artists demonstrate deep care and
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concern within their own subjecthood and for the world. This care and concern is expressed
in taking on responsibility for what is, Dasein fulfilling its own possibilities for authentic
being. Care is contained in the infinite generosity offered on behalf of artist and viewer. Love
in art is merely possibility; it is set apart from all conventional notions of love in that it
cannot be counted and it cannot be counted on. Yet it still counts.
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Chapter Two
Intermedius
What lends possibility to the role of the between of love in art? To review the
concept, the between is an ontological space-time which “hosts” the helical movement of
thinking that occurs when a viewer encounters a work of art or interacts directly with an artist
in performance. This space—intermedius in Latin—opens up when the viewer begins to
wonder, to silently pose questions with regard to it. The between is akin to the qi in Daoist
thought whereby the empty space in a work of art—a formless and open-ended interval—
holds an enlivening quality. As a transitional space of potential, the between can also be
compared to Heidegger’s concept of “clearing.” Clearing is an openness or receptiveness to
truth in which something is revealed.
What does Plato’s Symposium—the originary code of love—disclose to us about love
and how does it reconcile with love in art? In the first segment of this chapter titled “middle
ground” I turn to the Symposium. The focus is on the part concerning Socrates’ relationship
with his teacher Diotima, which he explains to his interlocutors by relating a dialogue with
her that illustrates the foundations of love. Diotima stresses to Socrates how the intermediate
position is the most important aspect of thinking about love. The notion of the between arises
multiple times in her explanation. How does this apply to works of art? Using a short film
made in 2003 I explore how the between as a component of love in art is manifested.
Diotima further describes the iconic ladder of love in this section of Symposium. The
metaphor of the ladder is demonstrative of love’s hierarchical schema in Plato’s theory of
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Forms in which the ascent concerns a mastery of love. I compare it with Martin Puryear’s
sculpture Ladder for Booker T. Washington (1996) as a ladder better suited as visual
metaphor for the actuality of love in which skill and control are impossible.
Does the love found in art resemble philia, the category of love found in friendship?
The film five deep breaths191 tells the story of two friends. Aristotle wrote extensively about
friendship in Nicomachean Ethics;192 he saw perfect philia as an expression of the good. I
discuss his ideas to consider how it relates but also contrasts with love in art, which—perhaps
un-intuitively—holds no elements of virtue.
The second part of this chapter—“love rules”—considers Doris Salcedo’s
monumental 2007 installation at the Tate Modern titled Shibboleth. This artwork raises
questions concerning the obligation of a subject towards the other by presenting as metaphor
a cracked floor that serves to reveal racial and ethnic contempt within a community that fears
immigrants and racial diversity. How does this artwork serve an opportunity for the love
found in art? In what way does Shibboleth offer meaning to the viewer? One way to think
about meaning comes from a definition by Heidegger.
As a work of art that calls for ethical contemplation with regard to the other,
Shibboleth addresses the more open-ended category of conventional love: agape, an
unconditional love of the other. This particular love stems from Western rules located in
ancient scriptures mandated by God that persist today in cultural memory and religious
doctrine. I take a closer look at what these early religious doctrines have to say. I then
contrast these ideas to Sigmund Freud’s more cynical or rational notions on loving the other
outside of any faith-based construct.
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In addition to a closer consideration of the between, this chapter unpacks works of art
not only to argue what I call love in art, but also to examine long-held notions of love in
terms of philosophy, history and religion. How do these align with or stack up against a
theory of love in art?
Middle ground
In Symposium after Aristophanes’ speech, Agathon the playwright—whose latest
accomplishment is being celebrated at the drinking party—chimes in with his interpretation
on love. He portrays the god of Love in a grandiose and eloquent fashion, describing him as
the happiest, gentlest, youngest, most beautiful and delicate god of all. Socrates notes the
errors in his speech and in turn questions Agathon, deploying his usual disciplined manner of
getting to the heart of these problematic assertions.193 His verbal interrogation results in
Agathon’s rueful admission that he doesn’t know much about love at all. This disclosure
leads Socrates to lay the ground for his relationship with Diotima194,
Now I’ll let you go. I shall try to go through for you the speech about Love I once
heard from a woman of Mantinea, Diotima—a woman who was wise about many
things besides this: once she even put off the plague for ten years by telling the
Athenians what sacrifices to make. She is the one who taught me the art of love, and I
shall go through her speech as best I can on my own…195

Socrates then recalls how Diotima cross-examined him about love. And in this elenchus,
Socrates—like Agathon—comes to admit he is largely ignorant about Love.
There are a number of ideas put forth in Socrates’ recounting of his encounter with
Diotima. Rather than the rhetorical superlatives of love’s qualities as described by Agathon
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such as beauty and goodness, she emphasizes how correct judgment reflects an “in between”
position,
“…Do you really think that, if a thing is not beautiful it has to be ugly?”
“I certainly do.”
“And if a thing’s not wise, it’s ignorant? Or haven’t you found out yet that there is
something between wisdom and ignorance?”
“What’s that?”
“It’s judging things correctly without being able to give a reason. Surely you see that
this is not the same as knowing—for how can knowledge be unreasoning? And it’s
not ignorance either—for how could what hits the truth be ignorance? Correct
judgment, of course, has this character: it is in between understanding and ignorance.”
“True,” said I, “as you say.”
“Then don’t force whatever is not beautiful to be ugly, nor whatever is not good to be
bad. It’s the same with Love: when you agree he is neither good nor beautiful, you
will not need think he is ugly and bad; he could be something in between,” she
said.196

Diotima furthers her argument with the assertion that rather than a god, Love is a spirit, in
between mortal and immortal. These spirits (of which Love is one) serve the purpose of gobetweens, running to and fro between gods and mortals. Diotima clarifies, “Being in the
middle of the two, they round out the whole and bind fast the all to all.”197 In this way love is
an incessant movement that is not anchored in any place.
The condition of being in the middle is commensurate with my thesis of the between
in considering love in viewing a work of art. It may be said that to experience a work of art is
in a way to judge it. But, unlike Diotima’s concern with “correct judgment” it does not
always result in a reasoning or conclusion; rather it is between understanding and
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incomprehension. As a result it prompts thinking and questions that expand cognitive borders
for the viewer. The enlargement manifests in a movement akin to Diotima’s to and fro. A
connection is made, and sometimes a rupture—a punctum—one that is open-ended. Love in
art is something always between.
***
Socrates asks Diotima about the parentage of Love, “Who are his mother and
father?”198 She explains that Love was conceived at a celebration for Aphrodite, the goddess
of love. Love’s father is the god of invention, Poros (Resource), who was a drunken party
guest that fell asleep in Zeus’ garden. Penia (Poverty) hatched a plan to lay with Poros as part
of a strategy to relieve her own constant need. She subsequently became pregnant with Love.
Since Love was conceived on Aphrodite’s birthday, he became her companion and
helpmate.199 Socrates quotes Diotima,
“As the son of Poros and Penia, his lot in life is to be like theirs. In the first place he
is always poor, and he’s far from being delicate and beautiful (as ordinary people
think he is); instead, he is tough and shriveled and shoeless and homeless, always
lying on the dirt without a bed, sleeping at people’s doorsteps and in roadsides under
the sky, having his mother’s nature, always living with Need. But on his father’s side
he is a schemer after the beautiful and the good; he is brave, impetuous, and intense,
an awesome hunter, always weaving snares, resourceful in his pursuit of intelligence,
a lover of wisdom through all his life; a genius with enchantments, potions, and
clever pleadings.
He is by nature neither immortal nor mortal. But now he springs to life when he gets
his way; now he dies—all in the very same day. Because he is his father’s son,
however, he keeps coming back to life, but then the resources he acquires always slip
away, and for this reason Love is never completely without resources, nor is he ever
rich.
He is between wisdom and ignorance as well…”200
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There are a few things that are remarkable in Diotima’s description of Love’s lineage. First is
the notion of poverty. To be poor is to have few material possessions and inadequate
nourishment; the indigent subject is chronically disadvantaged in the physical ease of
living.201 Love then is needy, displaced, in a state of chronic deprivation, and never has
enough of anything.202 Yet in spite of this hardship Love is creative, able to strategize and
able to procure the least of some things to get by; Love thinks things through. By way of
example, Nancy states, “… ‘thinking is love’ is a difficult, severe thought that promises rigor
rather than effusion.”203 Love does this by allowing for all of its possibilities and
contradictions.204
Diotima doesn’t specifically state this, but I imagine Love’s state of managing
poverty is through a relentless pursuit of understanding based on formulating questions. To
clarify, the act of understanding is defined as a process by which we come to know
something. Certainly Socrates mastered this tactic. To ask questions, there are connections
that must be made between ideas and observation. Connections come about in the constant
activity of love. In Diotima’s telling Love operates in the between by going to and fro,
always in movement; even the finality of death is overcome through resurrection. This is a
situation of being open-ended.
There is an important correspondence between the primordial tale of Aristophanes
and Diotima’s myth: love is not permanent. Love exists in a middle ground that is ceaselessly
shifting. It may come, but is not anything to depend on; and when it does show up it is
unstable and fugitive. It cannot be happily-ever-after yet it has a potential for joy as well as
the prospect of sorrow. All is temporary. While the image-repertoire of love tends toward an
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ideal—a state of perfection—love is better described as a flux between a number of states:
the flawless character of a god, utter benevolence, pleasure, discomfort, our worst nightmare
and our cruelest enemy.
All of this: thinking, wondering, impermanence, myriad feelings, temporality, making
connections, flux, potential and open-endedness are hallmarks of my claim for the love found
in art.
***
The film short five deep breaths
(2003) directed by Seith Mann is an
archetypal loss of innocence story;205 it is
fictional drama that takes place in an
unnamed historically black college in North
Carolina. The narrative focuses on the close
friendship between high school buddies who
become college roommates Banny (the

Figure 2.0. Film still from five deep breaths (2003)
featuring actor Jamie Hector as the character Banny.
Image: www.blogs.indiewire.com

protagonist) [Figure 2.0] and Mark. The two are celebrating their impending graduation when
they learn about a violent assault on their mutual friend Chastity (an art student) by her
boyfriend Kwesi.
To Banny’s surprise, Mark’s reaction to the news is to aggressively seek retaliation;
he subsequently plans an attack on Kwesi, whom neither man knows well. Banny takes on
the voice of reason arguing that the only appropriate thing to do is make sure Chastity is safe;
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by getting otherwise physically involved is overstepping ethical boundaries. Banny’s
objection includes the sober awareness that Kwesi has a gun and that someone may die if
more aggressive actions are taken.
Still Mark is relentless in his plan. In spite of his better judgment, Banny finally
agrees to help Mark; he feels strong loyalty to his best friend. A student group gathers to
execute vigilante justice with makeshift weapons; they eventually locate and confront Kwesi
in the basement of the college library. In an unexpected plot twist Mark balks at the last
minute, and insists that Banny also abandon the plan. Taken aback by Mark’s change of
heart, but at this point committed, Banny joins the group. A tense faceoff ensues and at one
point Kwesi aims a gun at Banny’s head. During an intense exchange, Banny realizes that
Mark is in a covert sexual relationship with Chastity. When a friend convinces Kwesi to put
down the gun, the group quickly disperses. At the top of the stairs Banny confronts Mark
who is waiting there,
Banny: You’re fucking Chas.
Mark: No, it’s not like that.

Mark hangs his head while Banny stares at him intently.
Mark: Look, I…I didn’t want you to think that… she was…this wasn’t the
way it was supposed to be. I tried to stop you.206

Banny looks for a long moment at Mark then walks away. The friendship is over; Mark has
betrayed the friendship with a lie—a deception that almost got him killed.
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If amenable, the viewer enjoins the between while watching the story unfold and
thinking about the characters. The unraveling of a friendship is at the heart of the narrative in
five deep breaths and questions about relationships arise. For example, what is the reason for
Mark’s vehement insistence on justice for Chastity? Why does Banny abandon his reasonable
argument with Mark regarding a confrontation with Kwesi? What is the unexplained cause
for the breakdown of communication between these good friends? The film is quick-paced
and fraught with a tension that builds to the sustained moment of physical violence: the gun
at Banny’s head. This is followed by the psychological “shooting” in the altercation of the
two men at the top of the stairs. The latter is the punctum of the film; the prick of feeling as
betrayal irreconcilably severs the two men. The viewer realizes that the feared death of a
character is actually the demise of friendship.
A hallmark of the between is asking questions that arise from a middle ground of
understanding and incomprehension. The film is in constant motion: the young men’s bodies
and their gazes, the back and forth of their clipped dialogue, the reversals of expectation and
plot; in synchronicity the viewer enjoins the action with the movement of thinking, an
incessant to and fro of wondering. To reiterate Diotima, “But now he springs to life when he
gets his way; now he dies—all in the very same day.” Resurrection is a metaphor in the film
with the storyline reversals that speak to an aspect of ontological unpredictability as denoted
by Heidegger’s thrownness. Every moment Dasein takes something away from the subject
and delivers something else. At the end of the film new questions that move beyond the
narrative take shape for the viewer: How do we understand the intersection of friendship and
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subjectivity? What does it mean to be a friend? What is it we desire from friends? The love
found in art offers the viewer a way to think about what and who we are.
Five deep breaths is a film about love, specifically the love found in friendship—
what the ancient Greeks called philia. Aristotle wrote extensively about philia.207 He came to
consider love in a grounded way compared with his teacher Plato. He departed from his
teacher’s theory of Forms,208 which is emphasized in Symposium with the conclusion of
Diotima’s dialogue with Socrates. Here she addresses the metaphysical goals of love at the
highest level—its perfect apex,
“…If once you see that, it won’t occur to you to measure beauty by gold or clothing
or beautiful boys and youths—who, if you see them now strike you out of your
senses, and make you, you and many others, eager to be with the boys you love and
look at them forever, if there were any way to do that, forgetting food and drink,
everything but looking at them and being with them. But how would it be, in our
view,” she said, “if someone got to see the Beautiful itself, absolute, pure, unmixed,
not polluted by human flesh or colors or any other great nonsense of mortality, but if
he could see the divine Beauty itself in its one form?”209

Beauty and love are entwined. To put this in Platonic context, Diotima describes the
appreciation of beauty as a metaphorical ascension up a ladder: from the bottom rung of
loving beauty (that is to desire boys,210 wonderful sex, etc.) to the top: loving Beauty—the
ideal of Beauty, which transcends the corporeal. In other words, beauty begins in the
admiration and desire for a specific body, then praise for other bodies, eventually recognizing
beauty existing outside the body in objects of knowledge, and ultimately understanding how
to be beautiful.211 To actually be beautiful is the highest manifestation of what is beautiful.
She explains that to “see” this final highest form of Beauty—to have insight into it—is to
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give birth to virtue, and that this virtue propels the gods to love us, the only chance we have
of being immortal.212 Since Plato is the author of Symposium, his theory of Forms is the
backbone of the dialogue, with the Form of Beauty as the highest in the hierarchy of love’s
objectives. In this analogy beauty has the quality of a divine nature because it transports the
lover to a mystic realm: untouchable, invisible, eternal and ineffable.
Symposium is a fantastic and “generous”213 story that explains love, yet it is also
problematic. Foremost because it espouses “a mastery over love”214 a situation that is
realistically an impossible accomplishment. This assertion requires absolute command over a
phenomenon that is hardly controllable by the self, since nothing about the subject—not
feelings, understanding nor perception—is perfectly actualized. The love found in art claims
no such mastery. Also, love in art is neither incompetent nor impotent. Love in art is not
slave or master. It is—as Diotima describes the spirit of Love—somewhere in the
intermedius, rounding out the whole and binding fast to the all.
Plato’s remark (via Diotima) regarding “the great nonsense of mortality” (quoted
previously) dismisses the corporeal as a critical component of living. What do we have if not
our very embodiment of self? Everything we know is filtered through the body; our body is
designed to do just that. Life and everything contained in it, including love, is embodied and
in constant physical and psychological adaptation to ever-changing circumstances. Plato
avoids speaking about much of the experience we have of a being-in-the-world where
everything changes all the time, including whom we love and why, or who loves us. Contrary
to Plato’s unchanging view from the top of his ladder, the love found in art exults in
difference.
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Plato sets up an ideal that the goal of loving is concerned with beauty; that this climb
is a linear trajectory, a straight route upward to a higher plane. The metaphor of the ladder is
one of hierarchy to ultimate virtue with the summit fixed in an unchanging revelation. The
notion of virtue is important in Symposium, but is the perfectly good fully relevant to love as
an endpoint?
The metaphorical ladder in Symposium brings to mind a sculpture by Martin
Puryear,215 titled Ladder for Booker T. Washington.
[Figure 2.1] It is the form of an impossible ladder carved
of wood; while it is thirty-six feet high it could not hold
the weight of anything heavier than a kitten. It is not
perfectly straight and parallel like a utilitarian ladder, but
warped and tenuous. Since the bottom is physically wider
than the top, it gives the viewer a misconception of
extending beyond thirty-six feet in the same way
Renaissance paintings create the illusion of deep space
using perspectival techniques. Puryear states that the work
was intended to have this “forced perspective.”216 In
offering his audience an artificial standpoint, Puryear

Figure 2.1. Martin Puryear Ladder for
Booker T. Washington (1996). Maple
and ash woods, 432” high, widest width
at bottom 22 ¾” narrowing at top to 3”.
Image: Modern Art Museum of Forth
Worth

creates an ambiguity as to whether the ladder is false consciousness or concrete entity; this
uncertainty places the viewer in a situation of wonder, of being between. Plato’s allegorical
ladder is similar in that while it is a beautiful image of love’s aspirations, it is also
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impractical as in the example Puryear’s Ladder. Both are devices employed to manipulate the
viewer’s perspective.
Perhaps through loving, the discovery of the beautiful self—if that exists—is more
characteristic of traversing a minefield rather than climbing a ladder. Let us imagine
Puryear’s Ladder as the one Plato describes. Is it possible for the beautiful self to be a
permanently static state? Once this beauty is achieved how is it maintained? (In Puryear’s
version of the ladder the top is very narrow with not much room for movement.) Once
ascended, can the self opt to descend? In other words, can immoral choices still be made?
Does the subject continue to expand insights into the self or is the top of the ladder the
endpoint of virtuous expansion?
Or—perhaps there is no goal of loving and beauty has nothing to do with it. Can love
alone simply be without the qualifier of a beautiful self? In that case love may have nothing
whatsoever to do with virtue. Love in art is like this: it disregards matters of virtue. The love
found in art is neither virtuous nor vicious. It stands apart from conventional love; it doesn’t
even merely stand because that implies stasis. Love in art is always in motion: walking,
running, climbing, crawling, falling, sinking, swimming, flying, crashing, resurrecting. If and
when love does stand it is at the least shifting its weight from leg to leg in contrapposto.
Virtue plays a role in five deep breaths with the abrupt loss of friendship between
Banny and Mark. It is based on the virtuous standards that Banny held for Mark, and
subsequently the lack of goodness demonstrated by Mark’s deceit. Yet equally as remarkable
is that Banny abandoned his own code of honor by joining the avenging group that sought
punishment for Kwesi’s assault on Chastity. He knew from the beginning it was not the
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ethical thing to do. Alongside friendship, the examination of moral judgment is a significant
idea of the film. Yet while the ancient theme of virtue continues to be located in works of
contemporary art, love in art, as I am defining it, is not a narrative or a symbol. It may be
closer to Heidegger’s notion of truth. His truth does not align with scientific knowing for
research, or falseness as we think of it, but possibility.
Heidegger claims that truth is set to work in a work of art.217 How so? He used the
example of Van Gogh’s still life of well-worn boots. It is not the painting by itself—a faithful
representation of boots—that is about truth (mimesis) but the experience of the viewer with
the artwork upon thinking about the boots. Heidegger describes his thoughts about the
painting and what the boots may represent including the owner wearing them to work in a
field, standing and hiking in them over damp earth, their eroded interior caused by extended
use, the lonely walk home in the evening, the thought of having enough bread to eat.218
Heidegger has imagined another’s world based on his encounter with the painting; a meeting
that conveys him out of his own everydayness. It decenters his subjectivity. This transport of
imagining is commensurate with my argument for the between. In the film five deep breaths
something similar happens because the love found in art is not confined to paintings or
objects per se. The film decenters us from our own subjectivity into the actuality of Banny
and Mark’s world, one that is falling apart and reconfiguring itself. This is not about beauty
or pleasure, but something between them.
A key feature of friendship is how it contributes to mutually improving a good
person’s actions.219 This is because it is not as much a shared activity as a collaborative
one.220 For Aristotle the good is a cooperative activity; the pleasure in acting together
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towards a shared goal brings the lasting happiness found in authentic friendship. Banny and
Mark may have shared some memorable times, but they were not ultimately participating in a
common cause for the good. In this way five deep breaths is a discourse on love that speaks
to our “communal indigence”221 and the familiar possibilities inherent to it. The viewer notes
conditions of neglect, faith, denial and disorder all of which—as Nancy would say—are
possible and necessary in the immanent situation of traversing the other.
We also traverse works of art, which are there for the crossing. A way to consider the
between is as a kind of collaboration between artist, artwork and viewer. Its collaborative
aspect is that (for the most part) this intersection is voluntary. To make a work of art or to
think about the art object (or performance) is based on willingness and sincerity to do so on
behalf of the viewer.
***
In Platonic theory, the truest beauty is fixed and unchanging. The theory of Forms is
like faith in a god; we cannot see it and it cannot be proven but we are informed it is perfect
and Plato urges us to believe that is so. Aristotle saw the gods as models for human life but in
his mature writings he placed emphasis on the empirical in philosophy rather than pure
theory. In other words, what we understand about beauty or love can only come from our
observation and experience, not from a universal concept.
As noted in Symposium, there is erôs in the sense of love of the body and there is also
a greater broader desire for wisdom and beauty. This desire is not applicable to love in art
since it is situated outside of virtue or the sensuous. Aristotle on the other hand was more
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pragmatic in thinking about how life can be good and society better in terms of love. Like
Plato, his is an ethical love but Aristotle emphasizes friendship (philia) rather than erôs.
Nicomachean Ethics locates the virtuous dimensions of love found in various kinds of
friendships all of which contribute to a satisfying life; he didn’t see how living without any
friendships would create happiness.222 And he thought it good to have many friends.223
Aristotle describes three categories of philia: friendship based on utility, friendship grounded
in pleasure, and—the most important of all—friendship centered on character.224 Aristotle
surmised that to choose to embrace every aspect of a friend is the most authentic and most
enduring type of friendship; it is friendship for the good of the two who share it. This
wholesome relationship develops as friends become well acquainted.225 He states,
…Such friendship requires time and familiarity; as the proverb says, men cannot
know each other till they have ‘eaten salt together’; nor can they admit each other to
friendship or be friends till each has been found loveable and been trusted by each.
Those that quickly show the marks of friendship to each other wish to be friends, but
are not friends unless they both are loveable and know the fact; for a wish for
friendship may rise quickly, but friendship does not.226

In other words, authentic friendship is predicated on spending time together, trust and mutual
goodwill. Importantly, Aristotle points out that friendship is the result of a subject’s character
whereas love (erôs) is an “excess of feeling.”227 By asserting love as feeling, he quite
radically disconnects from Plato’s theory of love as something ineffable. Because we are
embodied beings, feelings are rooted in our corporeal existence.
Germane to Aristotle’s argument is that philia is connected to justice. This is because
in all of its natures friendship is about how we treat the other in each and every manner of
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interaction. This not only concerns relationships of utility and pleasure but marriage, family,
neighbors and the greater community—extending to government. In this way Aristotle never
ascends Plato’s ladder, but rather keeps his feet (and ours) firmly on horizontal terra firma.
His love is an earthbound journey rather than a solo climb to a heavenly realm.
Compared with Symposium, the love defined and described by Aristotle eschews the
gods completely and focuses on subjects as they are, devoid of punishments, promises and
hopes that hinge on the heavenly. It is a matter of an actual loving of the whole versus
Aristophanes’ “pursuit of wholeness.” In other words, love is not to be desperately sought
and located, it is a matter of presence and duration. Love flourishes when the subject
embraces the other fully by knowing them well over time. In Aristophanes’ telling, humans
seek love from the other to relieve their pain or need; for Aristotle ideal friendship-love
concerns only the other’s sake. Merging and possession are not goals of this love. And each
subject is an independent whole, not a former half, or an incomplete.
Whereas the image-repertoire upholds the yearning of unconditional love philia is
quite conditional. Simon May points out,
Philia is inescapably conditional on the excellences of character that we perceive in
the other person. Since character is realized in concrete acts and desires over the
course of a lived life, we love someone not just for dispositions that we detect in her
but for how these dispositions are revealed, over time, in her actual life. Revealed in
heroic actions or personal crises or pursuits like thinking, artistic creation and
political leadership; and also revealed in ordinary everyday life; in eating, drinking,
having sex, party-giving, even telling jokes—all of which can be pursued with
varying degrees of excellence or baseness.228
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In other words, ideal friendship-love as character-based makes it a love that exists on and
affirms the facets of the other’s nature as a whole.229
Further contrast of Aristophanes’ tale of desire for completion demonstrates that for
Aristotle love begins with the self, for the self. He argues that self-love is not an
unwholesome character; it is not selfish.230 The subject wishes for the self the good, as they
do for their friend. All the qualities a subject admires and seeks in the other are at home in
the self; “…he is his own best friend and therefore ought to love himself best.”231 A
component of self-love involves self-knowledge defined as a self-consciousness of one’s
ethical excellence.232 The friend helps the other in their search for self-knowledge, which is a
virtuous activity rather than a getting of some other benefit.233 Seen this way, the friend is
another self in the sense of being a partner rather than a mirror.234
Erotic flirtations aside, many of the friends gathered for the party in Symposium may
be seen in just such an activity in their discourse on love. During a conversation with the late
arrival of the inebriated party guest Alcibiades,235 Socrates makes a point to assert that to
know the self is how we grow and flourish as beings.236
I see some comparisons between Aristotle’s philosophy of friendship and love in art.
Art—like friendship—also serves the subject to thrive and develop in Dasein. A subject first
comes to locate love in an artwork via a willingness to engage with and spend time with it. In
the manner of friendship, the subject may continue to engage with a work of art over time;
this relationship is also a matter of presence and duration. Love in art—like friendship—has
a contemplative aspect. If (or when) a connection with a work of art is made it is not based
on a universal concept but on the subject’s experience with it and wonder about it. Love in
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art is a kind of partnership or collaboration. Like friendship, art has a decentering effect since
art shares itself, and invites sharing. Like friendship, this sharing may or may not result in
self-knowledge or self-love.
How does friendship contrast with love in art? Love in art is not based in desire nor
does it operate towards possession. While art contributes to a satisfying life, it is also
capable of frustrating and disturbing. Love in art—like friendship—offers feeling such as
happiness, but it can offer any kind of feeling including the feeling of deep dissatisfaction,
distress or sorrow. When love in art does evoke feeling, it does not privilege it. In contrast to
friendship, the love found in artwork cannot be held to any ethical standard because it does
not concern virtue or justice. Unlike friendship, love in art is not preoccupied with wholeness
since that is a concept that involves measure; love in art cannot be quantified.
***
With Aristotle love concerns an intact and vibrant life that is “at home in the
world”237—an “ontological rootedness”238 in an existence that is at the same time
ontologically unpredictable. Through living we become aware that life changes all the time.
Aristotle acknowledges that love with another may die without a chance of resurrection.
Diotima asserts the homeless quality of love in her speech but this is not quite accurate. We
can—ideally and at the very least— locate love in two sites: the self and a work of art. It does
seem as if love may act homeless, but it always has a home. Love may reside there with the
self-insights we accumulate and the relationships we develop with others, with the questions
that emerge in the between when contemplating a work of art. I am not proposing that selflove or love in art is constant, because these loves are prone to the same instabilities as
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everything else. At any rate, Aristotle suggests that ideally philia may develop and last for a
lifetime, but that is not common; more typically love is altered or simply disappears. I
suggest that the love in art takes on a similar characteristic.
The film five deep breaths offers the viewer a perspective for love in art. The
plausible situation of Banny and Mark demonstrate how even the seemingly strongest
friendship comes crashing down for reasons that involve the other, the self or both. It invites
the viewer to enter a world of two young friends, in which we are temporarily situated
between their world and our own. To dwell in this space is to think and raise questions about
our own life and our own neglects, denials and disorders with others and subsequently about
the responsibility we have in communal indigence. In other words, what it means to be.
Love rules
We cannot and will not discover love in most of the artworks that we come across.
We cannot and will not be friends with most others who traverse our path. A recent work of
art that addresses the crossing of other is Doris Salcedo’s239 Shibboleth, [Figure 2.2] which
was a site-specific installation commissioned for the monumental space of the Tate Modern’s
Turbine Hall in London. In situ for six months between 2007 and 2008, it consisted of a
poured cement floor with fissures that meandered the length of the 458-foot space. The
depths of the fissures varied but were as much as three feet deep.
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Observing museum visitors at the Tate walk
around in awe of the grandeur they projected onto the
immense loftiness of Turbine Hall’s Modernist
industrial space originally constructed as a power
plant, inspired the conception of the work.240 Salcedo
asserts that such an industrial space did not deserve
this sense of wonder; it did not compare to the
outstanding architectural achievements of Hagia
Sophia or the Egyptian pyramids.241 She intended to
create another perspective with Shibboleth, a word
Figure 2.2. Doris Salcedo Shibboleth (2007).
Detail of installation. Image:
Bizarrebeyondbelief

that references an ancient Hebrew term that served as
a test of pronunciation to identify foreigners. By

reconfiguring the Tate Modern’s floor, Turbine Hall became an unsafe place to walk around
without caution; one needed to look down instead of gazing up at the lofty heights of the
structure. By doing so Salcedo literally placed all visitors to the Tate Modern in physical
jeopardy: a similar danger experienced by non-whites and immigrants as they cross borders
into white Euro-centric culture. The multitude of crevasses in the Tate floor forced visitors to
confront the boundaries of the abyss, to contemplate the crack in civilization between people
that is racial and ethnic contempt. She states,
I wanted to inscribe in this modernist, rationalist building an image that was somehow
chaotic, that marked a negative space, because I believe there is a bottomless gap that
divides humanity from inhumanity, or whites from nonwhites. I wanted to address
that gap, which I thought was mainly perceived in the history of modernity.242
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We may think of Salcedo as an example of a contemporary artist who provides horizontal
access to love in art by laying down Plato’s metaphorical ladder. In redirecting the viewer’s
gaze, she reminds us that in post-postmodernism, nothing and no one assumes a place of
privilege. Love in art also assumes no such privilege.
How does Shibboleth provide its audience with an opportunity for the love found in
art? The viewer who wandered across the floor of the Tate was forced to be concerned about
their footsteps; in doing so they had a heightened and embodied awareness of how the
ordinary everyday act of walking became a precarious situation. The artist imposed on the
viewer a fear of something specific. At the same time Shibboleth holds an aesthetic of
anxiety; since love in art is not (necessarily) concerned with security or sanctuary; Salcedo
commands the viewer’s attention by deploying anxiety. This is not a particular anxiety, but
one that is experienced when the subject becomes conscious of a mood of meaninglessness.
The reader recalls that anxiety—as a calculated part of an artwork’s design—is a
manifestation of love in art. Salcedo’s use of anxiety calls to the freedom toward a more
authentic self. The visitor who undertakes to walk amongst the floor gaps is being-with and
thinking-with, she is literally between safety and vulnerability. By being between she is
present amidst the absences of ground.
How does Shibboleth concern love for the other who is rejected from community—
the other who is mistrusted, feared or loathed in their difference? How does Shibboleth as a
work of art offer love? Heidegger states, “In the projecting of understanding, beings are
disclosed in their possibility.”243 The fractures in the floor, which recall the abyss, become a
metaphor for the inestimable questions about the meaning of the other. The fissures are an
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imposed negative space that calls for possibility. By asking questions the viewer opens to
possibility for new ideas, and new awareness that includes consideration for the actuality of
the other, who—in spite of differences—always is being-with.
Salcedo offers the viewer a potential for discovering meaning; Heidegger defines
meaning as an intelligibility of something that maintains itself.244 He elaborates,
Only Dasein “has” meaning in that the disclosedness of being-in-the-world can be
“fulfilled” through the beings discoverable in it. Thus only Dasein can be meaningful
or meaningless.245

In terms of a work of art, the meaning of something emerges from the viewer’s ability to
“read” the work of art, to interpret its structure within context. Shibboleth as a whole,
includes its placement in Tate Modern, in a city with a disproportion of native Brits and
immigrants at this time in the beginning of the 21st century, holds such articulacy for the
viewer that seeks to discover meaning within Dasein—what it means to be in the world at
that particular time and that particular place. It must be said though that Shibboleth as idea
has a universal quality that would hold the same meaning if installed in any major city at this
time in the world.
Occasionally it serves viewers well to take on knowledge that contributes to their
experience of a work of art. For example, Salcedo’s title of her artwork at Tate Modern is a
word that has a compelling background. The word “shibboleth” is rooted in an ancient
Jewish biblical story whereby the pronunciation of the word determined who was part of a
clan and who was the enemy.246 The subject who was unable to enunciate “shibboleth”
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correctly at a military checkpoint was killed. In modern usage shibboleth refers to the
concept that members of out-groups cannot grasp the meaning or significance of an ingroup’s time period, culture or idioms. Salcedo’s installation of Shibboleth raises the
question of ethical responsibility to the un-friends regarded as “others:” the dissimilar beings
that are categorized as human but judged by unknowable strangeness. The skin is a different
color and their words are not understandable, their beliefs, values and clothing unfamiliar. Or
perhaps they do not conform to prescribed expectations of gender or sexuality; their presence
seems suspicious marking them as outsiders at the least and dangerous at the most.
***
Thus far this chapter unpacks the role of early philosophical discourse in various
aspects of love including the beauty achieved at the top of love’s metaphoric ladder and the
ethical duty between friends (the film five deep breaths) as well as strangers (the installation
Shibboleth). Yet even more deeply rooted in human history—long before Aristotle and
Plato—is the concretized formality of archaic religious laws. While the Greek gods have
disappeared, other gods tenaciously call for human devotion. The monotheistic God of the
Abrahamic traditions has made demands on the faithful via mandates in ancient scriptures.
These also contribute to the image-repertoire in works of religious art that represent the love
of God for His creations. In the pantheon of pious art we see nearly countless images of
Christ, prophets and saints being rewarded (or punished) for performing compassionate
miracles and modeling loving behaviors meant as didactic for devoted onlookers.
The foundation of Western love arises from two divine laws located in the sacred
Hebrew writing of the Torah. Devarim is the fifth book of the Torah, referred to as The Book
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of Deuteronomy. Here the faithful are commanded to love God wholeheartedly and
indefatigably. Deuteronomy 6:5 states, “Love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all
your soul and with all your strength.” Vayikra is the third book of the Torah referred to as
The Book of Leviticus; 19:18 essentially stating, “ Do not seek revenge or bear a grudge
against one of your people, but love your neighbor as yourself. I am the Lord.” The
command to “love your neighbor” is a religious obligation. With regard to the latter, May
writes, “Love, we see here, has ethical force as a relation to the source of our being.”247 In
other words, according to God—who created humanity—love is a moral duty.248
The question, “Who is the neighbor?” is answered in Christ’s parable of the Good
Samaritan.249 This accountability takes away any freedom of which person you love since
there can be no preference. Yet Nancy asserts the command for unconditional love of
neighbor as impossible. He points out that to love your enemy is a position of absurdity
because we must think of the other as a subject without properties.250 I understand Nancy to
mean that we cannot mark them with signifiers such as Muslim, pedophile, Republican, poor,
etc. Devoid of characteristics, the subject stands as merely human being. Impossible? Nancy
states, “The law of love is precisely no law.”251 This is because love is beyond any law. In
other words, while religion has commandments and civil life many rules, edicts by definition
contain boundaries whereas love cannot be contained; rather, “it is an openness that remains
open.”252 This seems to be demonstrated in Jesus’ parable about the Good Samaritan where
an enemy who was despised by custom was shown concern and tenderness. Yet being a god
does not presuppose kindly love. Even gods who make the rules do so in a rather hostile and
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unloving way, such as in the case of Zeus, who retaliated on his subjects by cutting them in
half.
In addition to an ethical responsibility we also see the establishment of a hierarchy of
love in these long ago laws. In Deuteronomy the edict to love God above all marks His
supreme and absolute Being. Yet in Leviticus the commandment to love your neighbor is
horizontal since a neighbor holds no authority over you. So we have at the same time, a
hierarchical and non-hierarchical model for love at the onset of Western history and
religion.253
At the same time, the present day assertion that love is uncontained and not able to be
legislated, presumes that its antithesis is also open. Therefore we might also say, “The law of
hate is precisely no law.” Admittedly this is a more difficult concept because subjects tend to
want to live in a world that is tolerant and devoid of the violence that often accompanies
hatred of others.254 Yet we do live in just such a world and Salcedo’s artwork calls attention
to this predicament. Her general oeuvre addresses the universal condition of the subject’s
inhumanity to the other. A native of Columbia, she is based in the capital city of Bogotá, and
has been witness to the longstanding violence of the drug wars in her country. Her work
tends to be based on experiences of victims of violence and she expresses the effects of this
hatred in highly symbolic representations. Visitors to the Tate Modern during the installation
of Shibboleth were not only placed in physical jeopardy but also emotionally displaced at the
same time. They are unable to walk with untroubled confidence on a ground that was
rendered hostile. In this way, Salcedo literally and metaphorically created a space of
between: between familiar and strange land, between safety and danger, between belonging
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and alienation, between stability and chaos. For audience members that were receptive to
thinking about the artist’s intention and iconography of the work, it likely raised questions
about this time-space conundrum. One of those questions may be: what ethical implications
exist for other and myself?
In her previously noted quote Salcedo mentions the intention of marking a negative
space. It seems she meant the museum as a space of criticism as opposed to aesthetic
pleasure. The cracks in the floor as they form negative spaces—as voids—become a
“thinking out loud” for what is at stake for politically displaced subjects and their
experiences of outsider-ness. Shibboleth metaphorically connects subjects and in this way
becomes another example of love in art. It provokes discomfort, contemplation concerning
experiences of the other, what it means to leave home and be a stranger in a new place. In
this way, for some visitors to the Tate Modern it may have also elicited previously
unconsidered concern, care or empathy for immigrants.
***
Around the second century BCE the Torah was translated from Hebrew into the
common Greek language of the Mediterranean. The creation of this document is known as
the Septuagint and was carried out by a team of Jewish scholars from the twelve tribes of
ancient Israel at the behest of Egyptian pharaoh Ptolemy II Philadelphus, who was compiling
a great library in Alexandria.255 This translation was the beginning of a “global dissemination
of moral law.”256 The various Hebrew words for love in the Septuagint were translated into
the Greek idiom agape,257 a term the early Christians adopted to express an absolute, creative
and excessive love. St. Paul’s258 first Epistle to the Corinthians, employs agape, in which the
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highest ranking among the virtues is claimed: “…And now these three remain: faith, hope
and love. But the greatest of these is love.”259 Christian theology holds that God the Father
offered his son Jesus Christ to the world as the ultimate sacrificial expression of love.
Christ’s crucifixion on the cross was intended as the salvation of mankind, which had been in
jeopardy since the Original Sin of Adam and Eve. As a component of the Christian faith,
agape is a comprehensive fatherly260 love that God possesses for mankind, which as a
consequence extends to a love of one’s fellow man that—unlike Aristotle’s perfect philia—is
unconditional. Moreover, agape is considered a giving or charitable love, as opposed to the
egocentric love of erôs. For Christianity, agape becomes the supreme virtue because its
essence is God. This is expressed in the words of St. John the Evangelist,261 “Whoever does
not love does not know God, for God is love.”262 All beings and the measure of their actions
have genesis in love. This is marked as the establishment of a new Western morality: love as
the touchstone of all virtue in which humans can finally “possess the power of the gods.”263
Within this divine capacity, there lies an idea of an equality of mortal and God. This is
echoed in Levinas who asserts that the face of the other is where we hear the Word of God.264
***
Finally, we turn to the genesis of love in terms of its roots in faith and as interpreted
by the modern thinker Sigmund Freud.265 As stated, the duties of Western love begin with
divine laws first seen in Hebrew scripture even before the great ancient Greek philosophers.
They are the commandments to love God and your neighbor. The latter is a central principle
of Western ethics within community.266 To love your neighbor is—ideally—what the early
Christians termed agape. In its boundless nature agape is paradoxically an unattainable type
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of love because to love everyone is an unachievable task. Freud addresses this demand of
society; in response to the commandment ‘Love thy neighbor as thyself’ he writes,
The element of truth behind all this, which people are so ready to disavow, is
that men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most
can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures
among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of
aggressiveness. As a result their neighbor is for them not only a potential
helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their
aggressiveness on them, to exploit his capacity for work without
compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his
possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and kill him.267

Freud asserts that the love commandment is not tenable because the human tendency
for aggression will always contend with reason. In other words, Freud assigns hostility as a
default human state of being. Although convinced of humanity’s innate aggression, he does
admit, “It is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so
long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their
aggressiveness.”268 For Freud the occasional expression of agape is a trade-off for our need
to feel security and happiness.
Freud sees religion as an illusion, yet for many individuals their religious faith is a
source of happiness. According to Freud, the seeking of pleasure and joy along with the
absence of pain is at the heart of human endeavor. He believes the pain of our relationships
with others is the cause of most of our misery. At the same time he insists it is better to join
forces in the human community rather than choose the option of isolating the self. “Then one
is working with all for the good of all.”269 Freud’s assertion for the good here lines up with
Aristotle’s ethical philosophy of friendship-love. And he seems to have art in mind when he
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notes that the pleasure we experience in an imaginative work frees our mind from
anxieties.270 Some artworks do that, such as Giotto’s The Ascension of Saint John the
Evangelist, [Figure 5.0] which aims for a religious audience. Yet other works, such as
Salcedo’s Shibboleth do not liberate apprehensions, but compel us to think and to love
through the experience of anxiety, to think love and to ask questions, to provoke the
punctum, to expand the self.
***
Questioning is at the heart of love in a work of art. Love manifests in the between—
the intermedius—the space/time in which the viewer begins to wonder. The scheme of a
between is mentioned a number of times by the character of Diotima in Plato’s Symposium;
the first time when she points out that an intermediate locus must be assumed in truthful
judgment by the subject. Since love in art is not necessarily a judgment, the between dances
somewhere along the continuum of understanding and incredulity; however, the span is
indefinitely open and without an absolute at either end. As Nancy claims, the thinking of love
should not yield to restraint, not contain itself to a certain kind of thinking.271 It reaches
toward, but it does not reach.272 Art in love is always within reach, but reach as extension,
movement, not destination.
Then, in a second mention of between-ness, Diotima tells of Love as spirit behaving
as go-between for mortals and gods. This spirit is a fluttery force not anchored in any place,
but fugitive, always-in movement, managing its immanent poverty through resourcefulness
and creativity. If there is spirit in the love found in art, it is the dynamism of the cycle of
resurrection and making connections in pursuit of understanding through asking questions.
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Understanding as such is not based in the theoretical, but a process of coming to know.
Understanding is a condition of possibility, specifically the potential to disclose the being of
Dasein, what it means to exist.273
The willingness to think about a work of art is collaborative and cooperative, a giving
of presence that offers itself to duration in the manner of loving a friend or adoring a Deity.
Love has foundations in religion so its rubric arises from a relation with God.274 Yet love in
art makes no claim for the Divine, religious laws, prayer, or scripture. Likewise, there are
aspects of love in art that resemble friendship. Yet love in art has no claim for the friendly,
companionship or the good.
The love in art does not privilege; it revels in difference and impermanence. It is not
concerned with a beautiful body or a Beautiful Self but wonder about beautiful bodies and
Beautiful Selves. It does not complete anything.275 There is no possession or desire yet all
feeling is possible. It is not idealistic, nor heaven-bound, it exposes itself in the real-world
experiences of the subject, their ontological unpredictability, thrownness in the mutability of
Dasein. In its boundless generosity toward possibility, love in art climbs up or lays down
metaphorical ladders or steps over or into cracks in the floor; it embraces or retreats from the
other. Love in art is a crossing.
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Chapter Three
Wonder-full
What is wonder? Why is wonder important to a theory of love in art? This chapter
looks at the phenomenon of wonder, the starting point of thinking. Plato asserts wonder
(thaumazein) as the beginning of philosophy;276 in a lecture series delivered at Notre Dame
University in 1954, Arendt explicates on wonder and its meaning in early philosophy,
Thaumadzein, the wonder at that which is as it is, is according to Plato a pathos,
something which is endured and as such quite distinct from doxadzein, from forming
an opinion about something. The wonder that man endures or which befalls him
cannot be related in words because it is too general for words. Plato must have first
encountered it in those frequently reported traumatic states in which Socrates would
suddenly, as though seized by a rapture, fall into complete motionlessness, just
staring without seeing or hearing anything. That this speechless wonder is the
beginning of philosophy became axiomatic for both Plato and Aristotle. And it is this
relation to a concrete and unique experience which marked off the Socratic school
from all former philosophies. To Aristotle, no less than to Plato, ultimate truth is
beyond words.277

Most important in Arendt’s quote is the idea of speechlessness—the wonder that renders the
subject without words to express their thinking. Wonder is an experience possible in a work
of art for the beholder. This occurs when mere words cannot explain the effect of the artwork
on the subject in the moment of being-with and thinking-with.
Love in art is quite apart from any information obtained or opinions formed about a
work of art. The starting point of love in art is thinking. Thinking is to silently question
everything, beyond that initial experience of wonder. Thinking is the most essential of a
subject’s actions; it opens the eyes of the mind. Arendt employs the original term “thought105

thing” to refer to a work of art. This expression stresses that thinking is essential to the
experience of art. She is referring to the consideration of the subject contemplating a work of
art, but the idea is equally applicable to the artist, whose thinking-with, questioning-with
allows the artwork to come forth into the world. As wonder is beginning (archē) to
philosophy, the artist’s thinking is genesis for the work of art. How does wonder manifest as
love in art? Thinking about art is a manifestation of love based in wonder. By way of art we
arrive at wondering: curiosity, contemplation or interest. A viewer’s response to an artwork
can be emphatically wonder-full, inciting astonishment or marvel. It may just as likely be
confusing or banal. How the artist moves a viewer to wonder is on a spectrum of possibility.
The illustrations in this chapter offer some of the possibilities—such as art that appears
enigmatic, grotesque, transgressive, contradictory or familiar.
One of the ways wonder is deployed in art is through myth. What is myth? In the first
section of this chapter titled “the aesthetics of myth,” I take a close look at Nancy’s definition
of myth and ideas about the significance of mythos for the subject. For Nancy myth is the
origin of human history, an act of sharing that imparts meaning to being. What is the
relationship between art and myth? Myth and art are both disclosed as inventive and
visionary expressions. Nancy claims that new myths are always in development. New art is
emerging too; myth and art are living, impermanent, open-ended phenomena that create
connection between subjects.
In the first half of the chapter I consider the deployment of myth by contemporary
artists Mariko Mori and Wangechi Mutu; both create artworks that contribute to an ongoing
experience of mythos that incites wonder. Mori’s art practice draws from primordial myths,
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which reveal meanings within the subject’s relationship to the natural world. In that
disclosure, Mori aims to foster wonder as well as profound connections between subjects and
the cosmos, very much in the same manner as Nancy envisions the sharing of primeval myth;
in contrast to the recitation of myth, Mori is utilizing cutting edge technologies.
The future is a ground for wonder. Mutu creates mythopoeic art that reflects on longstanding cultural mythologies in addition to an imminent world. The transgressive, fantastical
and chimerical figures that populate Mutu’s oeuvre hybridize Bakhtin’s notions of the
carnivalesque, African symbolism and cultural ideologies, as well as the current revolution of
science and technology represented by cyborgs in the concepts of Donna Haraway and in the
contemporary philosophy of Afrofuturist aesthetics.
While I have so far spent much of this paper emphasizing the role of the viewer in the
love found in art, the second half of the chapter takes a closer look at the love in art that
emerges from the artist and art practice. In the section “two-in-one” I focus on prolific artists
Kay Walkingstick and Vivian Maier. Thinking is largely transparent in the work of
Walkingstick, a living painter who writes and speaks extensively about her practice. On the
other hand the issue of thinking is a mystery in the photography of Maier, who died in
obscurity and left behind no extant writing about her work.
What is the relationship an artist has with their art? Is this liaison also a manifestation
of love in art—of wonder? Walkingstick deploys wonder as love in art in a subtle, personal
yet complex way; I frame her practice with Arendt’s ideas concerning the “two-in-one” of
thinking. Plato called this eme emautō, which means between me and myself. Duality is in
fact an important part of Walkingstick’s practice; it is evident in two ways: the quiet interior
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dialogue with the self that brings the paintings forth and the diptych format of the works.
What happens in an artist’s studio? Most viewers only see the result of a finished work of art;
they are not normally aware of the cognitive and physical processes that comprise its
creation. The work and thinking that takes place in the artist’s studio space lays the
groundwork for love in art.
The idea of “two” comes up in a different perspective for Maier who was an unheardof amateur photographer in the second half of the twentieth century. The tens of thousands of
negatives found only after she died reveal an artist of astonishing skill. The notion of “twoin-one” applies to her double life: she worked as a nanny while discreetly taking pictures of
her world as an amateur street photographer. These images conjure wonder on a number of
levels, not the least is the question, what was she thinking? Maier left behind little or no
documentation about her work so there will always be wonder about her photography. Does
the lack of information about Maier inhibit the possibility for love in art in her practice? Does
her work stand on its own for love to be found in her work?
The works of both Maier and Walkingstick point to a critical intersection of life and
art in their practice and imagery. In this section of the chapter I unpack Mikhail Bakhtin’s
philosophy of “art for life’s sake”278 that stresses how human existence and creative practice
are in a co-dependent relationship. I also will take a closer look at Heidegger’s ideas about
art-making that describes less commonly held perspectives on the role of the artist in making
art. My intention in this chapter is to once again look towards the geneses of things to
consider how love is the origin of a work of art. I bind together the idea of thinking and
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wonder as starting points for love in art not only for the viewer but also for the artist—the
archē of artwork.
Aesthetics of myth
Nancy states that myths are fictions that establish the world; they are fundamental to
community.279 Myths may be easily dismissed as irrelevant in the twenty-first century, yet he
emphasizes the significance of their deep-seated origins: they are the palpable beginning of
human history. He locates an imaginary setting of a speaker surrounded by other people in an
earlier time. It could be on a hill or inside a cave, in front of a fire or a tree struck by
lightning; there might be masks, laughter, or singing.280 We might imagine a sense of wonder
is shared amongst the group. Nancy writes,

In the speech of the narrator, their language for the first time serves no other purpose
than that of presenting the narrative and of keeping it going. It is no longer the
language of their exchanges, but of their reunion—the sacred language of a
foundation and an oath. The teller shares it with them and among them.281

This scene is repeated innumerable times over time and over the world. Myth is not
dialogue, but foundational soliloquy; a message that imparts meaning.282 The telling and retelling of myth as well as hearing it create an understanding of the world.283 In other words,
the invention of myth is the origin of human consciousness and language.284
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Myth is trans-historical; like gods, myths change or disappear.285 Yet subjects
continue “mything” 286 as Nancy states, and new myths are often in development; now as then
myth may be deployed for the purpose of power.287 For example, in the case of Aristophanes’
myth the telling of it reinforced the power of the gods to their subjects. This power can be
utilized in a way that is destructive, but in best practice it brings subjects together. What
strikes me in the quote by Nancy is that we can also suppose the sharing of myth is
analogous to the sharing of art. Both myth and art are creative, imaginative and expressive

Figure 3.0. Mariko Mori, Primal Rhythm (2011) Still from digital video of a site-specific installation in Seven
Light Bay, Miyako, Japan. The Sun Pillar (left) comprised of layered acrylic was installed in 2011. The floating
Moon Stone will be set in place at a future date. Image: Faou Foundation.

enterprises. Like art, myth is neither objectively true nor objectively false. As “reunion” it
brings subjects into connection, a major component of love in art. As connection it is
experience. As experience it becomes part of us—it is embodied. What we see and what we
hear become part of our constitution and consciousness. Maurice Merleau-Ponty writes,
…They [ideas] could not be given to us as ideas except in a carnal experience. It is
not only that we would find in that carnal experience the occasion to think them; it is
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what we owe their authority, their fascinating, indestructible power, precisely to that
fact that they are in transparency behind the sensible, or in its heart.”288

For Merleau-Ponty thinking and the body are physically linked. Looking into the mirror or
gazing at the other, we see a body but we do not see inside, the containment of a heart that
beats, blood vessels that course through tissue and organ, nerves and cellular materials that
inform the muscles, and countless other components of physiological life. Yet we know they
exist. And in that knowing the subject experiences thought—although thinking cannot be
seen either. It is the invisible heart of being. When we confront the artwork or listen to the
myth we engage one or more of our tangible senses: sight, hearing, touch, olfactory and taste.
These corporeal faculties are at one with our immaterial consciousness. (This includes
wonder; after all, the idiom “a sense of wonder” indicates that an experience of wonder is
manifested as a physical sensation in the body.) It is through thinking we assign memory and
meaning to things; the capacity for memory (a component of consciousness) comes about
from this body-world relation.289 In consciousness we experience wonder, a phenomenon of
speculation. This experience is part and parcel of love in art.
Works of art—like myth—may establish a situation of wonder for the subject. Mariko
Mori290 is a contemporary artist actively contributing to twenty-first century mything that
animates the viewer’s sense of wonder. A work in progress titled Primal Rhythm [Figure 3.0]
is a large-scale project off the small island of Miyako in Japan, almost 200 miles southwest
of Okinawa Prefecture. This work consists of two site-specific parts. The tallest component
of this permanent installation is the sculpture Sun Pillar, a phallic-shaped column
approximately thirteen feet tall comprised of pressed acrylic.291 Pearlescent in hue, it weighs
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three tons, and is erected on the site of a towering rock promontory in Seven Light Bay.
Deploying eco-conservational methods with regard to the sensitive rocks and coral reefs in
the surrounding waters, Sun Pillar was carefully put into place by hand. A second sculpture
titled Moon Stone is not yet installed. It is designed as a nearly ten foot acrylic sphere on a
stainless steel base equipped with light-emitting diode (LED.) It will float in Seven Light
Bay and will constantly change hue based on the bay’s tides and the position of the moon.292
Sun Pillar and Moon Stone will interact literally and allegorically on the annual
winter solstice293 when the shadow of the column directly crosses the sphere. Mori’s
calculated placement of the work to achieve this mythopoeic effect evokes the ancient
meaning of the solstice as a time of rebirth in which all parts of life are connected. The sense
of wonder about the solstice permeates history; the significance of the winter solstice is seen
in prehistoric artifacts from the Neolithic and Bronze Ages at diverse archeological sites such
as Ireland, England, Egypt and Mexico.294
Nancy points out that within myth the transience of time is evidenced and myth
discloses this phenomena.295 The winter solstice is marked as the moment in the life cycle
that symbolizes ending and beginning. Primal Rhythm offers the viewer a situation for
pondering how extant things are linked in the regenerative energy of life. With Primal
Rhythm Mori upholds the “retelling”—the sharing—of foundational primeval myth but her
artistic contribution is innovative in the use of twenty-first century technologies and
materials. Like the ancients, Mori figuratively unites celestial and terrestrial. Through this
and other monuments she plans to install into the specific environments of six continents,
Mori aims to foster a profound connection—what she terms “earth consciousness”—for the
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viewer.296 This awareness will ideally remind the viewers of their dependent relationship on
the natural world (a one-way dependency since the world does not depend on humans) as
well as the ongoing responsibility to protect and honor it. In the best-case scenario, love as
experienced in Mori’s Primal Rhythm incites the viewer to wonder about our
interconnectedness with the passing of time, the cosmos, the landscape and being-in-theworld.
While Mori offers an unambiguous intention and interpretation for Primal Rhythm,
the assignment of meaning to a work of art is contingent because the artist’s intention for
meaning may be (and often is) altered by the viewer. This is true of philosophy as well; art
and philosophy share the characteristic of ideas. Merleau-Ponty asserts that, “… Philosophy,
like a work of art, is an object that can arouse more thoughts than those that are “contained”
in it…”297 This statement addresses the idea of an addition to something created. Once an
artist or philosopher puts the artwork or the thought out into the world, the ideas, intentions
and considerations that went into its formation expand when it reaches an audience. The
observer/reader/listener adds their own thoughts about it, and this may comprise notions not
originally intended by the creator. This occurrence is yet further addition, supplement or
enlargement. The occurrence of expansion is critical to love in art. Can there also be a
contraction? No, because although artworks and ideas are generally—and perhaps in
theory—intended for the other’s consideration, they exist independent of another subject’s
attention. If no one else sees it, hears it or reads it, the maker’s idea is not negated. The work
takes on an undisclosed life of its own that exists in relationship with the artist. It remains an
expression of love even if private. Yet aspects of this association can change over time as the
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artist/philosopher develops new thoughts. In any case the future of the artwork and
philosophical idea is perpetually open to possibility (indefinite openness.) Its existence
cannot be finalized. While art and philosophy share this common ground, art extends even
further. Art is idea but also—in most cases—a created object, musical score, text or
performance. In this way it is another sort of addition because it brings forth a tangible
phenomenon that is available to the senses along with consciousness.
It is this circumstance that calls up an extra something I am describing as love in art.
Specifically it is the thinking and wonder prompted by the experience of art for the subject. A
connection with art is made via the senses and consciousness. (Or perhaps consciousness is a
form of one of the senses.) Typically the correspondence occurs indirectly within the triadic
framework of viewer-artwork-artist. Yet some art is designed to offer a direct connection
such as in the case of performance art or live music. No matter the context the effect is the
same: the subject experiences an invisible interior expansion. Love in art is manifest in the
asking of questions, wondering, and seeking meaning that opens the self to other possibilities
as a kind of addition.
Arendt speaks of the action to ask “unanswerable questions” as necessary to forming
meaning.298 To form meaning is a supplement. And the activity of wonder—although based
on a connection with the work of art—leaves nothing manifest in its wake.299 It belongs to
the subject’s consciousness as the “starting-point of thinking.”300 Unlike the monological
intuitive myth, wonder is arguably an internal dialogue characterized by a to and fro; “all
thinking is discursive.”301 Therefore it is reasonable to assert that the self is multiplied in
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asking questions, as it is with love. There is the self who asks the question and the self that
answers.302
Something additional is offered by a work of art: an experience. While we are always
experiencing in that our senses and emotions are constantly engaged in the particular world
around us—what Heidegger calls “facticity”303—amidst the process of living—what he terms
“thrownness”; for example the ontic moments of experience in which we smell the freshly
brewed coffee, feel the cat rubbing against our leg, or glimpse bright blue sky beyond the
window. Then some experiences are set apart; they are exceptional, fuller, an intense
recollection that is relational as we are connected to them via a specific object or
circumstance. For example, to have read the book that moved us deeply, to witness a beloved
suffer and die, to revel in a moonlit celebration with friends. Experiences as such are singular
and possess a brimming unity that is intellectual and emotional.304 It locates itself in
conscious recollection; it emphasizes a poignant connection. This occurs in the experience of
a work of art; for example, to behold the sight of Leonardo’s extraordinary Last Supper in
Milan is an example of an experience that offers profound love in art.
John Dewey points out that a component of experience is flow. Specifically he
writes, “In an experience, flow is from something to something.”305 This description stresses
that experience is a kind of movement that applies to all experiences (including love in art),
but here I focus on an encounter with a work of art that may manifest love. For the artist it is
the movement of thinking and making that plays out from conception to completion. The
artist’s mind, body and tools operate (flow) together towards an end objective. During this
creative process, the artist is constantly and consistently thinking about what needs to happen
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in the work by asking questions; these
may express concerns regarding design
elements, quality of the media and
content. The artist queries herself: what
am I attempting to do here? What is the
best way to do this? Is there another,
better way? The artist is consciously
sensitive to process—what they are
doing and how they are doing it. The
artist experiences wonder throughout
making; this wonder is also the love

Figure 3.1. Wangechi Mutu, Sprout (2010), Mixed media, ink,
paint, and collage on Mylar. 54” x 51” Image: ARTFORUM

found in art. The artwork eventually reaches a final form in the physical sense; for example,
a painting or a video.
This sense of wonder in making art is constituent of an embodied undertaking that
contains the component of love. How so? One consideration is Dewey’s assertion that the
mastery and effort of the artist are vital, “Craftsmanship to be artistic in the final sense must
be ‘loving’; it must care deeply for the subject matter upon which skill is exercised.”306 In
this way the artist not only cares about the artwork, but also about the anticipated (yet
unknown) audience that will experience it. For Dewey care aims at the pleasurable reception
the viewer will have.
In this way he tends to be an idealist; today he might redefine art appreciation as a
wider experience—something that is not limited to the agreeable. This is because art made
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within the postmodern and post-postmodern context may be delightful or beautiful, but also
disturbing, sorrowful or abject. Examples include the cognitive dissonance previously noted
in Richard Drew’s Falling Man, [Figure 0.5] the incongruity of Martin Puryear’s Ladder for
Booker T. Washington, [Figure 2.2] as well as the feminist, racially satirical videos, collages
and sculptures of Wangechi Mutu.307
By way of a specific example, consider Mutu’s Sprout, [Figure 3.1] an inverted
female figure with mottled skin seems to be growing from the earth. Designed in an almost
square format, the figure occupies most of the visual field. In the manner of plant roots, her
arms are embedded deeply in the ground and her legs are splayed with knees resting
symmetrically on mounds of soil. Her lower legs have morphed into tree trunks with
numerous branches springing small leaves; her sex is a nest adorned with pearls.308 Birds and
butterflies perch or are in mid-flight. The figure’s face is a carved African mask,309 large
black eyes staring blankly out at the viewer.
Similar to Mori’s Primal Rhythm, Mutu’s idea here is mythopoeic. Sprout’s subject is
suggestive of the mythical Daphne310 in an upside-down birthing position. This image seems
to hold multiple readings. The artwork’s title denotes a state of transition—rudimentary new
growth. She is a vulnerable earth mother, an up-and-coming terrestrial goddess. In one
review of the work Sprout is described as an allusion to the black female as the non-Western
colonized subject, “pre-civilized, hypersexual and animalistic in nature.”311 I argue the image
has other intentions. Mutu has placed pictures of animal parts into the collage.312 The
medium of cut and pasted images, shapes and colors are used in such a way that the subtly
fragmented surface suggests a sort of violence such as colonialism, gendered brutality, or
117

female genital mutilation. Elements of perceptual representation such as butterflies, birds and
pearls further allude to the abundance of nature. In an art historical context the reproductive
capacity for females is conventionally linked with the representation of the fecund landscape.
Yet rather than bucolic fertile terrain Mutu may be suggesting that it is the female’s endless
work to survive within the natural world that is at stake.
An alternative possibility is that the female body in Sprout refers to play and not
work. I see a parallel in Mutu’s figure and Bakhtin’s notion of the carnivalesque body,
related to carnival time;313 it is represented as a body that eats, defecates and has sex that he
refers to as “grotesque.”314 With its devouring and excreting orifices, the body exceeds its
limit to misbehave upon other bodies. Clark and Holquist write, “The grotesque body is flesh
as the site of becoming.”315 This image is in contrast to the composed, smooth, idealized
Classical Greek statues of gods and athletes. We may compare those familiar Western
sculptures with that of the ancient chthonic figure of Baubo.316 Another striking comparison
is that the grotesque hybridizes with plant and animal forms joining with that of humans to
create a new being.317 Clark and Holquist further write,
Just as the carnival enacts the intertextuality of ideologies, official and unofficial, so
the grotesque body foregrounds the intertextuality of nature. The grotesque is
intertextually perceived at the level of biology.318

This intertextuality contains contradictions and ambivalence, which is a component of
carnival. The mask that Mutu’s figure wears may be a symbol of uncertainty, of “transition,
metamorphoses, the violation of natural boundaries.”319 Masks also produce ambiguity
around identity. The question then becomes: is the figure Sprout (like Baubo) laughing under
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her mask? In myth, Baubo takes on the role of a clown; there is reason to believe that what
Mutu has given us is an upside down trickster, a goddess of ribald sensuality.
How does Sprout offer wonder, myth and the potential for love in art? Mutu
synthesizes references to myth, African cultural ideologies, art historical genres and Western
festival into her artworks. Her particular choices for the absurd representation of the figure
are likely to provoke thinking that prompts the viewer to ask questions. What is this figure
doing? What does this mean? Is it humorous or dark? This contemplation is an expansion on
behalf of both artist and viewer. Mutu seems to have synthesized multiple mythical ideas,
which are “embodied” in Sprout. She also undertakes to imagine myriad possibilities
deployed in collage that call forth a thinking-with. These possibilities are open-ended as to
what the viewer can feel or know.
By default the future is an unknown, so the possibilities are completely open-ended.
Works by Mutu may reference aspects of history and myth, but at the same time they
anticipate the future. In doing so she contributes to newer mythologies expressed in the
aesthetics of myth. In fact, the title Sprout offers a clue to the nascent future. Mutu’s practice
is part of the late twentieth century concept of Afrofuturism, an aesthetic realized in music,
literature and the visual arts.320 Rather than a movement per se, it engages in broad
philosophical examination and speculation; adherents position themselves in a critical
perspective at the crosscurrents of race and technoculture as it affects the African diaspora
and beyond. Noted practitioners include science fiction writer Octavia Butler321, musiciancomposer-performer Sun Ra322 and singer-actress Janelle Monáe,323 along with film director
Terence Nance.324
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In an article explaining the current significance of Afrofuturism, artist and academic
John Jennings states, “Afrofuturism is not just science fiction based, but also about imagining
different spaces of creative thought that doesn’t put you in an identity box.”325 In this way
Afrofuturism does not emphasize characteristics of the subject in terms of racial, ethnic,
gendered or religious beliefs; it moves beyond claims that postmodernism embraced.
Important aspects of Afrofuturism are how it is simultaneously forward-looking while
primordially mythopoeic, an open-ended aesthetic that is optimistic and emancipatory in
nature; freedom is achieved via one’s imagination—an imagining based on wonder about an
imminent time. Creative thinking on behalf of practitioners incorporates African
cosmologies, Egyptology and the mythology of Dogon and Yoruba; the mythologies within
these sources contain ideas about science fiction and mysticism.326 Yet Afrofuturists also
embrace other resources that include,
…Shamanism, metaphysics, Hinduism, Buddhism, African traditional religions,
mystical Christianity, Sufism, Native American spirituality, astrology, martial arts
mythology and other ancient wisdoms typically funneled through an African or
diasporic viewpoint.327

Afrofuturism—like Mutu’s imagery—is a passionate bricolage that aims for the prospects of
a future based on science and technology; it rules out slave trade, racism, or inequality of any
kind.
“Science is about knowledge and power.”328 Haraway understands that science
provides an avenue to develop strategies for how to mold the future.329 “There is,” she writes,
“the possibility of overturning the order of things.330 Haraway—who examines feminism
120

from the perspective of science and technology—asserts that we should mandate not only a
rigorous approach for science but also a creative one as well.331 While Haraway is not
grouped with Afrofuturist practitioners, within Simians, Cyborgs and Women she writes at
length about Octavia Butler’s science fiction that imagines the embodied subject in a
technological world and claims Butler as a cyborg theorist.332 Haraway writes, “Science is
our myth.”333 She goes on to address the cyborg’s agency,
Cyborg writing must not be about the Fall, the imagination of a once-upon-a-time
wholeness before language, before writing, before Man. Cyborg writing is about the
power to survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but on the basis of seizing
the tools to mark the world that marked them as other.334

The notion of survival is rare in aesthetics. How will we (the artist, the viewer) persist into an
uncertain (and likely violent) future? How will technology be a tool for survival? How will
we thrive? In what ways will technology empower us? What about love? Slavoj Žižek
informs us that the future will be the human mind working with the computer, not vice versa,
as so often lamented.335
Haraway reminds us that the silicon chip is a surface for writing.336 Writing as
technology—as tool—is crucial to the struggle, but Haraway seems to overlook
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Figure 3.2 Wangechi Mutu, Non je ne regrette rien (2007) Ink, acrylic, glitter, cloth, paper
collage, plastic, plant material and mixed media on Mylar, 54 ½” x 92 ½”. Image: Rubell
Family Collection.

examples of visual art (and perhaps music) in the role of change. Artworks, film and music
cannot be ignored as types of apparatus for subsisting in and forming a new world order.
Love in art is robustly manifested in Afrofuturist art. With its emphasis on aesthetics,
Afrofuturists comprise an ethics of resistance to the harms inflicted in the past and persisting
in the present. Their new world order requires a forward-looking posture rejecting any future
that maintains injustice. If the sciences offer a social milieu free of a fixed and corrupted
power structure, they will become a source of freedom.337
Haraway describes the cyborg as at the same time living being and machine,
imagination and reality in a “post-gender world” without an “origin story.” 338 In a mixed
media work on Mylar, Non je ne regrette rien, [Figure 3.2] Mutu offers the viewer another
(but much larger) hybridized chimera that consumes the visual field within a landscape
format.
Like Sprout there is a violation of natural boundaries in the representation of
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the figure. Unlike Sprout, Non je ne regrette rien does not refer straightforwardly to
sexuality, because cyborgs replicate rather than organically reproduce.339 This monster does
not sport a visible sex or unambiguously identifiable parts in the manner of Sprout. Instead
the amalgam of representation is highly complex, comprising features that are manifold
things: human, reptile, animal, machine part, weaponry, insect and plant life. It is also part
pure painterly abstraction. An unwieldy cyborg, it appears to be suspended or to float
weightless in an indeterminate atmosphere that hints at the sky.
Tiffany E. Barber refers to this image as “transgressive disfigurement” which is not
based on wholeness but forms of transformation, either violent or unwanted.340 This may be
the case, yet the title (I have no regrets) seems to refer to something less adverse, perhaps a
voluntary change of bodily composition or even submission to the power of some inevitable
cataclysm. Haraway makes a case for the possibility of enjoyment in the disorder of
boundaries and for accountability in their creation.341 If so, then for Mutu’s freak there are no
mistakes or accidents—or apologies. Mutu represents the body as “becoming-machine”:
metamorphosis.342 Žižek asks, “How does the very identity of human mind rely on external
mechanical supplements? How does it incorporate machines?”343 He sees the externalization
of our capabilities via technology as liberating us to be more “pure” subjects,344 a radical
form of subjectivity in which bodies can be swapped out for other options. What becomes of
what we call identity in this scenario?
Cyborgs are likely to take on the appearance and status of an unimaginable (and
therefore completely unprecedented) other. It is possible they do not have a face such as the
one necessary for Levinas. After all, Haraway denies any innocence on behalf of the cyborg
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as they are illegitimate creatures sans religious or patriarchal origin stories and therefore lack
allegiance to a father.345 They exist outside any established or known system. They defy
dualism, resist rules, dismiss psychoanalysis, laugh at the notion of a lack, and eschew
identity. They do not signify class, gender or race—ideas that preoccupy subjects. Are they
subjects? That answer is up for debate. Mutu’s choice of figuration in Non je ne regrette rien
speaks to the blurring of hierarchy of all things living in addition to inert technologies. As the
sum of their parts, cyborgs reach a limit at the same time they seek new limits, making it up
as they go along.
How is love in art possible in such disjointed representations? The artist and the
artwork form an extension toward the other. By this I mean that no matter how a work of art
appears, if the viewer is willing there will be a crossing. When the viewer encounters the
work, the viewer likewise wills herself toward the art, or she simply does not. Love in art
must find itself on equal footing within the crossing of art, artist and viewer; this is not
always possible. All artists and works of art beckon the viewer. Yet there are individuals who
do not wonder at the stars in the night sky or think twice about a work of art. A connection is
never assured; it can only will itself into being. But when it happens, this mutual willingtoward sets up the between—the space/time in which the viewer begins to wonder.
Arendt describes the will as, “…Sometimes identified with the heart and almost
always regarded as the organ of our innermost self.”346 For Arendt, the phenomenon of the
will is one of three basic, autonomous mental activities that include thinking and
judgment.347 Compared with thinking, the will is not contemplative, nor argumentative; it
operates on imperatives even when calling up thought or imagination.348 The will is not
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desire, because desire indicates a lack; Nancy reminds us, “Desire is unhappiness without
end...”349 The will—like love—is both noun and verb that signifies action, movement. And
like love, the will is an engine of reach, of extension. Love in art is always a willful
movement to connect through wonder and thinking. Yet love’s extension is not towards an
end; it is not a project. This thinking does not presuppose knowledge; in the same way that
wonder renders the viewer speechless, love in art defies claims such as the one staked by
knowledge.
Two-in-one
Dewey claims experience holds the constituent of flow, a movement from something
to something. Like experience, thinking is flow; the phases Dewey describes are sometimes
ebbing and other times flooding; it plays out over time. Dewey explains,
Thinking goes on in trains of ideas… They are phases, emotionally and practically
distinguished, of a developing underlying quality; they are its moving variations, not
separate and independent…but are subtle shadings of a pervading and developing
hue.350

If we regard experience as something that develops and thinking as something that plays out
in successive stages, then we can be assured that the aesthetic experience—both the making
and the encounter with a work of art—is not a static one, nor is it necessarily finalized.
Certainly the actual time physically spent in an aesthetic experience comes to an end. In
many cases the work of art is forgotten; in other instances it escapes memory altogether. On
occasion the viewer’s reaction to an artwork is outstanding as in the case of the punctum, and
persists as an experience easily recalled in consciousness in the same way that the birthday
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Figure 3.3. Kay Walkingstick Four Directions Stillness (1994) acrylic and wax on
canvas, and oil on canvas, 36” x 72” Image: kaywalkingstick.com

celebration or the friend’s death is quite memorable and evocative of emotion. This is the
occasion of love in art. It is a love that is born in wonder and questions, which manifest as a
form of care in its attentiveness to what it is contemplating.
This statement is true not only for the viewer but for the artist as well. In the studio
the artist undergoes the flow of thinking in trains of ideas as well as in emotional and
physical phases of developing a project. These activities are a means to an end. They are an
unfolding of the art in the artwork.
Arendt considers artworks, which are traditionally constructed of palpable objects—
what Heidegger calls its “thingly” quality—such as paper or paint, as “thought-things”
because once completed their alteration into something new calls for another way of thinking
beyond their original materiality and utility.351 To hybridize Arendt and Heidegger’s ideas, I
employ the adjective thought-thingly to works of art comprised of objects that have
properties and also originate in thinking. This synthesis becomes something that contains
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meaning in the artwork. By way of example, Kay Walkingstick’s352 painting titled Four
Directions Stillness [Figure 3.3] is a diptych, defined as two panels placed side by side or
physically joined. The left panel is comprised of acrylic paint and wax and the right side
rendered in oil paint, both on canvas supports. When we deconstruct the artwork in terms of
making, there are two corresponding perspectives, a kind of two-in-one. The first is to
contemplate the time and thought that went into its conception. Second, to consider the
physical labor of constructing the painting. More tangible is the latter—how we might
independently imagine the original forms of the various media she assembled and organized
within her studio space: a spool of woven canvas, wooden stretcher bars, ground pigments
suspended in plastic medium or linseed oil, and beeswax. Many other studio tools were
additionally utilized that may include measuring tape, nails or staples, brushes, scissors, a
palette knife and mineral spirits. A combination of tools and physical labor brings the
painting into being, but not because Walkingstick is genius, but a collaborator; she has
partnered with these things. This collaboration has an emergent quality comprised of
variations of movement—not separate or independent but entwined—that cause the paintings
to appear. This is what Heidegger describes as poiēsis, “a poetic shepherding into being.”353
The painting comes to presence. Movements that comprise the making of the work bear the
mark of care. This is love at work in the artist’s studio manifested in all elements of thoughtthingly creation; rather than a master Walkingstick allows the openness necessary for a
coming-to-being.
Generally the viewer does not take on an envisaging of what happens in the artist’s
studio. The viewer who encounters the painting in a gallery or museum sees the finished
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work and detaches it from the context of its mundane media and apparatus. For viewers the
artwork is more than the sum of its physical parts; they may be subjectively moved to find
meaning in what they see as its final form; they may be moved to love.354 That viewers may
lack an awareness of the studio collaboration does not diminish the inherent love in the
revealing of the artwork. We might reframe the word “artwork” as another way of saying “art
is love at work.”
With regards to the time and thought at work on behalf of Walkingstick, it may be
overly speculative to understand how she conceived the idea or to what lengths she mulled
over the work’s general concept, unless she specifically reveals or otherwise documents this
process. The point to be made is that Walkingstick’s thinking about the art she makes is a
silent hermetic activity, the previously described speechlessness of wonder. Thought in terms
of cognitive processes is a mute interior dialogue, what Plato called eme emautō: between me
and myself. With this internal dialogue of contemplation, one is split into two.
Contemplating the meaning along with the physicality of the work itself is a kind of
ownership.355 This means the viewer who ponders the artwork takes possession of it through
a conscious relationship as part of the thought process. As mentioned earlier it is an activity
that has an aspect of duality. Arendt writes,
…[I]t often appears in works of art…especially in Kafka’s early prose pieces or in
some paintings of Van Gogh where a single object, a chair, a pair of shoes, is
represented. But these artworks are thought-things, and what gives them their
meaning—as though they were not just themselves but for themselves—is precisely
the transformation they have undergone when thinking took possession of them. In
other words, what is being transferred here is the experience of the thinking ego to
things themselves. For nothing can be itself and at the same time for itself but the two
in one that Socrates discovered as the essence of thought and Plato translated into
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conceptual language as the soundless dialogue eme emautō—between me and
myself.356

Part of Arendt’s assertion here is that thinking is transformative. As things that are thought
about artworks are imbued with significance. A subject thinks them as special or set apart in
some way. Arendt explains, “…what Plato somewhat later called ideas perceivable only by
the eyes of the mind.”357 The dialogue with the self—the two-in-one—is always an
opportunity to conjure meaning, an act that is perhaps the fullest and most creative
expression of being alive. At the heart of thinking is a relationship with the self, one that is
based on action. In this way the subject’s consciousness is never whole or in a state of
conclusion, but always interacting within the self and therefore subject to continual change.
Like a work of art, thinking has an emergent quality.
The notion of duality—a “two-in-one”— is perfectly expressed in facets concerning
Walkingstick’s diptych and the artist herself, as singular being. There are a number of points
to make all of which contain some measure of unity (one) and separateness (two.) First,
Walkingstick is bi-racial: her father is Cherokee Indian and mother Euro-American.358 She
has asserted that her dual identity informs the dynamic of the content for her art practice. Yet
another kind of twoness presents itself within this personal discourse: she notes the double
life of American Indians (such as herself) who negotiate their indigenous origins and ethos in
the context of a powerful Euro-centric culture that negates those originary principles.359
Like all artists Walkingstick conceives and plans her artworks via thinking—the
interior dialogue within herself. As noted, the conception of the artwork is a continuous to129

and-fro flow that is the composite of thinking and making, including envisaging its figuration
and symbolism, building the painting support as well as the process and application of
various paint media. This phase holds a double aspect: the artist and the emergent painting in
a discourse of care and connection.
As a diptych comes together yet another dialogue plays out in the relationship of the
two symmetrical square panels comprising Four Directions Stillness, which begin to “speak”
to each other in their difference. The left panel of is a flat abstraction that consists of an
equilateral cross form that is a Cherokee symbol for the Four Cardinal Directions: east, west,
north and south. The cross, which is outlined in green, is placed in the middle of an orange
and pink field, whereby the acrylic pigments are layered in a heavy wax impasto that allows
the colors a certain amount of transparency. Walkingstick explains her technique as building
up the surface of the wax and pigment using her bare hands and then alternating scraping and
scratching areas away.360 This haptic approach is how Walkingstick’s imbues the whole of
the image—and the paint itself—with a kind of idiosyncratic meaning.361 The use of her two
hands holds a double reference as the binary of left and right are reflected in the basic
structure of a diptych.
The right panel depicts a lushly painted landscape of a cliff face seen from a distance,
and employs a similar palette to the left panel with the same pinks and orange colors. The
cliff occupies most of the composition; there is a narrow irregular band of pale sky above it
and likewise an uneven band of purple-brown earth at the bottom. The use of neutral colors
for the land and sky further emphasize the vibrant warmth of the principal color scheme.
Together firmament and earth serve to give a sense of deep space to the landscape along with
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a feeling of monumentality and the profound wonder at the passing of time embedded in the
idea of rock. The undulating surface of the cliffs is suggested in the rendering of its deep
vertical rifts that catch illusionistic sunlight and cast deep shadow.
While the painting is physically static, actual motion drives a discourse between the
two panels. This motion commences with the eye of the viewer whose gaze goes to and fro,
left and right and back again, from abstraction to representation. The left panel does not
directly concern place or space but formal concerns of color and texture embellished with the
ancient geometric cross. The right panel suggests a location, but a generic remote landscape
devoid of overt symbolism at the same time hinting at a relationship with ancestral terrain.362
While each panel presents a different sense of space and image, they are united in color
scheme, size and symmetry. They are two joined by one artist in dialogue with herself
regarding the personal, historical and cultural. The panels are alike and different; they are at
once separate and together; one does not privilege the other.
In Walkingstick’s Four Directions Stillness we see two types of unity. The first is
exterior and the second conceptual. With regard to the former, the two panels in a diptych are
hinged, or otherwise joined together in a manner that keeps their relationship physically
stable. As to the latter, the panels are united in ideas—consciousness—that are connected
first by Walkingstick in the work’s thought-out creation, and subsequently by the viewer.
The relationship between the panels themselves and that of artist and viewer to the artwork is
a manner of dialogue: an interchange between two. Something fundamental to dialogue is the
notion of between, a space that simultaneously unites and separates. This concept applies to
the viewer and to artwork in terms of love in art.
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***
In an early essay Bakhtin addresses concepts of unity specific to the experience of a
work of art as compared to the overarching experience of life. Basically he noted that when
we think about a work of art, we are making a specific and unique effort. He used the term
answerability to describe the specific form of interaction between two subjects or a subject
and a work of art.363 Answerability is rooted in a shared response of self to the other, and in
fact is based in an ethical responsibility to not ignore or deny the other.364 The subject not
only concretely answers the other, but the self as well. This means that the artist has a moral
obligation to carry out her creative work, to share her work with the viewer, and the viewer
to consider the artwork. Outside of an ethical demand, answerability calls up a theory for
love in art because it is also based on care. Walkingstick did not create Four Directions
Stillness—or any artworks—in isolation and without concern; every step of the making
process is imbued with answerability to the materials and work on her end as well as an
anticipated audience. In the open realm of viewing a work of art, the diptych then answers
the viewer and the viewer responds in kind. Answerability is immediately concerned with
self/other relations365 and represents another concept of two.
We may think of answerability as another configuration of love in art that is at hand
in both the making and viewing of art, because it not merely a form of care it is also way to
make a connection. Yet it is not an association based on understanding or even agreement; it
is possible but not necessarily so. In fact, the outstanding aspect of dialogue for Bahktin is
based on the open-ended search for meaning on behalf of the subject in the face of sustained
uncertainty that neither the self nor the other does not (cannot) completely satisfy; therefore
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the ongoing phenomena of dialogue. To
reach an absolute conclusion is the dead
end of discourse, therefore the self
continues to contemplate possibilities.
Bakhtin understood life and the
world as unpredictable. Earlier in this
chapter I state that artworks and ideas
are generally intended for the other’s
consideration. If it happens that no one
else experiences the artwork, its idea is

Figure 3.4. Vivian Maier May 5, 1955. (Self-portrait)
Photograph. Image: motherjones.com

still not revoked because it takes on an
undisclosed life of its own that exists in relationship to its maker and a prospective audience.
In this case the future of an art-philosophical idea is perpetually open to possibility: to seeing,
to contemplation and to experience. A contemporary demonstration of Bakhtin’s argument
for art’s capriciousness is the abundant work of previously unknown and recently discovered
American street photographer/nanny Vivian Maier.366 [Figure 3.4] Writer John Maloof367
was seeking old photographs for a book in progress and inadvertently discovered at an
auction house a large and astonishing trove of negatives and undeveloped film by the obscure
Maier shortly after her death. He subsequently located more of Maier’s negatives and film in
storage units after investigating her identity. Gathering and examining much of the more than
100,000 negatives along with numerous boxes of Maier’s personal items hoarded over her
lifetime, Maloof then took on the enormous task of developing her prints and established an
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archive. He continues to research their origins and has sought out and interviewed Maier’s
previous employers and the (now grown) children she cared for.
Along the way he established that Maier was a self-taught photographer who earned
an itinerant living as a nanny and housekeeper. While she carried her camera around in
public and ardently photographed her subjects, she maintained a discreet profile in terms of
her live-in domestic jobs, even using bathrooms as inept darkrooms. The picture of her
character is inconsistent. By some reports, she was a beloved nanny; according to others she
possessed a dark, off-putting and occasionally
violent demeanor. The point of agreement
between people who knew her was that Maier
was an eccentric individual who was very much a
loner with a strong and complicated personality.
She possibly had a deep-rooted fear of males, yet
they are often the unwitting or complicit subjects
of her photographs.
Figure 3.5. Vivian Maier, 1954, New York, NY.
Photograph. Image: pbs.org

1954, New York, NY [Figure 3.5] is a black
and white photograph that reflects an

unremarkable moment in mid-twentieth century urban life. Maier has captured two young
boys one of them shining the other’s shoes near a corner a busy city street in front of a
picture window store display. Maier records the moment when the white child having his
shoes cared for looks up and directly into the camera lens. He has the expression of someone
caught by surprise to see someone taking his picture; the shoe-shiner remains unaware of
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Maier. In the background are two Caucasian men, one also shining the shoes of another; they
nearly mirror the foreground pair. The man having his shoes shined is wearing a white fedora
with a business suit and seems to be staring directly at Maier taking the photograph. Beyond
him passersby bustle along.
This photograph depicts a chronotope of the 1950s in the largest city in the United
States. As an image of a public space, it represents a historically specific idea of what it
meant to be a subject at this particular time and place. The discovery of Maier’s works offers
twenty-first century subjects a way to engage with a time and place unknown or forgotten.
Sidewalk shoe-shiners are a rare sight in New York today as are fedoras. Maier relentlessly
roamed urban avenues with her camera at the ready; there is a sense of engagement with her
subjects, yet she kept her distance (more or less) physically and emotionally. For whatever
reasons, she captured on film a gaze, a moment, a feeling, a style, a location and a gesture
tens of thousands of times. We can never know for sure exactly why, but as viewers of her art
we may begin to wonder.
By reports Maier was exceedingly private, opinionated in her liberal political views
and felt particularly connected to the poor. She could be overly strident and unreasonable in
her demands on others. She travelled the world as an independent woman; she documented
herself in hundreds of self-portraits.368 Maier apparently had no overt ambitions as a
professional artist; she did not exhibit her work and in fact did not show anyone her
photographs let alone seek to exhibit them publicly—with one exception. Maloof discovered
correspondence between Maier and a shopkeeper in Saint-Bonnet-en-Champsaur where she
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had lived as a child. She offered to have him see her pictures in the hope he might reproduce
them for sale. Apparently this suggestion did not pan out.
In his research Maloof sought out the feedback from prominent photographers Joel
Meyerowitz369 and Mary Ellen Mark370 who critically appraised Maier’s vision and technical
abilities such as framing and lighting. They note her work for its mechanical mastery and
authentic sensitivity to human nature on par with celebrated twentieth century photographers
Diane Arbus371 and Lisette Model.372 Yet unlike these renowned artists Maier did not seek
any recognition for her talents; she seems to have been driven to take photographs purely for
her own pleasure—or perhaps—as an effort to drive away personal demons. In this way she
stands in stark contrast to Walkingstick (and most artists) whose work is developed with an
audience in mind.
How is Bakhtin’s notion of answerability applied to Maier’s art? How does Maier’s
art practice demonstrate a theory of love in art? Deborah J. Haynes elaborates on Bakhtin’s
position of “art for life’s sake”373 in which he emphasizes the intersection of life and art. She
writes, “Even if we do not know the artist’s name, a work of art… is an example of the
artist’s action in the world.”374 Based on the astonishing number of Maier’s works, her
lifetime endeavor to take photographs is now well established. This very large oeuvre of her
work speaks to her essential love of taking pictures.
Art for life’s sake is at odds with the traditional Western philosophy of L’art pour
l’art (“art for art’s sake”) that arose in the nineteenth century in France. At that time L’art
pour l’art was a nonconformist value that divorced the affiliation of art from didactic or
ethical purposes and pronounced art making as an autonomous motive. In consideration of
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art for life’s sake, Bakhtin stresses the importance of life and art as a co-dependent
relationship; art is an extension of life’s profound possibilities in both actions of creating it
and of viewing it. Love in art is a boundless generosity toward possibility.
I suspect Maier understood that on some level. The fact that she did not discard or
destroy her images, negatives and personal mementos may indicate her understanding (even
if unconscious) of the possibility of their future deployment to some purpose. Her willful
saving reveals a love for her artworks. I further imagine the Maier took so many photographs
and kept all this things because they represented her understanding of being in the world with
others. The majority of her images are the faces of people in the midst of ontic being: doing
things (playing, working, resting, looking) in public spaces (museums, parks, streets).
Are Maier’s photographs an example of Nancy’s notion of transcendence? For Nancy
transcendence is a constant arrival and departure, an “incessant coming and going”375 He
writes,
What is offered is the offered being itself: exposed to arrival and to departure, the
singular being is traversed by the alterity of the other, which does not stop or fix itself
anywhere, neither in “him,” nor in “me,” because it is nothing other than the comingand-going. The other comes and cuts across me, because it immediately leaves for the
other: it does not return to itself, because it leaves only in order to come again. This
crossing breaks the heart: this is not necessarily bloody or tragic, it is beyond an
opposition between the tragic, and serenity or gaiety. The break is nothing more than
a touch, but the touch is not less deep than a wound.376

This passage in an enigmatic way speaks to Maier’s oeuvre, a body of work that reflects all
matter of subjectivity. Nancy reframes transcendence as “the crossing of love.”377 Looking at
Maier’s pictures that capture thousands of crossings—an ocean of other, which binds us
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together in shared sense of existence. In this way Maier’s work is about love. This love is not
about promises, unity or merging with the other; it is about what is “infinitely
inappropriable”378 because we are finite singular beings. By photographing others in their
crossings, she captured moments that mark her connection to each subject no matter how
ephemeral the moment. This includes the many and myriad self-portraits in which Maier
recorded herself in public and private spaces: reflections in mirrors and windows as well as
cast shadows. There is a speechless wonder to be found in her work for those seeking to find
it.
Heidegger would describe Maier’s photographs as poiēsis in that she allowed
something to emerge and in that revealing the viewer might grasp something about what it
means to be human. His modern idea of technē is a companion term to poiēsis. Technē was
understood in ancient Greece as a kind of knowledge but deployed in modern times as a term
that indicated a mode of production. Heidegger redirects the meaning to its earlier use—
technē as poēisis—bringing-forth.379 He writes,
From earliest times until Plato the word technē is linked with the word epistēmē. Both
words are terms for knowing in the widest sense. They mean to be entirely at home in
something, to understand and be expert in it. Such knowing provides an opening up.
As an opening up it is a revealing.380

Certainly Maier became expert in her art practice and was at home in it. This is not to say she
was a genius, but that her relentless efforts were always made in striving for the openness
that would allow a happening of truth—defined as possibility for Dasein. She was constantly
testing her own limit. Something else Heidegger states is cogent to Maier’s work,
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It is precisely in great art—and only such art is under consideration here—that the
artist remains inconsequential as compared with the work, almost like a passageway
that destroys itself in the creative process for the work to emerge.381

He is not saying the artist self-destructs but that she becomes insignificant in the bringing
forth of the work. Contrary to the prevailing status of celebrity artists, the artist must
maintain humility. This statement knocks down the preconceived notion of the artist as
mastermind and focuses on the primacy of the artwork itself. For Heidegger, art—not the
artist—is the origin of the work of art. Heidegger’s perspective contributes to my argument
about love in art. Technē exists alongside love on behalf of the artist; both technē and love
partner as a poetic shepherding of art into the world.
***
Art is a philosophy of love in action in which something happens that begins in
wonder and proceeds with thinking. Thinking in turn, launches the questioning essential to
love in art. Thinking about art is a manifestation of love based in wonder.
This chapter approaches the question of love in art through wonder and the
subsequent thinking and questioning it prompts. Here I consider two possibilities for wonder:
the artist’s studio work as a ground for love and artworks that take on the theme of myth.
Nancy’s explanation of myth begins with the sharing of fictive narratives between
ancient subjects. As myth is an ongoing phenomenon, contemporary artists deploy myth as
an aesthetic, not only in a trans-historical sense but also in a way that anticipates the future as
a ground for wonder.
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The saying, “a sense of wonder” gives a clue to the embodied experiences that
wonder offers. Thinking launches wonder. As the heart of being, thinking is the transparency
behind the sensory body-world relation along with memory and consciousness. The
connection made with art takes place within mind and body for both viewer and artist.
Myth is often based in notions of time; artworks based in an aesthetic of myth may
intend to evoke wonder at time’s passing; this is the case in Mori’s mythopoeic installations
that engender a contemplation of the viewer’s experience of time on Earth. Alternatively, the
figures seen in Mutu’s collages invite wondering about a future that is not earthbound, and
whereby the subject becomes blurred by science and technology. Whatever the artist’s
project may be, the unifying idea is the subject’s being-in-the-world, a world that is grounded
in being-with others. Wonder questions what it means to be and is the conduit for an
expansion the subject undergoes in awareness of being.
Like art, myth is imaginative and expressive; it brings subjects together in the manner
of sharing. In decentering the self as well as in thinking, the self is configured as a two-inone: the self that asks the questions and the self that replies. The dialogue with the self is an
open-ended search for meaning. This pursuit establishes a subjective enlargement that is a
component of love in art.
Dewey’s claim for the flow of experience underscores the movement of love found in
art that begins with wonder and under the directive of the will. This flow is engendered in a
mutual willing-toward; the artist initiates this movement in the studio while care is
manifested in the work. One way to think about this care is through Bakhtin’s call for
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answerability, which is the attention put into thinking, making and engaging with the work of
art as deliberate acts of responsiveness.
The artist’s role is that of midwife who is thinking and questioning while designing
and building the artwork with care and towards connection. Thinking and art both evince
emergent qualities. As midwife, the artist is a collaborator of the thought-thingly coming-tobeing called a work of art. Heidegger names this care-full emergence (bringing-forth) of art
poiēsis. Yet even if the artwork is never shared outside the artist’s studio it remains an
expression of love. This is particularly evident in Maier’s photographs since their discovery
is an act of fate. In contrast, Walkingstick’s studio practice reaches toward her anticipated
audience. In either case art is grounded in an action that lovingly coaxes it into being. Both
artists demonstrate the action of the artist in the world: art for life’s sake.
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Figure 4.0. Bird’s eye view of Marina Abramović’s The Artist is Present (2010) in Marron Atrium at
Museum of Modern Art in New York. Photo: New York Times.

Chapter Four
Indefinite Openness

In this chapter I return to contemplating the direct relationship an artist fosters with a
viewer as an expression of love in art. The first section (“presence”) describes the recordbreaking performance by Marina Abramović at the Museum of Modern Art in New York
City in the spring of 2010. In a work titled The Artist is Present, [Figure 4.0] Abramović
maintained a silent presence in the museum’s atrium that included the collaboration of 1500
successive participants over three months. How does an artist come to presence in a work of
art? In what way does presence become what Butler called “indefinite openness”?382
The representation of physical and mental anguish in art has a long history. Yet what
about the manifestation of actual pain purposefully taken on in performance art? The second
section “the aesthetics of pain” reflects on Abramović’s practice in which hurting herself is a
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recurrent motif. How does an artist’s intentional discomfort substantiate a claim for love in
art? Is there a purpose for violence or suffering in art? What role does the punctum have in
artworks that contain actual pain? Here I also consider the history of performance art within
the 20th century that deploys the body as medium in response to the nonobjective sensibilities
of abstract expressionism. Reflecting upon the prototype performance Challenging Mud
(1955) by Kazuo Shiraga in Japan—as well as other performances by Abramović—I further
consider how an aesthetic of suffering puts forward a claim for love in art by way of selfimposed pain.
The third section titled “zero space” considers the discursive inter-subjective
engagement vital to a loving relationship between artist-performer and viewer with a focus
on the face-to-face encounter in The Artist is Present.
The final section called “risky business” unpacks notions of collaboration and
complicity in performance art. Risks taken by artist and viewer in live performance raise
questions about the uncertainty of being as well as the authorship of performance. What is
the limit for an artist in live performance? How does the reach of an artist engender love in
art?
Presence

I have defined love as an expansion of the self that occurs as a viewer’s response to
an artwork. Performance art can act as a unique means for this dilation because it creates a
time in which thinking and questioning on the part of viewer and artist happen in
synchronicity. By way of example, artist Marina Abramović383 undertook a real-time artwork
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at the Museum of Modern Art in New York City as part of her major retrospective in 2010.
The performance consisted of Abramović sitting silently across from a voluntary participant,
with eyes frequently locked in a mutual gaze. Titled The Artist is Present, this audience
participation performance took place in the spacious Marron Atrium between March 14th and
May 31st in uninterrupted duration for seven and one half hours five days a week, and on
Fridays for nine and one half hours. (Sunday was a day of rest.) The accumulated time
logged for the performance by the final day totaled more than seven hundred hours; the total
number of participants was 1566.384 The Artist is Present broke the record for longest
performance in a museum.385
A large square area in the middle
of the atrium was cordoned off;386 in the
center of the space sat Abramović on an
unpainted wooden chair.387 She would
take this seat immediately before
museum hours commenced and remained
seated until closing. On the wall behind

Figure 4.1. Photographic documentation of Marina
Abramović with a participant performing in The Artist is
Present. Image: New York Times.

her chair, a simplified hand-drawn calendar indicated the months March, April and May; at
the end of each performance she would mark off the day. Abramović wore high-necked,
long-sleeved, floor-length voluminous unadorned gowns that were color-coded according to
the current month: blue, red and white. Her long dark hair was braided and pulled forward
over one shoulder.
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Directly across and a few feet from Abramović, a similar chair accommodated
museum visitors who chose to act as participants. [Figure 4.1] Volunteers queued on the
outside of the partitioned area and waited for their turn to take this seat. Participants spanned
ethnicities and occasionally included children, curators, artists and celebrities. Some sat in
the chair for a few minutes; others for hours or even all day. 388 A number of people returned
to the seat multiple times over the three months. The sitter determined the duration of a
sitting, although one reporter writes that time constraints were eventually imposed due to
increasing numbers of individuals who wished to participate.389
The sustained wordless gaze between Abramović and her participant was the most
striking element in viewing the performance. Sometimes smiles were exchanged; more often
there were mutual tears; gazes tended towards an emotional intensity that periodically
seemed to embody sadness. Occasionally an indicative hand gesture was made—such as a
hand over the heart. In the few minutes between participants Abramović would hang her
head, chin on chest, and close her eyes. Now and then she would rub her face with her hands.
Videos and photographs document these temporary moments of fatigue and retreat into her
self. Yet each time a new participant took the seat, she would raise her head and open her
eyes mutely indicating her full attention to the sitter. The artist always returned to presence:
awake and aware in this immediate and corporeal relationship. By being present, she is
being-with by which Abramović offers her participant an open-ended connection, a situation
of love.
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The aesthetics of pain
In The Artist is Present, Abramović’s persistent return to availability with each new
participant may be considered a reanimated arrival of love achieved via a re-openness of self.
Indeterminate feelings on behalf of artist and viewer cross with unspoken thoughts and
questions, not only between Abramović and the sitter, but also with the audience observing
the interactions in the museum. All
are involved; all are thinking, some
(perhaps) self-questioning. Is this
situation of contemplation an act of
loving? I argue that it is because
everyone is offering their time to be
present, and in the case of the artist,
more than that.
This particular performance
caused Abramović to endure an
extended period of physical pain and
psychological sacrifice, demands

Figure 4.2. Photographic documentation of Marina Abramović’s
Rhythm 10 (1973). Image: elevarte website.

she placed on herself for the sake of
the work. This election of pain is a pattern Abramović exhibits in her work as an artist. She
attended the Academy of Fine Arts in Belgrade in the late 1960s and completed postgraduate studies at the University of Zagreb in 1972. In addition to teaching, she maintains a
life-long and global career as a performance artist. From the beginning, her work has
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consisted of performance pieces in which her body is used to extremes of hunger, danger,
self-mutilation and exhaustion. Her first performance took place in Edinburgh in 1973. Titled
Rhythm 10 it was based on a Russian drinking game in which Abramović employed a
succession of knives that were repeatedly jabbed in a fast-paced rhythmic manner between
the splayed fingers of her hand, palm side down. [Figure 4.2] The stabbing gestures and
patterns were counted in various numeric sequences. Abramović also implemented a
recording device that captured and played back the sounds of the game; she would then
repeat the sequence to mimic her original actions. By the end of the performance she had cut
her hand twenty times.
The ideas of Rhythm 10 include gesture, ritual, time (past/present) and
consciousness; all of these persist in her oeuvre of performance work, including The Artist is
Present. Notions of gesture, ritual and time are relevant to the subject’s everydayness;
simply put, gesture is a way to communicate something with the body such a wave goodbye
or shake of the head to indicate refusal. Ritual is part of a pattern such as the habit of making
coffee in the morning or taking the post-dinner walk, the passeggiata. Regarding time, the
clock and calendar are elemental standards by which we structure and progress through life’s
activities, a measurement by which something starts and stops. Along with consciousness
these comprise a conceptual unity about how we go about daily life. In terms of a work of art,
it is at once different and the same. The examples at hand here are the performances of
Abramović, in which forms of ritual and gesture are set apart, compressed and amplified or
exaggerated at the same time. In setting them apart the viewer (perhaps) understands them in
a different way. Bakhtin, in his contemplation on the nature of time, rejects the conventional
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perception of time as a unit that is anticipated, arrives and retreats into the past.390 Instead he
emphasizes the “presentness” of the moment that holds promise and possibility.391 With this
perception of time, we are offered responsibility and options. In this way each moment
contains indefinite openness for the subject. What typically occurs when we think about the
past? We tend to only reflect upon what happened rather than how that time held this
potential.392 In performance art whereby we observe an action in real time, the approach of
the viewer might be to think of that time as the “open present.” Works of art call for a
different kind of thinking on behalf of the viewer—an effort—what Bakhtin termed
answerability, discussed in Chapter Three.393
That Abramović includes actual bodily pain—or the potential of it—to her
performances provides for yet another layer of thinking about gesture, time and ritual. Seeing
the performance or watching a video of her work provokes a kind of wonder, albeit wonder
that is based in existential anxiety. Authentic pain is not something objective, but utterly
situated in the subjective, always a marker of our finite condition. Pain is something typically
avoided as both an actual condition and in thought, yet Abramović embodies it in her art.
This departs from philosophy that tends to remark upon how to avoid pain.394 Nancy
describes joy (something we think of as the opposite of pain) as beyond satisfaction to an
overflowing state.395 He writes,
To joy cannot contain itself. Joy is not even to contain joy itself, nor the pain that
consequently accompanies it. The joy of joying does not come back to anyone,
neither to me nor to you, for in each it opens the other.396
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It seems that the same things Nancy explains about joy can also be said about pain. Pain in
many ways does not contain itself; we recognize it in others. Pain holds vulnerability, it also
open us up to others. Pain (like joy) is also an extremity of presence, an exposure.
Abramović’s performances are acknowledgement (and even affirmation) of the menacing
situation of pain. Rhythm 10 and other artworks that include the contemplation of pain put
into place a decentering—a rupture—of our everyday insulation.
***
American performance art begins in earnest in the
early 1960s with artists that included Carolee Schneemann,
Allan Kaprow and Yoko Ono. Performance as an
expanded field of art arose out of the avant-garde practices
of the mid-twentieth century in a search for “aesthetic
reevaluation.”397 Contemporary artist Mary Kelly398
explains, “During the 1960s artistic practices attempted to

Figure 4.3. Raphael, Betrothal of the
Virgin (1504) oil on round-headed
panel, 69” x 48”, Pinacoteca di Brera,
Milan. Image: Wikipedia

repudiate the notions of genius, originality, and taste, by
introducing material processes, series, systems, and ideas in
place of an art based on self-expression.”399 The self-

expressive art Kelly refers to—American abstract expressionism—was the post-World War
II poly-stylistic movement that supplanted social realism’s political agenda, which addressed
urban conditions for the working class and poor.400 Abstract expressionism’s widely diverse
approaches contained evocative, personal and emotional nonobjective imagery in the
medium of paint and—to a lesser extent—sculpture. The splattered action painting of
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Jackson Pollock is a good example, as is the energetic brushwork of Willem DeKooning and
Barnet Newman’s vertical blankets of color. Abstract expressionism was a male-dominated
genre, yet women made equally important contributions. Two cases in point: the sweeps of
poured and puddled acrylic pigment on Helen Frankenthaler’s canvases and Lee Krasner’s
lively use of collage.
In general, abstract expressionist works were typically larger-than-life expanses of
non-pictorial painted canvas that hung on the white walls of New York galleries. While oft
times emotive in tone, abstract expressionism consolidated hegemonic formalist principles
touted by the prominent critic Clement
Greenberg. Foremost was medium
specificity, which he believed lent
autonomy and originality to painting
divorced from subject matter. For
Greenberg, the nature of an art’s medium
distinguishes its singularity as a work of art;
Figure 4.4. Wassily Kandinsky Composition VI (1913) oil
on canvas, The State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg.
Image: wikiart.org

he refers to this as “purity” but in the sense
of “self-definition with a vengeance.”401 In

other words, what an artwork is made of comprises the essence of its integrity. For painting,
this would be the immanent two-dimensionality upon which paint is applied. It was this
striving for the empowerment of painting that made inroads for the development of
performance art.
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Greenberg claims a major departure of
Modernists from Old Masters was that the space
of the latter was intended as a false
consciousness in which the viewer could walk
around in the illusionistic planes of linear
perspective, whereby the space of the former
was restricted to “travel only with the eye.”402
We come to an idea of what Greenberg means by
examining the classical composition of
Raphael’s Betrothal of the Virgin [Figure 4.3]
which is carefully organized in mathematical

Figure 4.5. Photograph of Kazuo Shiraga in his
work Challenging Mud (1955). Image: © Fujiko
Shiraga featured in paper by Kunimoto.

perspective as an apprehension of near and deep
space behind the picture plane, using the placement of figures in relationship to architecture
and distant landscape. Whereas Kandinsky’s Composition VI [Figure 4.4] has some
indication of depth with overlap of shapes, colors and lines, but essentially precludes any
mental stroll beyond the picture plane. Considering Greenberg’s ideas about the flatness of
painting, it is interesting to see how Abstract expressionism generates in ways that he (likely)
did not anticipate, particularly in terms of performance art in which the three-dimensional
body is reframed as the essence of robust self-critical tendency.
A prototype performance work that arises from the principles of abstract
expressionism is Challenging Mud [Figure 4.5] by Kazuo Shiraga403 a founding member of
the Gutai Association404 in Japan. The Gutai was a radical group of post-war artists whose
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manifesto in part promoted a kind of aesthetics of destruction that would go “beyond the
borders of abstract expressionism.”405 Their debut took place at a plaza in Tokyo as part of
the First Gutai Art Exhibition. In this work Shiraga dove into one ton of mud situated in front
of the exhibit entrance and used his body to wrestle the muck into sculptural shapes. Namiko
Kunimoto406 describes the performance in an essay on Shiraga,
Challenging Mud was engineered from a heaped mass of mixed, viscous grey matter
– stone, cement, sand, gravel, clay, plaster and twigs – intentionally worked into an
extremely dense consistency to allow only a degree of constrained movement. When
Shiraga, dressed in a loincloth, heaved his body onto the mess, the detritus lacerated
his skin. As he became dirtied by his own actions, the definition of his figure against
the medium became increasingly diminished.407

Shiraga went beyond Pollock’s expressionistic technique of throwing paint onto the canvas
with a stick or Frankenthaler’s poured pigment since his field of action fully embodied the
making of an artwork. It also served Greenberg’s mandate of medium specificity as Shiraga’s
body literally merged with the medium. With Challenging Mud, the artist’s engagement with
the material is alarming in its rawness. That the blood from his wounds mingled with the
mud is particularly profound.
The self-imposed wounds upon his body by the mud bring to mind the cuts endured
by Abramović in Rhythm 10 or the painful pooling of her blood caused by prolonged sitting
in The Artist is Present. A critical element of Shiraga’s approach to art is the concept of
shishitsu, a term which translates to mean “innate characteristics and abilities.”408 (This is not
a philosophy related to Abramović’s practice.) In his writings he describes shishitsu as an
essentialist philosophy concerning the psycho-corporeal aspects of the self as transfigured
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forms over time.409 Shishitsu is obscure and nothing seems to be written about it outside of
Shiraga’s own papers. It is not clear if this is a concept he invented, or an existing ideology
shared by others at the time. Shiraga believed shishitsu to be an inborn, personal and unique
energy that dynamically determines inter-subjective difference in that it shapes the self as a
reconciliation of flesh and spirit, the conscious and unconscious.410 Shishitsu, like
existentialist philosophy, is the notion that our actions ultimately mold who we are. Shiraga
believed that it is a person’s existential duty (especially the artist) to express their shishitsu to
the greatest extent possible since art is the action of the highest expression of individual
creativity.411 A statement by Shiraga is included in the accompanying text for a 2012
exhibition of his paintings at Axel Vervoordt Gallery in Hong Kong,
One has to dare to imagine and undertake something senseless. A dimension in which
something that now appears senseless will no longer be senseless […] One will feel
as if one had entered a dimension, which is neither rational nor irrational. It is a
world of an endless cave, a zero space […] There one enjoys all possible spiritual
games and one becomes fuller and fuller. When at last rationality like emotion
surpasses every human phenomenon, the difference in the quality of each person will
come to light clearly.412

Shiraga’s statement that senselessness provides potential for the subject is important because
this is what Abramović does in The Artist is Present. It can be argued that she creates a “zero
space” that cannot be judged as anything other than what it is: a dimension for singular
contemplation that is open to any possibility. The human construct of zero is neither a
positive nor a negative value; it merely serves as a point for something—or nothing—to
happen. I suggest that this is love.
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Shiraga’s assertion also raises a few questions. The Oxford English Dictionary’s
definition of senseless has a number of variations, including purposelessness. Is there a
purpose— a reason, a ground—for violence or suffering in art? In particular, what can we
make of Shiraga’s and Abramović’s performances of self-inflicted pain? It may be argued
that to consciously hurt the self in a performance for no predetermined, explanatory reason is
in itself senseless.
Immanuel Kant413 saw art as purposive without purpose; purpose defined as the
deliberate design of an object or an intended outcome of an action.414 Kant explained that
while art may seem to have an objective, part of its beauty—or the experience of the
beautiful—is that any purpose of art is actually undetermined. Although Kant was analyzing
how we judge artworks such as painting or sculpture as that which is beautiful, we may apply
his investigation to contemporary art by expanding the meaning of aesthetics.
Kant appropriates Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s415 redefinition of aesthetics as
we understand it today.416 In the mid-eighteenth century Baumgarten borrowed the term from
the Greek word aisthêsis meaning sensation and feeling. Thomson elucidates how Heidegger
considered this genealogy of modern aesthetics,
…Just as logic (conceived as the science of thought) seeks to understand our relation
to the true, so aesthetics (conceived as the science of sensation or feeling) seeks to
understand our relation to the beautiful.417

In other words, we may comprehend aesthetics as an appraisal of the visually beautiful, but
also as a method of appreciation for the ethos418 that underlies a work of art, including
performance. In this respect one of the ways we consider The Artist is Present, Rhythm 10
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and Challenging Mud—any art performance that embodies physical or mental suffering—as
belonging to a category of the aesthetics of pain. This aesthetic certainly has a protracted
history in representational art; consider the Assyrian reliefs that decorated the palace of
Ashurbanipal, Nineveh in the fifth century BCE in which an exquisitely carved lioness dies
at the hands of the king in his chariot on a royal hunt. [Figure 4.6] The moment depicted in
the relief shows the creature’s torso shot through with arrows; its hind legs paralyzed, yet still
drags itself forward in a wretched final attack. Other representations of pain abound in
Renaissance and Baroque artworks of crucifixions and martyred saints, but Francisco Goya
produces some of the most powerful in the early nineteenth century with his Disasters of War
series. In a series of eighty-two intaglio prints, Goya illustrates graphic scenes of torture,
rape, executions, castrations, dismemberment and famine that occurred during the French
occupation of Spain under Napoleonic rule. [Figure 4.7] These two examples differ from the
intent of representing pain in contemporary art. Dying Lioness was propaganda for the king’s
prowess to his subjects and enemies; the prints comprising the Disasters of War series was
Goya’s effective statement about man’s inhumanity to man. Yet both set precedents on the
power communicated by images of pain in art. Most of us would not make a claim that pain
is beautiful. However, pain is a universal and fundamental human sensation and feeling. The
source of pain is always the body; even if we are not suffering at any given moment, pain is
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Figure 4.7. Francisco Goya, Plate 39 Grande hazaña!
Con muertos! (A Heroic Defeat! With Dead Men!) (1810
- 1813). Etching. Image: British Museum.
British Museum, London. © (HIP)Heritage-Images.com

Figure 4.6. Detail of Dying Lioness (645 – 640 BCE)
Gypsum relief, 24” high. Image: British Museum.

perpetually in the background, always in the memory or somewhere in the potential of our
experience. We recognize it in others and know it can happen to us too. We might say that
pain is a polyphonic phenomenon; the idea of pain offers a unity between subjects. In the
case of performance art, it is an aesthetic that is at once unifying and dividing; something
shared but not necessarily experienced at the same time. In every sense the aesthetics of pain
present powerful opportunities for thinking love. In this way it decenters and expands the self
as a way of knowing the other, even if that other is a stranger.

***
Kant further determines that works of art are not to be judged by any set of rules, but
the impact on our feelings and senses. This returns my argument to the notion of the punctum
in which an artwork produces an acute sensation whereby feelings cross with questions on
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the part of the viewer. By taking on singularly illogical (and painful) tasks in their
performances, Shigara and Abramović impel questions that are otherwise unconsidered and
offer the onlooker an opportunity for an expansion of the self by way of contemplation. It is
noteworthy that Heidegger saw thinking as having a correspondence to art,
What art is should be inferable from the work. What the work of art is we can come
to know only from the essence of art. Anyone can see we are moving in a
circle...Thus we are compelled to follow the circle…To enter upon this path is the
strength of a thought, to continue on it is the feast of thought, assuming that thinking
is a craft. 419

When we are feasting we are beyond the ordinary; we are in abundance. For Heidegger this
bounty of thought is circular; and this notion of roundness is compelling. The shape of a
circle has no beginning or end; its boundary is capable of expansion or shrinkage. A circle—
the ¢—brings to mind Shiraga’s description of the zero space as a dimension of
contemplation. Heidegger tells us that the thought provoked by a work of art is something
that does not contain scarcity because it is about asking questions. He continues, “In order to
discover the essence of the art that actually prevails in the work, let us go to the actual work
and ask the work what and how it is.”420 He suggests that inquiry that arises from an artwork
is a surplus. And while performance art is a genre beyond the scope of Heidegger’s epoch, it
is interesting to imagine how he might have addressed its experience and what questions he
would have asked.
The genre of performance art directly enjoins artist and viewer in a thinking-with;
there is no mediatory art object. Since I was not a witness to Challenging Mud, my
experience is indirect and dependent on photographic documentation of it. This image evokes
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a human genealogy of violence: the blood and gore of childbirth, earth’s reclamation of the
body at death, or our species’ slithery emergence from a primeval ooze. Yet consideration of
context here is critical: Challenging Mud takes place in 1955, only ten years after the United
States and Japan were engaged in a savage conflict in which Shiraga personally experienced
the devastating effects of World War II. In a 1998 interview with Gutai scholar Ming
Tiampo, Shiraga shares his eyewitness account,
I just saw people covered with blood. I just saw war victims and Osaka burnt to the
ground. A lot of people, totally smeared with blood, soot, and mud were coming to
Osaka castle for help.421

The mingling of his blood with the detritus of the earth echoes a powerful identification with
the land of Japan. Thinking about the horror Shiraga witnessed along with the actions he
took, his performance provokes questions and feelings. Does Challenging Mud somehow
coalesce our knowledge of—and participation in—powerful experiences of war, childbirth,
death and human evolution? Is this performance a metaphor for how the subject grapples
with the overwhelming traumas of life? Or is it a reenactment of what he witnessed, the
playing out of a personal psychological trauma? The actual act of wrestling with mud was
senseless—a synonym for the unconscious—yet it produces a punctum, a prick of feelings
which connects viewer to artist; it yields consciousness. The punctum itself contains some
degree of emotional pain. In this way, a punctum can be a component of the aesthetics of
pain. Shigara’s performance moves the unconscious into awareness by embodying the
metaphysical implications of an abiding human struggle that ranges from highly personal to
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universal. The coagulation of consciousness and discomfort marks our finitude; this is part
and parcel of the aesthetics of pain.
The aesthetics of pain obviously come with a sacrifice on behalf of the artist who
elects this avenue of discourse. Abramović prepared her body with yoga and other rigorous
exercises for a year in anticipation of the grueling toll it would take to sit virtually motionless
many hours a day, for seventy-two days. Six months in advance, she adopted a vegetarian
diet in order to better control her digestive and excretory functions. She did not speak with
friends or attend social events for the duration of The Artist is Present. Pre-performance she
strictly controlled her food and liquid intake, making sure to fully hydrate in the evenings.
Nonetheless she experienced pain in her legs, shoulders and arms from extended sitting, as
well as problems with her eyes. In The Artist is Present, Abramović’s performance embodies
the idea of physical and mental endurance; by her own admission the prolonged immobility
was “difficult, extremely difficult.”422
Considering an ethos found in the aesthetics of pain, Kelly elaborates,
The art of the ‘real body’ does not pertain to the truth of a visible form, but refers
back to its essential content: the irreducible, irrefutable experience of pain. The body,
as artistic text, bears the authenticating imprint of pain like a signature; Vergine
insists, ‘the experiences we are dealing with are authentic, and they are consequently
cruel and painful. Those who are in pain will tell you that they have the right to be
taken seriously.’423

Abramović’s pain is chronicled in the documentary about her performance and her
performance art retrospective at the Museum of Modern Art (also titled The Artist is
Present).424 In addition to her own ascetic preparations during the year leading up to the
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exhibition, Abramović trained thirty-nine artists for five re-performances of a number of her
original artworks. All of the works contained significant efforts of endurance and the
experience of pain.
For example, Luminosity was visually striking yet challenging to view given the
awkward pose of the performer. [Figure 4.8] This work consisted of a bicycle seat mounted
ten feet above the audience on a gallery wall and straddled by a nude artist. The artist’s arms
and legs were splayed outward, reminiscent of a
pinned butterfly. If one spent time in the gallery
observing the work, it became apparent that the up and
down movements were so controlled in the arms of the
artist that they were almost imperceptive. In an
interview with six artists hired to re-perform
Abramović’s works in her retrospective, performer
Gary Lai reveals the hardships that the artists
underwent in their daily performances, “People came
into the resting space crying, or fainting and falling. If
Figure 4.8. Marina Abramović Luminosity
(re-performance at 11 Rooms Manchester
International Festival) Image: artbasel.com

someone felt like they would faint, the stage manager
would come into the ‘green room’ asking for someone

to replace them.”425 Another artist Abigail Levine commented, “Luminosity was the most
theatrical in my experience and the most difficult to perform.”426
Suffering is a theme that stubbornly runs through Abramović’s oeuvre. In a
performance that took place in Copenhagen titled Art Must Be Beautiful, Artist Must Be
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Beautiful [Figure 4.9] she stands nude for fifty minutes
while grooming her hair with a metal comb in one
hand and a metal brush in the other, chanting “Art must
be beautiful, artist must be beautiful.”
At some point her face and scalp begin
bleeding, her hair becomes broken and damaged and
she grows exhausted. In an interview about this

Figure 4.9. Marina Abramović performing
Art Must Be Beautiful, Artist Must Be
Beautiful (1975) Detail of photographic still.
Image: Huffington Post.

performance Abramović states,
I never create art to be decorative. I don’t like this idea of aesthetic beauty—a
beautiful frame, nice colors that will go with the carpet. To me art has to be
disturbing. It has to ask questions and have some kind of prediction of the future
within it. It has to have different layers of meaning.427

In this piece, the stereotypically feminine act of brushing hair turns violent. Human hair is a
loaded cultural signifier, carrying notable weight for women, particularly in certain religious
and cultural practices. Abramović’s twofold act of simultaneously combing and brushing, not
only puns with her double title but also drives home the relentless striving for a feminine
ideal in Western culture at the same time it remarks upon the emphasis of the beautiful in the
art world. Again the punctum produces feelings and questions. What is the relationship
between beauty and suffering? In particular, the relationship between beauty, suffering and
women?
The Western tradition for an ideal of beauty reaches back twenty-five hundred years
to ancient Classical Greece where it is expressed in mathematical formulas applied to
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sculptures of Olympians and gods intended to convey notions of the perfectly beautiful. In
Plato’s seminal dialogue Symposium as well as in his Theory of Forms, love and the beautiful
are linked. By his reasoning beauty is unachievable in the visible world; beauty exists merely
as a perfect Idea, not something that can be located in the human body, or a work of art, or
representation. Abramović’s Art Must Be Beautiful; Artist Must Be Beautiful is a nod to Plato
in this way. Perfection is not achievable in either love or the corporeal; only the idea of
perfection can be absolute.
Abramović’s self-abusive combing and brushing can be compared to Shiraga’s
Challenging Mud in its senselessness and futility. The long-standing and entrenched Western
ideals of the beautiful cannot be brushed away; the pain immanent in an unachievable ideal is
equally inescapable.
Zero space
Performance art, which employs the artist’s body as the medium intends (in part) to
negate the traditional gallery-controlled commodification of artwork; its agency is antiformalist.428 Body art is a category of performance art in which the artist’s body (nude or
costumed) is employed sometimes to an extreme as in the examples of Abramović and
Shiraga. The use of the artist’s body as “universal object”429 becomes indistinct from the
artwork as original, actual, ontological experience. Modernist Greenbergian notions of
disinterestedness and distancing are not germane to the inter-subjective engagement of the
body in performance. In describing the phenomena of body art, writer and curator Lea
Vergine430 states,
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The public is needed to complete the event; it must be involved in a collective
experience that leads it to reconsider its quotidian existence and the rules of its
ordinary behavior…The relationship between public and artist becomes a
relationship of complicity.431

There are two points in her statement that I want to address. First, I will consider Vergine’s
premise of the immanent relationship between viewer and artist; secondly her notion of
complicity.
Inter-subjective engagement is, of course, vital to The Artist is Present in which the
artist-viewer encounter holds an unspoken discourse. The Oxford English Dictionary notes
that the etymology of the noun discourse arises from the Latin discursus meaning the action
of running off in different directions;432 in other words, to and fro, a term expressed in the
aforementioned model of Armstrong’s hermeneutic spiral. In The Artist is Present—like
many of her works—Abramović uses her body to make a direct demand on the viewer and
likewise the subject directly enjoins Abramović in being-with and thinking-with. In The
Artist is Present the metaphysical movement of thinking links the artist and viewer in an
ephemeral moment that is open-ended. This linking of the two subjects in this moment is
what I call the between.
Although wordless, Abramović’s performance nonetheless creates a discourse
between artist and participant predicated on a mutual gaze and the parallel thoughts of
Abramović and the sitter. These thoughts are not shared in the way an audible dialogue
would be, and therefore present metaphysical questions of communication. What is actually
going on in this contrived situation? Is manipulation of either party in play? In a Facebook
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and Twitter question and answer interview post-performance (documented on the Museum of
Modern Art’s website) Abramović considered why participants become so emotional,
So, when you enter the square of light and you sit on that chair, you’re an individual,
and as an individual you are kind of isolated. And you’re in a very interesting
situation because you’re observed by the group (the people waiting to sit), you’re
observed by me, and you’re observing me—so it’s like triple observation. But then,
very soon while you’re having this gaze and looking at me, you start having this
invert and you start looking at yourself. So I am just a trigger, I am just a mirror and
actually they become aware of their own life, of their own vulnerability, of their own
pain, of everything—and that brings the crying. [They are] really crying about their
own self, and that is an extremely emotional moment.433

This statement makes clear that Abramović sees her role as a mediator on behalf of her
participants. Is this what is actually happening? It should be pointed out not all participants in
The Artist is Present cried or demonstrated distressed emotion. Some smiled and appeared
delighted; some were stoic, some impassive.
Vergine rightly points out that the meaning of the encounter between artist and
spectator is dependent on “recognition on the part of the spectator.”434 She states,
The artist needs to feel that others are receptive to him, that they are willing to play
the game of accepting his provocations and that they will give him back his
‘projections.’ It is indispensible that the public co-operate with him, since what he
needs is to be confirmed in his identity. The behavior of the spectator is a gratification
for the artist just as the behavior of the artist is a gratification of the spectator. When
the public allows itself to be used, the artist has found an ‘other’ who is willing to
give him reassurance in the fantasy or utopianizing world that he is attempting to
make visible, and the experiment works the other way round as well.435

As a documenter of at least sixty performances for which Vergine analyzed patterns and
outcomes, her critique stands with some amount of impunity. Cooperation of the viewer with
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the artist is essential; it seems reasonable to give credence to the assertion that there is mutual
gratitude. Yet is the notion that the performance artist requires validation an absolute? Did
The Artist is Present provide a space of fantasy or utopia? Is it necessarily idealistic for
Abramović to provide a time and space of self-reflection to her audience? Is a “projection”436
always in play? It is possible, of course, but exceptions and considerations must allow for
other possibilities.
While it is credible that the predominance of performance artists (and all artists)
demands an audience, I would argue that it is not part and parcel that the artist requires a
confirmation of identity from her viewers. Like any skilled professional, the artist knows who
she is; to suggest the artist makes art to gain validation is too broad a claim. Would Vergine
claim a lawyer or graphic designer needs their clients to confirm who they are? Artists make
art for many reasons; to feel valued may be one—or none—of them.
That Abramović sets up a space for reflection in the face-to-face encounter cannot be
disputed; however, by Vergine’s account this would be a utopian or imaginative situation.
For The Artist is Present, that is a possible scenario, but not the definitive one. Vergine’s
claim here negates individual agency on the part of the artist, the viewer or both. It also
denies the open-ended possibilities of the viewer’s experience. Isn’t it possible that while the
viewer may come away with one perception of her experience at the time of performance,
other insights or ideas may take shape, and form a different perception in the future? How we
remember things—our self-reflections—is susceptible to change.
In a videotaped post-performance interview of The Artist is Present by the Museum
of Modern Art, Abramović reflects on her experience,
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…You know I never could imagine that amount of emotions I experienced in the
piece. It was like—it was something to do with pure love—giving to the total
strangers. And I think that this piece, you know, really changed me on a quite deep
level. I’m not the same as I was before. It’s just some really profound experience, and
kind of lifting my consciousness…my spirit is different.437

Here Abramović identifies love as an outcome of the between. She does not elaborate any
further about this idea specifically; in fact, it seems apparent that this experience is intense
and largely escapes verbalization. It is not a love that is singularly idealistic, pleasant or
provides security; instead it offers contact. This idea conjures up a statement by Nancy in
which he negates the idea of love as resolution, “Instead of this law of the completion of
being, one would want to deal only with a moment of contact, at once eternal and
fleeting.”438 In the Artist is Present this connection is shared with Abramović and the
audience at large, and—more directly—with her sitter.
In the same interview, Abramović asks Paco439 (who is in the audience) about his
experience. Paco is the most frequent of participants; he sat with her twenty-one times during
the course of the performance, one of which was for the duration of seven hours (the entire
day of a performance of The Artist is Present.) She tells the audience that although she never
actually talked to him, she feels she knows him intimately because he spent the most time
with her over the course of the three months.440 She asked him to explain why he returned to
the space “over and over again.”441 Paco replies he had anticipated the retrospective because
he was attracted to her work. He describes the first time he took the chair across from
Abramović,
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I came and sat with you without expectations, and of course I had the curiosity and
excitement of sitting. But then I sat with you for the first time. It was like diving into
an ocean of light. I immediately felt comfortable with you, I felt like I knew you and
there was no questioning about…like, yeah, I could feel the audience and feel the
energy…but I’m a very distracted person by nature and always looking around and I
was amazed also to be able to have that concentration sitting in front of you.442

He describes going a second time to the museum with the plan of seeing the re-performers.
When he noticed no one was standing in line for The Artist is Present, he decided to take the
chair again although not intending to keep the seat until closing time, and then taken by
surprise to find he had been sitting for seven hours.
It was your magnetism and your commitment to the piece. And I really felt
transformed from the very first sitting. And I know that’s what brought me back. It
was a healing experience, cleansing, letting go, and at some point it was very painful
because it was very emotional. But it was always very luminous, and you know, it
was just amazing…443

These descriptions on behalf of Paco and Abramović allow for some insight into the
ontological space-time of the between which grants the to and fro of thinking. In the case of
the performance The Artist is Present, the between takes place simultaneously with
Abramović and her sitter/audience and contains the notion of an interval. This is not a space
that can be observed or documented in real time, but one that is nonetheless substantiated by
way of a personal reflective discourse of what happened in their shared silence. To unpack
the between further, it can be compared to the Japanese aesthetic sensibility called ma (the
character 間.) Essentially it conflates the objective idea of a particular space with the
subjectively experienced aspect of that place in a particular situation.444 For example,
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consider a specific place of a window in a room combined with the sense one feels while
observing moonlight streaming through that window. In other words in 間 (ma) an objective
space is imbued “with an additional subjective awareness of lived, existential, nonhomogenous space.”445 This self-consciousness is the between. When Abramović and Paco
sat across from each other, there was the space of the Marron Atrium in the museum and
there was their individual consciousness of thinking during this period. (The same applies to
the audience observing Abramović and her sitter.) And then everyone’s continued thoughts
as they recall that place, that experience and reflect on and question it in time. In
performance art, we might consider the between as a zero space of thinking love that is
unique to that viewer and the artist occupying that place and triggering feeling.
Risky business
Now returning to Vergine’s first quote, in which the description of viewer and artist is
noted as a “relationship of complicity.”446 To be complicit is to be involved in something
wrong. The Artist is Present pulled viewers and participants—as well as Abramović’—out of
their everydayness. (It could be argued that art in any medium has that potential.) For the
interim the performance put into place a new code for sitting with someone in which a silent
gaze replaced customary conversation. There was no pretense about what was going on. Yet
Vergine’s use of the term complicity brings a cynical spin to Abramović’s intent. Would
collaboration be more apt? The notion of collusion and audience brings to mind the idea of
theater in which actor and onlookers are collectively occupied in a narrative that is based on
dramaturgy rather than performance. In the dramatic arts a fixed narrative is normally
rehearsed; an actor is playing someone other than her authentic self. Abramović is adamant
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that performance can never be rehearsed because it is veritable experience. Whereby acting
requires practice—a pre-enactment—performance may necessitate disciplinary exercises in
which the body (and mind) becomes prepared but does not hinge on a predetermined
script.447 In this way we understand performance as a situation that is open to unanticipated
possibility.
A performance by Abramović addresses Steinweg’s definition of ontological
unpredictability or being’s capriciousness and her work embodies this in acute ways.
Through performance she creates a tension based on the open-endedness of what might
happen. For example, will she faint? Will one of the participants do something untoward? In
this way Abramović blurs the authorship of her performance; she does not control what will
transpire or a final outcome since this depends on the collaboration of viewers.
Most of the participants in The Artist is Present were not disruptive but a few did
exhibit unexpected behaviors. For example, an aspiring performance artist suddenly and
completely disrobed; another individual put on a mask he had concealed in his jacket.448 In a
sense this blurring of an end is a contradiction of Abramović’s definition of performance as
“research for mental and physical answers.”449 What solution she seeks exactly is not clear;
answers of any kind seem antithetical to her work in light of her declared openness to
ontological unpredictability.
While The Artist is Present includes the design of ontological unpredictability, an
earlier Abramović performance amplifies the volume on this tension and acutely indicates the
magnitude of unknowing. Rhythm 0 [Figure 4.10] was a six-hour performance in which she
completely opens herself to being’s volatility. At Galleria Studio Morro in Naples, Italy,
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Abramović laid out seventy-two
objects on a table that included
“…A rose, perfume, piece of
bread, grapes, wine, and there
was objects like scissors, nails,
metal bar, and finally a pistol with
one bullet.”450 She indicated in
Figure 4.10. Marina Abramović in performance of Rhythm 0 (1974).
Image: iRez Virtual Identity Salon

the instructions that the onlookers

should also consider her an object; they could do anything they wanted to her for the duration
of six hours, and she would take full responsibility for their actions. So here she deliberately
and consciously set herself up for an undetermined outcome.
Abramović recalls that she wanted to take the risk of an audience member killing her
because it would take her to a new mental limit. She was curious as how the gallery
participants would handle this self-determination and what breaking point would be reached.
Abramović assumed an impassive posture and flat affect for the performance. At the
beginning, gallery-goers engaged in playful manipulation, even kissing her.
But as time went on, the participant’s actions escalated to abusive behavior by cutting
her skin, laying her on a table and placing a knife between her legs, hooding her head, and
cutting off her clothes.
Photographic documents of the performance show a mostly male audience; in an
interview with Judith Thurman for The New Yorker magazine, Abramović recalls that while
men were the active participants in the abuse of her person, some women encouraged their
170

vandalism.451 Finally a man loaded the gun, placed it in her hand and aimed it at her neck,
with a finger on trigger. A gallerist then seized the gun and threw it out the window. It is
alarming to consider that this artwork might have ended in harm or even death, yet
Abramović had indicated her awareness of that potential scenario.
Abramović’s consciousness of the uncertainty of being is an acknowledgement of
indefinite openness. Here I return to the Introduction in which I noted Butler’s declaration of
indefinite openness as a temporal unfolding of love. Butler indicates that love never reaches a
“final form”452 because it is endlessly developing in ways that cannot be known. This
assertion conflicts with commonly held ideas about love: the notion that love will be
(eventually, ideally) perfectly fulfilling and complete. Yet Nancy reminds us we can only
reach toward love, we can never reach it; love is simply a movement.453 In life and love as
well as art, we are always situated in a place of unknowing; the immanent riskiness of being
negates any certainty outside of our eventual death. Between our consciousness of the present
and the moment of our future death, there is a gap comprising the lacuna of indefinite
openness. I argue that a work of art and the crossing of feeling and thinking it evokes
concerns this gap for both viewer and artist. This case can be argued for Rhythm 0 in which
Abramović creates a work in which she consciously constructs a risk in order to move
towards a limit. Nancy locates the idea of limit in Plato’s Symposium; that “philosophical
Eros”—the divine rung at the very top of love’s ladder—is not only the summit of an
ideology of love but paradoxically a situation of distress and fragility which is necessary to
“the experience of the limit, where thought takes place...”454 Nancy elaborates,
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In the Symposium, Plato broaches the limits, and all his thinking displays a reticence
or reserve not always present elsewhere: it broaches its own limit, that is to say, its
source; it effaces itself before the love (or in the love?) that it recognizes as its truth.
Thus it thinks its own birth and its own effacement, but it thinks in such a way that it
restores to love, to the limit, its very task and destination. Philosophy is not occupied
with gathering and interpreting the experiences of love here. Instead, in the final
analysis, it is love that receives and deploys the experience of thinking.455

For Nancy the love is a movement that throws and catches. We understand what Abramović
intended in reaching for a limit by imagining her at the top of a perilous ladder, at once
triumphant and utterly vulnerable.
Vergine claims that body art’s bottom line holds an infinite and unfulfilled demand
for love. She describes this love as,
…The need to be loved for what one is and for what one wants to be — the need for a
kind of love that confers unlimited rights — the need for what is called primary love.
This is what gives the art its dimension of inevitable delusion and failure. This
unobtained love is what transforms itself into the aggressivity that is typical of all
these actions, events, photo-sequences and performances. It is also redirected to other
versions of the self, and the self is doubled, camouflaged, and idealized. It is turned
into love of the romance of the self. This avid need for love becomes narcissism in
the fetus that we continue to be, but to be loved in this way is the only power that
might once again give sense to the lives of so many of us.456

There are two parts of this statement to consider in regard to love and art. The first is “need”
and the second is “aggressivity.” Regarding the latter, I am not convinced that Abramovic’s
performances—or any body art—universally hold elements of aggression. This notion arises
from a Freudian frame in which subjects are at baseline antagonistic beings, whose
tendencies are channeled into creative activity as a sublimation of their inherent hostility. It is
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an argument not completely unreasonable, but neither is it totally convincing. Instead, there
are many possibilities for a work of art as to why it was made and how it functions.
Escalating aggression in Rhythm 0 is a blatant and compelling aspect of the performance;
however the objects Abramović chose to lay out did allow for—and encourage—the
possibility of both harm and tenderness. What were the gallery goers thinking in their choice
of actions? There doesn’t seem to be any documented evidence of that so we are left to
wonder. Perhaps it doesn’t matter because in the end Abramovic’s reach for the limit is the
most important legacy of the work.
Vergine’s assertions also contain the thread of need, meaning that body art contains a
requirement of love that is sabotaged in its efforts because of its primacy. In order to buy into
Vergine’s notion of primary love, we necessarily subscribe to the hierarchy of love in Plato’s
Symposium or the theories of Freud, in which life is immanently a struggle between eros and
death.457 Now in the twenty-first century, we may understand the ancient metaphorical
ladder of love as merely a manner of reaching; there is no summit to conclude its range and
no rung on it is more or less important than any other. Contemporary art reframes love as
non-hierarchical, as both delusional and authentic, as something that fails at the same time it
flourishes, at once obtainable and elusive. Love is between these binaries where it is open to
indeterminacy, where thinking and questioning guarantee only the opportunity for contact
and presence. The performance art of Abramović offers a particular perspective of love in
that this presence happens in real time.
***
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In performance art thinking and questioning happen in synchronicity with the viewer
and artist; both offer the time to be present. The present-ness of the moment holds promise
for unlimited choices. This open present is a kind of freedom and suggests another mode of
love in art.
By expanding an understanding of aesthetics to include consideration of the ethos
within a particular artwork, the subject broadens an outlook that fortifies the experience of
the artwork. Pain, although a subjective condition, is an extremity of presence used by the
artist to make a connection in art. The universal of pain is a shared aspect of being. By
constructing a situation for the contemplation of pain, the artist allows for a rupture of the
viewer’s everyday insulation. In this way, pain or its representation in art is never senseless
but a way of relating to the other; it decenters. It is similar to the Heideggerian anxiety
discussed in Chapter 2, defined as mood that discloses what it means to exist.
It is important to remember that performance art is veritable experience in real time
and as such opens itself to immeasurable possibilities and ontological unpredictability in a
way that escapes painting and sculpture. That the performance artist may elect to undergo a
rigor demanded by embodied suffering and that the viewer accedes to observe or participate
in that experience is an expression of love. In this mutual undertaking, the between becomes
an important ground of love for thinking. This ground manifests a self-conscious thinking
that coalesces objective space with subjective experience. In this way there is indeterminate
openness whereby there is an ongoing unfolding of love. Love in performance art is not
guaranteed with a tender kiss, a slap to the face or a gun to the neck; these experiences are
merely crossings, which are indefinitely open.
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Figure 5.0. Giotto di Bonde, The Ascension of Saint John the Evangelist (1320) in Santa Croce, Florence,
Cappella Peruzzi. Fresco secco. Image: Wikipedia free domain.

Chapter Five
Pure Knowing
Thus far I have unpacked an aesthetic of anxiety, myth and pain. In section one of this
chapter, I now consider the “aesthetics of joy.” What does joy in art offer beyond feelings of
delight? What is the viewer’s relationship to the venerated artists and artworks of long ago,
still admired and sought out? I begin by recounting the well-known ekphrastic writings by
Stendhal458 upon his visit to Florence in the early nineteenth century, particularly the frescoes
of Giotto. His reaction to exploring the Renaissance art of the city reflects the experience of
unbounded joy that prompts questions: What is the role of embodiment in the subject’s
ecstatic response to art? What is the relationship between thinking love and the body? Here
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I examine the embodied connection a subject has experienced with a work of art through the
lens of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and other philosophers.
Is it possible to completely lose a sense of self in contemplating a work of art? The
second part of this chapter “without will” addresses the experience of strong emotions or
actual physical signs that overtake the viewer when engaging with art. Is this occurrence
related to love in art? A few syndromes have been identified that trigger symptoms in
viewers in which they become overwhelmed to the point of a loss of control. This brings
forward questions about the viewer’s will in relation to art as postulated by Arthur
Schopenhauer. He asserts that when a viewer is engaged with a work of art there is a subjectobject collapse that renders the subject will-less. How does Schopenhauer’s theory of will
reconcile with thinking love in art?
In previous chapters, I take up the categories of Western loves philia and agape; I
also touch upon erôs. In the third section titled “out of Eden,” I suggest that in addition to
elements of classical erôs we find that love is evident in how we think of art that addresses
sex, desire and the body, as well as the questions that arise by thinking love. As discussed in
Chapter One, erôs is a manner of love based in sexual attraction and desire. In what ways
does erôs influence a theory of thinking love in art? How does a representation of the nude
body factor into thinking love? The first example under consideration is the collaboration of
Yoko Ono and John Lennon. These artists broke ground in the second half of the twentieth
century as a couple who took on a number of creative projects in which they deployed their
bodies along with technology as a site for epistemic shifts of thinking. Next, I examine the
current collaboration of Breyer P-Orridge, a couple who present radical possibilities for a
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committed partnership between lovers, one that rethinks the body via surgeries as well as
prescribed gender roles. Lastly in this section, I discuss contemporary artist Shigeyuki
Kihara, who uses he/r body through a postcolonial lens in order to address the rupture of
gender performance instigated by Western missionaries in he/r native South Pacific culture.
What role does memory play in thinking love in art? How does the autobiographical
nature of an artwork figure into thinking love? In what ways does confession affect the artistartwork-viewer crossing? Self-disclosure is a genre of literary art that goes back to Saint
Augustine in the fifth century; it is universally popular today in reality television shows. In
the fourth section “aesthetics of confession,” I consider British artist Tracey Emin and French
sculptor Louise Bourgeois who utilize their personal experiences as a point of departure for
their multi-media artworks.
In confessional art, artists frequently reveal painful experiences; but anger and
disappointment are merely a few of myriad aspects comprising a subject’s life. In the final
section of this chapter—“the will to presence”—I continue to reflect on Emin’s studio
practice, but in the way it announces an affirmation of life—what Nietzsche calls the will to
power. How does Nietzsche’s philosophy manifest in a work of art? What are the choices for
action the subject has in dealing with life’s challenges? In what way does the artist’s sharing
of a particular identity and private experiences contribute to thinking love in art?
In this final chapter, I also address attributes of the conventional loves erôs and storge
to possibilities for thinking love and art. Additionally, I stress that love in art is at the same
time an act of love.
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Aesthetics of joy
In 1817 a French writer who went by the name of Stendhal emerged from Santa
Croce in Florence after looking at its Renaissance art that includes frescoes by Giotto.459
[Figure 5.0] In a retrospective book recounting his Italian journeys he describes his euphoric
feelings upon spending time in the church,
I was in a sort of ecstasy, from the idea of being in Florence, close to the great men
whose tombs I had seen. Absorbed in the contemplation of sublime beauty I reached
the point where one encounters celestial sensations. Everything spoke so vividly to
my soul. Ah, if I could only forget. I had palpitations of the heart, what in Berlin they
call ‘nerves.’ Life was drained from me. I walked with the fear of falling.460

This passage by Stendhal is oft quoted as the quintessential ecstatic experience of seeing
great art. His overwhelming sense of awe seems to touch a limit that evokes the Kantian
sublime. Yet the statement is also understood that Stendhal was overjoyed. Nancy describes
joy as abundance—beyond pleasure—in which the subject is in a state of excess.461 Nancy
writes, “…Joy offers being itself, it makes the being felt, shared.”462 In other words joy
affirms existence for the subject. And it not only sanctions being, it also allows for
participation in the world. In the case of Stendhal the joy of experiencing great art became—
for a brief time—a nearly unbearable-ness of being. What is this extraordinary moment?
Nancy asserts,
It is the question of presence: to joy is an extremity of presence, self exposed,
presence of self joying outside itself, in a presence that no present absorbs and that
does not (re)present, but that offers itself endlessly.463

178

Nancy’s phrase “self exposed,” suggests a vulnerability of being that occurs when we deeply
participate with the world. In Stendhal’s case, he was interacting with Renaissance
masterworks and monuments housed in historical Santa Croce.464 With this participation he
is fully present in that moment for which there is a crossing of subject and art. Stendhal gives
himself over to the viewing experience to the point that it overflows his being. (Consider
Nancy’s phrase again, “…No present absorbs…”) That moment of time—that acute
present—is so much that the subject experiences an overabundance of feeling. Nancy’s use
of the word “endlessly” returns us to the concept of indefinite openness, which allows the
subject a boundless movement towards a limit never to be reached.
While Nancy’s reference to joy in the quote noted is framed with the subject in
relation to the other, I want to stress that art also offers potential to provide such a
bountifulness. The presence he describes—the “extremity of presence”—is applicable to a
viewer who encounters art—the crossing of the self and art. Here the notion of presence is
important in terms of the artist. While Stendhal was present, obviously the master artists were
not. With objects such as painting and sculpture the artist is the absent other, the artwork
their trace.465 Artworks stand in proxy long after the artist is gone and in this sense their
offering is infinite.466 This offering is an act of love in art. For example, while Giotto lived
500 years before Stendhal, the frescoes he so lovingly and carefully created still have the
power to enjoin the contemporary onlooker. Viewers before and after Stendhal continue to
make pilgrimages to see the profound and long-standing legacy of masterpieces in sacred
places, palaces and museums467 throughout the world, what we may think of as missions of
joy. The journeys too, are acts of love in art. These places hold potential to joy—the word
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Nancy considers the “verb of love.”468 However, joy is but one possibility for thinking love
(the burst), which is being in relation with an artwork and the artist that created it.
There are other potentialities that preclude joy such as grief or wonder. In any case,
the open-ended moment of thinking-with is a form of presence and Nancy claims that a
magnitude of presence “opens the other.”469 This is vital; again, Nancy is referring to two
subjects in relation, but I assert that the artist is the absent other and the artwork stands in
proxy for the artist. This is a unique presence because it contains absence. As absence-inpresence it nonetheless remains a crossing, which may result in an opening marked as the
punctum—the piercing of the metaphysical heart. The ingress of the punctum allows the
subject to flourish in a way that nothing else can. Its occurrence produces a penetrating
sensation whereby feelings cross with questions on the part of the viewer. Yet while Stendhal
recorded his feelings, what questions he considered remain uncertain.
Giotto’s The Ascension of Saint John the Evangelist in situ at Santa Croce provides a
good example for Stendhal’s experience of the punctum as we might imagine it. The
principle figure of John in the center of the composition simultaneously defies death and
gravity by leaving the earthly world for a heavenly domain. He is enveloped in diagonal rays
of golden light, which illustrate his movement towards the celestial realm. Giotto’s Saint
John is in a transport of joy—Nancy’s verb of love—that can be compared with Stendhal’s
moment of “celestial sensations” as an ecstatic moment of thinking love. The term celestial
offers the idea of the boundless, timeless realm—an astral plane of indefinite openness—
forever beyond bodily reach. At the same time Stendhal’s feelings of “palpitations” of his
heart suggest an embodiment of presence.
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Joy (and other poignant emotions) is not only experienced in the mind, but
throughout the body as well; we recall Baumgarten’s claim of aesthetics as a science of sense
perception, a combination of sensation and feeling. Yet Baumgarten regarded sight and
hearing as belonging to the realm of the mind, dismissing the body as a place for authentic
experience.470 Adrienne Dingerink Chaplin writes,
Therefore, despite his re-evaluation of sense-perception as a legitimate form of poetic
or artistic knowing, Baumgarten still remained trapped in a dualistic anthropology
and never developed a proper aesthetics of the body.471

In other words, Baumgarten holds on to the Cartesian split of mind and body, as did Kant
who restricted the body as the locus for corporeal appetites.472 However, contemporary
thinking in the philosophy of aesthetics brings together philosophical argument and science,
which integrates how we understand the experience of creative work.473 Chaplin makes clear,
In recent years this attitude to the relation between art, the senses, and the body has
undergone significant changes. Many of those changes have been informed by recent
developments in cognitive science and evolutionary psychology. Part of that research
consists of an exploration of the link between our cognitive make-up and the making
and appreciating of art. The underlying assumption shared by these scholars is that,
despite immense historic and cultural diversity, there is a universal biological basis
for these phenomena. Art, both as a practice and as an experience, belongs, as it were,
to the hardware of human nature.474

In other words, art not only springs from some essential aspect of the human animal’s
constitution, but is also part and parcel of a lived (embodied) human experience that informs
how we know the world.475 Merleau-Ponty notes,
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Man taken as a concrete being is not a psyche joined to an organism, but the
movement to and fro of existence which at one time allows itself to take corporeal
form and at others move towards personal acts.476

What I understand Merleau-Ponty to say is that the subject’s body and thoughts function in a
constant exchange—a back and forth—of action, attitude and focus; they are not working
strictly in synchrony. What a subject is doing (in terms of the body), thinking about and
feeling is changing moment to moment. This sustained movement marks the body’s
relationship with itself as well as others and objects. As noted in the introduction, the idea of
to and fro recalls Armstrong’s interplay in reading and from that the extension of an idea for
reciprocity in an aesthetic experience: viewer and artist/artwork enjoin in a shifting and
unpredictable movement of thinking. The thinking of art is a helical conveyance—a to and
fro—within the space of between that involves interpretation by way of questioning, of
thinking love.
One or more of the five477 bodily senses are in play when connecting with a work of
art. These culturally mediated sensibilities are critical to how we understand and navigate the
world. Certain works of art emphasize particular sense perceptions more than others. Optics
is, of course, vital for most visual and lively arts, but creative work also involves other sense
organs such as hearing and touch. For example, a performance or recording of Rhapsody in
Blue by George Gershwin is an aural experience. As Frances Dyson explains,
Sound surrounds. Its phenomenal characteristics—the fact that it is invisible,
intangible, ephemeral, and vibrational—coordinate with the physiology of the
ears, to create a perceptual experience profoundly different from the dominant
sense of sight.478
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In the same way the auditory apparatus liaises with the brain to hear, the physiology of optics
and the nerve receptors in our skin do likewise for sight and touch. Maurice Merleau-Ponty
reminds us that the idea of music is impossible without sound; in the same way paintings
manifest color. He writes,
A novel, poem, picture or musical work are individuals, that is, beings in which the
expression is indistinguishable from the thing expressed, their meaning, accessible
only through direct contact, being radiated with no change of their temporal and
spatial situation. It is in this sense that our body is comparable to a work of art.479

The idea of art as a kind of being possessing singularity in the manner of a subject is
compelling. Yet a work of art without the crossing by a subject radiates nothing. It is the
discrete subject who activates the potential in the work by thinking-with. As Heidegger
suggests, “…let us go to the actual work and ask the work what and how it is.”480 Yet again
we see the importance of inquiry; Heidegger suggests that the origin of a work of art begins
with asking questions for both viewer and artist.
These questions arise from more than just the machinations of the mind. MerleauPonty framed the bodily senses as consciousness;481 the body-subject482 perceives as the
senses interface with each other.483 Stendhal’s experience at Santa Croce included
synchronous sense perceptions. We might imagine that his joyous adventure was not limited
to gazing at and examining the classical architecture, paintings, sculptures, and grave
monuments, but also hearing the ambient sounds of the church and the echo of his footfall as
he walked over marble floors. He may have been mindful of the scent of hot wax from
devotional candles and the pungency of lingering incense, or whiffed the old varnish of oil
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paintings. Did he notice dust suspended in visible columns of light as it raked through the
windows? Perhaps he ran his fingers over the warm plaster walls and smooth cool stone
carvings. He may have contemplated what Heidegger calls their “thingliness”—their
essence—what makes them what they are, and the process of their creation. Was he alert to
the way he moved through the various spaces of the church? Cool shadows cloaking dim
corners, the simultaneous height and weight of Brunelleschi’s dome rising over his head and
the elaborate wooden rafters in the lofty nave that make a person feel small. All of these
“inter-sensory correspondences”484 would have heightened Stendhal’s consciousness of his
experience in the church. It is through the body a subject has access to the world on a day-today basis, but an encounter with art (i.e., visual and audio) is a particularly special moment.
Chaplin writes,
Art, whether in Lascaux or the Louvre, can capture this affective primordial contact
with the world that tends to get lost, both in the usual hum-drum character of our dayto-day affairs, as well as in scientific abstraction. However, in the aesthetic
experience, humans respond to forms, shapes, and colors in such a way that they
begin to take on a life of their own and open themselves up to metaphoric meaning.485

As body-subjects crossing works of art, we are affected bodily and imaginatively by aesthetic
experience. Santa Croce, as an aesthetic whole, makes the absent present for the art pilgrim at
the same time all the senses are in high gear. Merleau-Ponty describes the body-subject as a
“synergic system” based on movement in which all its undertakings are integrated in order
for the subject to be in the world.486 The ceaseless movement of the body-subject in its
synergy result in our total consciousness.
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This notion of movement in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological philosophy is
important to my argument of thinking love in art. We recall that Nancy stated, “Love is the
extreme movement beyond the self of a being reaching completion.”487 Although love does
not complete anything, this remark stresses the action of connection between subjects; I
further suggest this effort at contact takes place between a viewer and a work of art or artist.
(Merleau-Ponty points out that the meaning of the word “between” is understood because of
the condition of our embodiment.)488 Connection with art manifests a particular kind of love
that arises from the metaphysical movement of thinking; it occurs as part of the questioning
process on behalf of the viewer. My argument finds some footing with Merleau-Ponty; he
recognizes the critical phenomena of questioning as it involves the senses on behalf of the
body-subject,
The passing of sensory givens before our eyes or under our hands is, as it were a
language which teaches itself, and in which the meaning is secreted by the very
structure of the signs, and this is why it can literally be said that our senses question
things and that things reply to them.489

In other words, to ask questions is a whole-body phenomenon and not confined to a mental
action. As stated earlier, the thinking of art is a helical conveyance—a to and fro—within the
space of between that involves interpretation by way of questioning.
Merleau-Ponty goes on to point out that vision and movement are ways of entering
into a relationship that exceeds mere thought.490 In thinking art, a culmination of movement
results in the moment of an inexpressible revelation whereby the artist indirectly (as in the
case of Stendhal) or directly (as in the case of Abramović or deRobertis) enjoins the other
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who is present to the artist’s work. I believe this connection is love—an exceptional kind of
love found in a work of art.
I further suggest that Nancy’s explanation of “extreme movement” as love can be
considered in a fundamental way in terms of the body. The word movement is a vast and
comprehensive notion that describes the holistic inter-sensory integrative correspondences of
the body. Along with our consciousness of thought and sense-abilities, there is virtually
ceaseless motion of bone, muscle and tissue that is the infrastructure for the profuse minutia
of our bodily physiology: the conveyance of blood through internal organs and vessels, the
complex actions of digestion and excretory functions, perspiration traversing the skin, the
demise and reproduction of countless cells, the exchange of gasses in the respiratory system,
and the synapses of trillions of nerve endings. Elements of the physiological body are
literally in movement at all times. Considering all these roles, the negation of body
movement signals the absence of life. Movement is a certainty of being. I suggest then, that
Nancy’s statement of love as extreme motion is not only in excess of the self as realization,
but within the self as well. Love is an embodied act.

Without will
Over the course of the introduction I note that works of art are traditionally
considered in terms of sensations such as those romantically described by Stendhal. This
passionate and idealized notion of eros (desire) has persisted in Occidental thought since the
ancient Greeks and reached an apex in Romanticism.491 Yet I argue that love in art deviates
from this view. Art does of course evoke feeling, but it also provokes questions in the viewer,
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though not necessarily answers. It is these questions that expand cognitive boundaries. This
thinking is a mode of reaching that gives us the opportunity to thrive—no more so when we
are contemplating a work of art. This manner of flourishing—this thinking-with—is a kind of
love. Yet Nancy reminds us that love is never a fulfillment but a “promise always
disappearing.”492 Like our emotions, the blood traversing our vessels, the neurons that are
gained and lost daily in our brains, love in art is transient.
Classic love (affection or
desire as felt and expressed for others
and objects) is generally connected to
feelings of some kind, pleasurable or
otherwise. We feel deep affection for
our pet, adore our lover, and cherish
our grandparent. When the dog bites,
the lover abandons us, or the
grandparent dies, love holds the
potential to disappoint at the least or
Figure 5.1. Photographs of sitter’s during Marina Abramović’s
interactive performance The Artist is Present (2010). Image:
Jezebel.com

devastate at the most. Euphoria
becomes melancholy. Yet Nancy

asserts that all loves are equivalent.493 Abandonment is no less love than devotion and
tenderness; contact was made. Art potentially provokes feeling too, which can be intense. In
addition to the example of Stendhal, this was evidenced in the strong emotions experienced
by participants in Abramović’s The Artist is Present performance at the Museum of Modern
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Art described in Chapter Four. [Figure 5.1] In the late twentieth century Italian psychiatrist
Graziella Magherini identified an acute and overwhelming grappling of feeling she named
Stendhal Syndrome that affects some individuals while looking at works of art. The
symptoms include breathlessness and feeling faint; at an extreme these effects induce a
temporary psychosis requiring brief hospitalization.494
Another state of emotional arousal associated with looking at art is identified as
Rubens Syndrome in 2001 by the Roman Institute of Psychology.495 This condition is
manifested by impulsive sexual pursuits triggered in onlookers after viewing ancient Greek
sculpture or paintings by artists such as Caravaggio or Rubens. An article in ARTnews notes,
The researchers, who completed the project last summer, say that the Rubens
Syndrome is a spontaneous response to the beauty of art and that those that are
afflicted by it do not enter a museum with sex specifically on their minds. The report
observes that a viewer calmly taking in a work of art is particularly predisposed to
erotic suggestion, and unsurprisingly, classical scenes depicting mythological romps
hold greater sway than abstract pictures.496

According to Dissanayake, “…Responses to works of art unequivocally indicate that they
may be as sensuous and physical as any human experience.”497 She elaborates,
To modern biological thinking, of course, a feeling as physical response is no more or
less bodily than an idea, a perception, a memory or a thought. A “mental” or
“emotional” apperception of color, shape, or process is comprised of physiochemical,
neurophysiological events.498

Still, the overall findings prompt questions about art as a conduit for some of existence’s
basic issues such as death and erotic desire.
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Both Rubens and Stendhal Syndromes are connected to physical symptoms and
strong feelings. A predecessor to Merleau-Ponty, the nineteenth century philosopher Arthur
Schopenhauer is remarkable for his attention to the subject’s body-mind connection that
earlier philosophers overlooked. He considers how the world that surrounds the subject’s
body corresponds with its inner domain such as thoughts and feelings. In the former, there is
the phenomenal world of sensation—everything that is apparent: objects that can be
physically seen, touched, and heard via the senses. For Schopenhauer this phenomenal world
exists as (what he calls) ideas. Phenomena are not, however, experienced from the “inside”
with the exception of our own body, which possesses a duality of inner and outer states. For
example, a person caresses a lover’s hair or skin yet cannot know the other’s thoughts or feel
the other’s pain or pleasure. Nevertheless the lover is aware of her own body as an object, in
addition to her own thoughts and sensations. It is through sensation or reflection that subject
knows the world.499
This dual aspect is both phenomenon and thing-in-itself.500 Schopenhauer postulated
that all living things501 possess this inner and outer experience but only the subject has
reflective consciousness—will—that is manifested in both dimensions.502 His explanation is
broader than the conventional notion of will as a component of a subject’s free choice of
action.
But it has now become clear that what enables each one of us consciously to
distinguish the idea of our own body from all other ideas which in other respects are
similar to this idea, is that our body appears in consciousness in quite another way in
toto genere different from idea, and this we denote by the word will; and it is just this
double knowledge which we have of our own body that gives us information about it,
about its activity and its response to motives, and also about what it suffers as a result
of outside intervention; in a word, about what it is, not as idea, but over and above
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that, what it is in its self. We have not such direct information about the character,
activity and tolerance of all the other real objects.503

In other words, the subject can only know its own will, not that of others. Additionally, the
will drives the subject towards objects to satisfy its cravings for what is missing or
unavailable to it. These yearnings are anything we want or need, such as to buy a book or
take a vacation. In the case of Stendhal, a journey to see great Italian Renaissance art was one
of these longings. A key component of Schopenhauer’s argument is that the one phenomenon
in the world that has pushback power over a subject’s will is the aesthetic encounter.
Schopenhauer believes that as a subject contemplates art this thoughtfulness provides
an opportunity to escape the ubiquitous needing and wanting that is part and parcel of a being
in the world. Art offers a momentary avoidance of suffering that comprises the relentless and
ranging desire to gratify it. Schopenhauer writes, “He ceases to consider the where, the when,
the why, and the whither of things, and looks simply and solely at the what.”504 In other
words, idea and will drop away. Looking at art is a situation that allows the subject to
transcend the will, to become will-less in the face of something completely knowable: what
Schopenhauer refers to as the “pure subject of knowing”.505 This knowing has an antecedent
in the Platonic Idea506 for which there is subject-object collapse.507 Pure knowing offers
liberation from serving the will and a forgetting of individuality. This particular knowledge
permits the subject to comprehend something without a sense want or need—without a sense
of the self. Schopenhauer explains, “It is then all the same whether we see the setting sun
from a prison or from a palace.”508
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Devoid of will the “pure subject of knowing”509 contemplates a work of art and
grasps ideas in an unadulterated manner. For Schopenhauer the aesthetic experience is
generally music, painting and sculpture but in the twenty-first century we recognize that
performance, dance, film or a book also provide metaphysical transport. Schopenhauer
suggests that the only way to wholly perceive something is for the subject to completely lose
a sense of self. In this way the subject is de-centered. He writes,
He does not allow abstract thought, the concepts of the reason, to take possession of
his consciousness, but, instead, gives the whole power of his mind to perception,
immerses himself entirely in this, and lets his whole consciousness be filled with the
quiet contemplation with the natural object actually present whether a landscape, a
tree, a crag, a building, or whatever it may be. He loses himself in this object…he
forgets his very individuality, his will, and continues to exist only as the pure subject,
the clear mirror of the object, so it is as if the object alone were there without anyone
to perceive it, and he can no longer separate the perceiver from the perception, but the
two have become one, because the whole consciousness is taken up with one single
sensuous picture.510

What strikes me in this passage is how Schopenhauer could just as well be describing the
climatic moment in the sexual act, in which lovers amidst their jouissance elude their sense
of self and merge as one. It is not so far-fetched to have an experience of art that is analogous
to sexual rapture, in which the occasion of having desire fulfilled allows us to forget the
world of reason and responsibility for a short time. (Yet—Rubens Syndrome triggers the
desire to sexually act out, so this situation is in conflict with Schopenhauer’s theory of pure
knowing.) Is sexual ecstasy and contemplating art comparable situations in terms of the pure
knowing subject? Does pure knowing preclude any possibility for asking questions? Is
Schopenhauer’s theory incompatible with thinking love in art? As an embodied subject, is it
possible to completely lose the sense of self?
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Out of Eden
In modern art history a number of couples511 have pioneered creative work born
through mutual love, but even fewer combine romance with socio-political statements
intended to make a change in epistemic norms. Arguably the most famous is Yoko Ono512
and John Lennon513 who originated a series of Bed-Ins in the late twentieth century as the
onset of their robust activism for world peace.514 Bed-Ins were public
performance/protest/media events that took place on two separate occasions in 1969. The
first one was staged after their clandestine marriage in Gibraltar when they set up in a suite at
the Amsterdam Hilton. [Figure 5.2]
Dressed in matching white robes, Ono
and Lennon conducted interviews with
dozens of invited reporters while
lounging in a king-size bed for twelve
hours daily over seven days. (The
Figure 5.2. Bed-In at Hilton in Amsterdam with John Lennon
and Yoko Ono, March 1969. Image: Wikipedia. Amsterdam
Archives.

reporters initially expected the couple to
have public sex.) The walls of the hotel

room were covered in drawings, posters and hand-painted signs that called for peace and
love.515 Lennon and Ono consciously exploited their celebrity via twentieth century state-ofthe-art technologies (television, radio and newsprint) to globally disseminate their political
agenda. Anthony Fawcett, who was Lennon’s assistant at the time, recalls this statement by
Lennon,
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Yoko and I are quite willing to be the world’s clowns…if by so doing it will do some
good. I know I’m one of these ‘famous personalities.’ For reasons only known to
themselves, people do print what I say. And I’m saying peace. We’re not pointing a
finger at anybody. There are no good guys and bad guys. The struggle is in the mind.
We must bury our own monsters and stop condemning people. …We’re trying to
make Christ’s message contemporary. What would he have done if he had
advertisements, records, films, TV and newspapers? Christ made miracles to tell his
message. Well, the miracle today is communications, so let’s use it.516

Lennon’s emphasis on the technology of media points to their fully conscious utilization of
it. While the critics at the time were harsh, their Bed-In photographs were featured on the
front page of newspapers all over the world. Riding the
wave of sensation caused by the performance in
Amsterdam, a second Bed-In took place two months
later.517 During a stay at the Queen Elizabeth Hotel in
Montreal Ono and Lennon conducted sixty interviews
with print and radio press over ten consecutive days.518 It
is difficult to overlook how the passionate erôs that Ono
and Lennon shared made this deployment of their

Figure 5.3. Cover art for Two Virgins
(1968). Image: Wikipedia.

political activism all the more striking.
Already public personas (at once doted on and derided by the media) they made their
bodies accessible with the Bed-Ins spectacle. Only a year before they had also broken new
artistic ground with the release of their first experimental album titled Two Virgins.519 The
record cover featured a photograph of Ono and Lennon standing frontally nude with their
arms casually around each other. [Figure 5.3] (The back cover was a photograph of the nude
couple from the viewpoint of their rear but looking over their shoulders at the camera.) The
193

ordinariness of this unembarrassed image is striking in that neither Ono nor Lennon is
idealized. There is an unreserved quality to the photograph, which was a double self-portrait
taken by the couple with a timer. Considering the direct manner in which they peer out of the
picture plane towards the viewer, the question arises: who is viewing whom? Ono and
Lennon’s photograph levels the viewing field of difference; there is a loss of mystery—at the
same time, questions arise as two artists bare their bodies to the world in an unprecedented
fashion.
The most astonishing thing is their willful choice to be naked this public way. In
Ways of Seeing, John Berger comments on the function of the naked human form in the
everyday world as an unexceptional phenomenon,
Their nakedness acts as a confirmation and provokes a very strong sense of relief. She
is a woman like any other: or he is a man like any other: we are overwhelmed by the
marvelous simplicity of their familiar sexual mechanism.520

Berger’s statement reflects a basic element of embodied being we may apply to Ono and
Lennon’s extraordinary photograph. Two Virgins can be seen as offering the viewer comfort,
or a sense of wonder or recognition, or a feeling of sameness or ambivalence, or the insight
possible in fully seeing the lived body of the other. This is certainly an act of love. And yet
seeing (or being) a Western naked body is culturally regarded as shameful.
This notion of body shame is a relic from the Platonic argument that taking on
corporeal form is a deviance from the perfection of the ideal later incorporated into Christian
values.521 This idea is visualized most obviously by way of the exposed and disgraced
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representations of Adam and Eve after they indulge in forbidden desire in the Garden.522 The
doctrine of the fall is “the foremost shame narrative in Western culture.”523
By way of example, Massacio’s version [Figure 5.4] of this myth represents the
moment they are striding out of Eden beyond an architectural gate, chased and threatened by
an airborne and armed angel (not shown.) Adam covers his face in humiliation reflecting an
internal sense of shame, symbolic of the expression “a loss of face.” Conversely, Eve shields
her breasts and pudendum (a nod to the classical venus
pudica); she has a self-consciousness of sexual degradation for
the first time. Her facial expression emphasizes an existential
suffering. Sally Munt further points out the elements of their
legacy, “What we see in the Creation Myth is that the origin of
human experience, individuation and desire resides in a locus
of shame, and it is out of that shame, separation and loss that
sexual differentiation occurs.”524 Out of Eden we are exiled
from a primordial place of flawless morality (ideal Platonic
love) and become aware of the self as split internally at the
Figure 5.4. Masaccio, The
Expulsion (1426 – 27) fresco in
Brancacci Chapel, Florence. Image:
Wikipedia

same time different from the other. This echoes the primordial
tale of Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium in which humans

were divided in half by the god Zeus as punishment for their undisciplined behaviors. Adam
and Eve’s existential rupture—psychically and physically—is the object of our endless
discontent and unmet desires. What we might take away from our status as subjects
permanently out of Eden is that the genesis of shame is an “interruption of love.”525 In the
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primordial story of humankind’s fall from grace, original love was fixed—an always already.
Afterwards love becomes movement and attempts at connection—a redundant effort of
reattachment to self and others but nonetheless unpredictable and precarious.
The act of shamelessness in creating the full frontal nude album cover for Two
Virgins was in itself an action of risky business. That Ono and Lennon presented themselves
au naturel to the world without shame was without precedent. (In the twenty-first century it
has become common for performing artists to be seen by the public nude in film and
photographs but in the 1960’s it was largely unheard of.) The notion of shame for MerleauPonty is an expression of ambivalence as embodied consciousness.526 He states,
Usually man does not show his body, and, when he does, it is either nervously or with
an intention to fascinate. He has the impression that the alien gaze which runs over
his body is stealing it from him, or else, on the other hand, that the display of his body
will deliver the other person up to him, defenceless, and that in this case the other will
be reduced to servitude. Shame and immodesty, then, take their place in a dialectic of
the self and the other which is that of master and slave: in so far as I have a body, I
may be reduced to the status of an object beneath the gaze of another person, and no
longer count as a person for him, or else I may become his master and, in my turn,
look at him. But this mastery is self-defeating, since, precisely when my value is
recognized through the other’s desire, he is no longer the person by whom I wished to
be recognized, but a being fascinated, deprived of his freedom, and who therefore no
longer counts in my eyes.

Here Merleau-Ponty asserts an “either/or” scenario: a stare by a subject upon the nude figure
as irresistible or disgraceful. Does this apply to Two Virgins? Given their stated agenda Ono
and Lennon did not intend to fascinate their audience. With unabashed access to their bodies,
they hoped to offer to viewers a statement about the personal and the political. They were
obviously self-conscious, and in that awareness they intended the audience to come to their
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way of seeing their position. This effort does not concern subjugation. Is this a tender version
of the master-slave dialectic? The Hegelian idea of the master-slave dialectic is often used as
a model for a social struggle whereby matters of obedience, conflict or dependence are at
stake.527 It is also used to describe the internal striving of a subject’s consciousness. Ono and
Lennon put forward what might be considered a sacrifice of the personal and private to effect
change: their immodest and natural bodies as currency, a trade off for the ethical good.
Shame is defined as holding some degree of a painful emotion that arises from
dishonoring the self or as the consequence of an offense of decency.528 If there exists some
degree of unacknowledged shame, is it a reasonable price to pay for provoking social
change? Ono and Lennon challenge the viewer by questioning the meaning of obscene. They
suggest that what is authentically dishonorable or indecent is not a photograph of naked flesh
or exposed genitals. Is war and intolerance of difference the greater transgression? Their
blatant image was a loaded signifier that in a number of ways heralded a new era of thinking
about love and openness. We might think of their art and performances as an ethics of love.
The Two Virgins album cover529 addresses not only the ban on the exposed body, but
also the prohibition of interracial relationship and pre-marital sex, both of which were largely
taboo at the time. Irigaray has something to say about effecting change in thinking,
What being is in its reality compels us to the questioning of value that Nietzsche calls
for as the challenging of our tradition and a possible access to the new epoch of
thinking… Consciousness, not as a simple knowledge of nature, of things, of objects,
but as knowledge of oneself and of the other, going as far as to respect the
unknowable and the mystery, becomes the chance for an entering into presence that
has not yet occurred: that of the human as such.530
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Irigaray calls upon Nietzsche, who urges the subject to ask questions about ethics that are
assumed over time. He explains tradition as a form of obedience on behalf of the subject to
long held conventions that consist of rules and directives.531 To be a moral person is to
comply with upholding tradition; to be evil is the opposite—to resist those same customs.532
Nietzsche points out that traditions were developed to sustain and protect community, and
although the reasons for conventions are lost over time, preserving their practices
nonetheless becomes morality.533 In this way upholding tradition is a command made upon
the subject, “without thinking about oneself as an individual.”534 In other words, there is a
demand for the sacrifice of subjectivity when observing tradition for the sake of the greater
community. Yet Nietzsche did not see morality as a “one size fits all” phenomenon. To think
and act as an individual is the consciousness to which Irigaray refers.
Making a stake for individuality Lennon states,
…The picture [Two Virgins] was to prove that we are not a couple of demented
freaks, that we are not deformed in any way and that our minds are healthy. If we can
make society accept these kind of things without offense, without sniggering, then we
shall be achieving our purpose.535

Ono and Lennon’s performances and photographs are an extension of their hearts to their
audience via the presence of their bodies. And through their art the viewers (perhaps) are
brought closer to them as beings, not merely abstract ideas. The Two Virgins image succeeds
in this objective; Lennon assures us that he and Ono are merely human—a latter-day Adam
and Eve, out of Eden after the fall—fig leaves willfully put aside. All of these actions are
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deployed with the image of their naked bodies to invite the viewer to think love. Irigaray
reframes a primordial scenario for the contemporary couple,
…Rapture of return to the garden of innocence, where love does not yet know, or no
longer knows, nudity as profane. Where the gaze is still innocent of the limits set by
reason, of the division into day and night, the alternation of the seasons, animal
cruelty, the necessity of protecting oneself from the other and from the God. Face to
face encounter of two naked lovers in a nudity that is more ancient than and foreign to
sacrilege. That cannot be perceived as profanation. The threshold of the garden, a
welcoming cosmic home, remains open. There is guard but love itself, innocent of the
knowledge of display and of the fall.536

In other words, Irigaray claims that love denies and forgets the unholy or possible harm; love
is outside of logic. The space of love for the lovers is accessible, a space with no history, and
perhaps no future. Love is confined to the present, and always entering into presence.
Berger reminds us that it was only after original sin that, “Nakedness was created in
the mind of the beholder.”537 With the exception of being naked alone, to be naked in front of
the other is to be exposed—unprotected and vulnerable. But what is it to look at the naked
other? Elkins writes that seeing another’s genitals is to see a “force”538 that always brings
some measure of sexual thoughts, realized or not. He further notes the overwhelming
experience of viewing the other’s body,
Something about the body has this power, as if it has weirdness and unnamable force
in reserve. In the entire field of vision there is nothing more affecting than images of
the body, nothing more puzzling, nothing that is potentially more purely
incomprehensible.539
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This force may be a matter of our imaginations. Butler asserts the body as a cultural sign that
is never liberated from some element of fantasy.540 Perhaps we are hardwired for those ideas;
this might explain the phenomenon of Ruben’s syndrome. Elkins does not directly reference
the ideas of Schopenhauer, yet they seem relevant here. Does Elkin’s idea of “force”
correspond to Schopenhauer’s theory of the will to life as an unconscious and unquenchable
biological power?
Importantly, Elkins addresses possible questions and feelings raised by the viewer of
the body that is depicted throughout art history as far back as the athletically ideal marbles of
the ancient Greco-Roman world. Questions that arise for the viewer are not articulated aloud,
they move under the conscious mind in a loving engagement with the image or work of art.
In this way the Two Virgins photograph and other artworks that depict the body have the
potential to deliver a version of the punctum. The punctum itself is a force that is unseen but
always felt in the way of emotion.
With the mass reproduction and distribution of the stark representation of their unidealized bodies, Lennon and Ono made a radical effort to effect social change. (This in turn
led to the Bed-Ins whereby they used their clothed bodies to subvert the media’s expectation
of a sexual liaison in the marital bed.) Ono and Lennon were part of the movement in the late
1960’s marking the rising trend of postmodern thought. For example, as vital innovators in
popular culture, Ono and Lennon breach traditions of Western society dominant since the
Victorian age,541 and deconstruct master narratives about the body that includes a lack of
shame in exhibiting their bodies. In the earlier part of the decade, other socio-political
changes were afoot such as the Civil Rights movement,542 and by the mid-sixties the
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Women’s Movement543 and Gay Liberation544 were growing social phenomena. These
campaigns in tandem with pop culture were part of a tsunami of social change in North
America.
It was a time ripe for transgressive acts in the face of social biases. By giving access
of their bodies to the public, Ono and Lennon offer a salutation of love, described by Nancy
as,
…A moment of contact between beings, a light, cutting, and delicious moment of
contact at once eternal and fleeting. In its philosophical assignation, love seems to
skirt this touch of the heart that would not complete anything, that would go nowhere,
graceful and casual, the joy of the soul and the pleasure of the skin, simple luminous
flashes of love freed from itself.545

What particularly resonates in this quote is how a connection between subjects can manifest
the jouissance of the spirit and the delight in the body all at once. We can see why the ancient
Greeks believed the body and spirit are one546 since the subject may locate love that is shared
with the other’s body and soul.
***
By the end of the twentieth century another couple took the potentiality of body to a
more radical level deploying ever more powerful tools of technology. Like Ono and Lennon
they intended to effect social change. Breyer P-Orridge547 is the title of the collaboration of
artists Genesis P-Orridge and Jaye Breyer. Thinking about their work, I am reminded of
Nancy’s formula of convention, “Love is the extreme movement beyond the self of a being
reaching completion.”548 However, the self is never complete. Therefore a keyword in this
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statement is “reaching,” deployed as a verb, as in to
extend something such as part of the body (a limb) or
to offer or give something such as support or
sympathy to another.549 In the case of Breyer POrridge, reaching takes place on a number of
unprecedented levels.
A number of informative interviews are
available, yet the 2011 award-winning documentary
The Ballad of Genesis and Lady Jaye [Figure 5.6]
directed by Marie Losier550 best chronicles the
compelling love story and radical life alliance of
artist-performers Genesis551 and Lady Jaye.552 The

Figure 5.6. Film poster for The Ballad of
Genesis and Lady Jaye (2009) directed by
Marie Losier. Image:
www.balladofgenesisandladyjaye.com

legacy of Breyer P-Orridge553 is how s/he takes performance art to groundbreaking limits
rooted in mutual devotion. They deviate from the progressive heterosexual commitment of
Ono and Lennon because their work challenges the hegemony of socially determined gender
roles and patriarchy.554
British-born Genesis is an influential figure on the punk and post-punk music555
scene; he founded and performed with industrial bands COUM Transmissions, Throbbing
Gristle and Psychic TV, which are renowned for merging performance art with music. He
also collaborated with beat poet-novelist William Burroughs556 and with Brion Gysin557, a
painter and sound poet. Genesis met his soul mate Jaye an American nurse, in the early 1990s
in New York City. As he tells it, it was love at first sight and an intense, romantic, creative
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alliance ensued until her death at age thirty-eight.558 What makes their union noteworthy in
terms of a historical and artistic partnership was the undertaking of a series of genderbending acts they took on as part of a venture they called Creating the Pandrogyne. Genesis
states,
My project is not about gender. Some feel like a man trapped in a woman’s body,
others like a woman trapped in a man’s body. The pandrogyne says, I just feel
trapped in a body. The body is simply the suitcase that carries us around. Pandrogyny
is all about the mind, consciousness.559

Genesis makes a claim here for a Cartesian mind-body split; however, I want to point out
their project is a shift of thinking about gender that is deployed through the bodies of he and
Jaye. Their venture sought to “deconstruct two separate identities through the creation of an
indivisible third.”560 This third identity came about through a series of cosmetic surgeries
each underwent to take on a shared physical appearance; they further assumed the common
name Breyer P-Orridge. In essence, their intention as a pandrogyne is a fully embodied act.
The term “pandrogyne” is coined by Genesis to break the cultural construct of the
gender binary man/woman. Their intention was to achieve an ideal hermaphroditic state561 in
not only their physical resemblance, but also the way they lived life and carried out
collaborative projects, which included music, performance, painting, photography and
writing. A biological hermaphroditic condition by its very nature establishes the sexual
implausibility of a singularity according to Butler.562 Foucault points out that the corporeal
canon in the determination of an absolute single sex identity is entrenched in modern
Western practices; this constructed belief serves as touchstone of truth and pleasure.563
Referring to Foucault’s publishing of Herculine Barbin’s journals,564 Butler points out that
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intersex individuals give rise to, “… a convergence and disorganization of the rules that
govern sex/gender/desire.”565 This rupture is a key aspect of Breyer P-Orridge’s project in
regards to their unique objective of a quasi-hermaphroditic state and the blurring of their sex.
To clarify, the American Psychological Association defines the noun sex as either one
of three possible biological categories into which humans, other animals and other living
things are divided, based on their reproductive characteristics and functions. The categories
are female, male and intersex.566 If we accept that sex is a biological classification of the
natural sciences, then how do we consider the intentions of Breyer P-Orridge as a female and
male with fully intact single sex reproductive characteristics? The significance of Breyer POrridge’s collaboration is an intentional breach of social norms, even if merely symbolic.
In constructing a genealogical critique of how we might understand the so-called
norms of sex and sexuality today, Foucault deploys the term “anatomo-politics” in his text
The History of Sexuality. This word (along with the similar-meaning “bio-politics”) identifies
how techniques of power deriving from all levels of society are imposed upon the bodies of
citizens that comprise the state.567 He identifies anatomo-politics as a power play put into
place during the eighteenth century in Europe as a strategy of capitalism to maximize the
work force, since a robust population insured a plentiful supply of laborers. The breadth of
the state’s authority on its citizen’s bodies further imposed a hierarchy of sex resulting in
social limitations, segregation and legal consequences for failure to comply with bio-political
laws set in place.568 (This included death sentences.) Importantly, these accumulated policies
over time became standardized,
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…The law operates more and more as a norm, and that the judicial institution is
increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative,
and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory.569

In other words, sex develops as an established political and social issue following a span of
ever-pervasive government controls. What started as an effort of population regulations
extended to all other aspects of the sexed body; it persists today as so-called foundational
beliefs that go beyond the reproductive (or non-reproductive) potential of a particular body.
Current anatomo-politics are related to discriminatory practices of pay and hiring based on a
subject’s sex, as well as laws about and access to women’s birth control, men’s virility
pharmaceuticals, medical treatment and research, education, marriage, personal sexual
practices and sexual orientation. Anatomo-politics additionally take a long reach into faithbased laws like the interpretation of Holy Scriptures; it is entrenched in popular culture for
matters such as sports and dress codes. Essentially there is no aspect of politics and society
not affected by a subject’s classification of sex at the time of their birth. To complicate things
further, intersex subjects—as stated above—destabilize the fixed binary frame of malefemale. This subversion is exactly the aim of art and performance of Breyer P-Orridge.
Before I return to he/r example, I will briefly consider the differentiation of the terms sex,
gender and marriage as an existing framework of conditions so the reader may better
appreciate Breyer P-Orridge.
It is determined that a subject may be born with one of three possible biological
reproductive states; now the question of gender becomes apparent. Gender (as defined by the
American Psychological Association) refers to the attitudes, feelings and behaviors that a
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given culture associates with a person’s biological sex.570 Gender, then, is a bio-sociopolitical construction for the most part. (For clarity, the use of the terms sex and gender will
be differentiated here since gender is also commonly used as a marker indicating a category
of sex.) Charles Darwin’s571 highly influential evolutionary theory on the human animal
included the differences between the sexes as well as a causal explanation for roles of the
sexes in society.572 In The Descent of Man, Darwin wrote explicitly gendered descriptions of
humans, “Man is more courageous, pugnacious and energetic than woman, and has more
inventive genius…”573 and “Woman seems to differ from man in mental disposition, chiefly
in her greater tenderness and less selfishness...”574 Darwin asserted a marked discrepancy
between the two primary sexes (male as antagonistic and smarter; female as caretaker) and
that this “natural” phenomenon plays out over the course of human evolution.
Since the nineteenth century more contemporary considerations complicate matters of
biological difference regarding how the sexes are gendered. For example, human size: males
are generally larger—taller, heavier—and stronger than females.575 In addition there is
physiological evidence that females and males have neuro-endocrinological deviations. 576
While these studies are not conclusive, it cannot be ruled out that the construction of gender
is rooted in some measure of an organic component.577
In addition to biotic make-up, it is further possible that gendering the sexes has roots
in rural and agricultural social history. After the age of prehistoric hunting and gathering, the
establishment of organized agriculture took place in the Orient around 8000 BCE and
traversed the Occident. Fisher points to the ancient farming technology of the plow (about
3000 BCE) as responsible for pivotal changes in the roles of males and females in growing
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food. The loss of this capacity may have contributed to the onset of a more subservient status
in the community. The earliest subjugation of females is recorded in Mesopotamian law
codes dating to about 1100 BCE that indicate their status as private property along with
statutes that forbid abortion, adultery, monogamy and divorce for failure to bear children.578
These laws did not apply to the males for the most part. Given this ancient chronicle of bias,
was there ever a time for human beings that sex was not marked as gendered?
Fisher argues that research into various societies existing over time demonstrate that
what is symbolically powerful within that society determines its gendered practices.579
Currently in the United States, the contestation of gender is in play for conservative
legislators committed to bio-politics, as well as feminist theories, the LGBT580 community,
and the social marking of the feminine, masculine and androgynous in pop culture. Butler
states,
…The problem that sexual difference poses, namely the permanent difficulty of
determining where the biological, the psychic, the discursive, the social, begin and
end…Sexual difference is neither fully given or fully constructed, but partially
both.581

So how to approach this highly complex and apparently never-ending argument of gender?
Invoking the writings of Irigaray, Butler elucidates the importance of asking questions in the
face of ongoing gender bias,
Irigaray makes clear that sexual difference is not a fact, not a bedrock of any sorts,
and not the recalcitrant “real” of Lacanian parlance. On the contrary it is a question, a
question for our times. As a question, it remains unsettled and unresolved, that which
is not yet or not ever formulated in terms of an assertion. Its presence does not
assume the form of facts and structures but persists as that which makes us wonder,
which remains not fully explained and not fully explicable.582
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It is remarkable that we are invited to think about gender with wonder—to be curious and
doubtful. In asking questions we also might consider the difference in the agency of
questions: are they deployed to discredit or stimulate the discourse?583 In some cases making
queries challenges authority and thwarts the formulation of an absolute. In other cases it
reveals unconsidered possibilities and new horizons. Once posed, questions may need to be
repeated; it is often the case when answers are not forthcoming. Yet, questions must persist.
Philosophy’s beginnings are problem-based; as Socrates knew well, questioning uncovers
assumptions and analyzes complex issues about how the subject thinks about life. Like art,
we might think of philosophy as an undertaking of joy, Nancy’s verb of love. Philosophy as
love of knowledge corresponds to thinking love in art. There is wonder, doubt, reassurance
and confusion; all experiences are authentic.
This brings us to the question of marriage, one of the oldest documented practices in
human history. Friedrich Engels584 explored the history of marriage in the nineteenth century.
Marriage is defined as the relation between persons married to each other: the condition of
being husband and wife in a contractual bond.585 Although the connotation of the word
“husband” is shifting at this time, it remains largely defined as the male head of the
household, the master.586 As master, he holds authority and sits in a place of primacy. In this
language is expressed the notion of gendered sexes, hierarchy and possession that at the least
displaces the expectation of mutual, romantic love which is also attached to the conjugal
union. The official liaison of marriage between genders disregards the female’s identity
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because it is based on the male’s needs, creating a “genealogy of one”: patriarchal.587 Irigaray
puts marriage into a long perspective,
In fact, for centuries in the West marriage as an institution has bound women to a
universal duty for the sake of the development of man’s spirit in the community, and
bound men to a regression to the natural to insure that the interests of the State are
served in other respects. Real marriages do not exist to the extent that two legallydefined sexed persons do not exist. Both are enslaved to the State, to religion, to the
accumulation of property. What’s more, this absence of two in the couple forces the
intervention of other limits deriving from the labor of the negative on man’s terms:
death as the rally place of sensible desires, the real or symbolic dissolution of the
citizen in the community, and enslavement to property or capital.588

Irigaray’s critique of marriage iterates some cogent points: the subservience of both sexes to
the state, religion, and capitalistic gain at the detriment of sexed subjectivity, as well as the
lack of equality in legal and cultural arenas. Yet some of her other assertions can be argued.
Her grounds concerning the conjugal state are predicated on a few things: heterosexuality,
hetero-sociality, pair bonding,589 legitimacy and an emphasis on difference as a solution to
gender bias. In the same way that gender demands questions, so does the belief in and
practice of marriage. What are viable alternatives outside of marriage, contracts, monogamy,
state ratification, entitlements, divorce590 and difference? Is it possible to have a discourse
about marriage that is not state-centered, outside of reproductive relations, not limited to
heterosexual orientation, or that is inclusive of combinations beyond two?
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***
Philosophers and artists “play with ideas”
by asking questions. Earlier it was noted that
Heidegger proposes the origin of a work of art
begins with asking questions and I argue that love
in art is also launched by inquiry. Dissanayake,
who approaches art with a bio-behavioral view,
coined the term, “making special.” She understood
the evolution of art as something that humans did
as a “biologically endowed predisposition”591 set
apart from everyday activities and likely derived
from play592, a behavior marked by make-believe,
imitation, improvisation, surprise and ambiguity.
To play is to step outside of the mundane and
exercise athletic abilities, strategizing skills or
imagination. Like play, art and philosophy offer an
“as-ifness”593; the imagined potential of something

Figure 5.7. Shigeyuki Kihara, Fafa’afafine: In the
Manner of a Woman (2005) C-type photograph.
Image: http://www.lefolauga.co.nz/?page=shigeyuki

that stokes innovation or discovery. This is another
manifestation of wonder.
Feminist scholarship carried out since the second half of the twentieth century
determines that European colonialism with its Western customs and attitudes about the sexes,
affects indigenous societies that were once largely egalitarian.594 (Although perhaps the
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better term is equalitarian since egalitarian is a term deployed to indicate equality between
males.)595 The contemporary artist Shigeyuki Kihara creates compelling artworks that
address the colonial consequences indicated by Fisher. A Samoan multimedia artist, Kihara’s
work explores gendered identity exploiting he/r own body and that of he/r indigenous
traditions. In 2004 – 2005, Kihara created a sepia-toned photographic triptych of a full-length
self-portrait titled Fafa’afafine: In the Manner of a Woman. [Figure 5.7] The setting for all
three photographs is the same shallow space: a woven grass wall behind a chaise, framed by
some tropical potted plants. In the first image Kihara, bare-breasted, long hair falling past
he/r shoulders, is semi-reclining on a Victorian-style fringed velvet chaise wearing a grass
skirt and a long necklace. He/r alert gaze is aimed directly at the viewer. Kihara’s pose is
identical in the other two images, except in the second photograph s/he is nude in the manner
of a female, and in the third, s/he is also nude, but he/r penis is visible on he/r thigh. It is this
third photograph that subverts the viewer’s expectation; the contraindication of a presumed
sex is startling; the viewer may wonder, “What is actually going on here?”
In Samoan culture, there is a third gender called fafa’afafine and the term roughly
translates in English as “to do as a woman.” Fafa’afafine are individuals born male but
possessing the “spirit” of woman and live as a liminal sex that is a part of the community
fabric of Samoan culture as well as throughout the South Pacific.596 (The counterpart is the
less common fa’atama for females who embody a so-called masculine essence.)597 The
mothers decide these gender roles for their children when they are a young age, typically
based on the child’s tendency toward behaviors not congruent with their gendered body, for
example, if a boy shows a preference for feminine or a girl for masculine activities. As Butler
211

noted, gendered roles are based on specific values in a given culture. The history of
fafa’afafine and fa’atama long predate the colonization of the traditional communal Pacific
Island cultures, which was significantly modified by Western Christian missionaries who
converted indigenous communities. In doing so, they imposed Western attitudes of gender,
white/non-white, heterosexual/homosexual binaries embedded in Judeo-Christian ethical
systems. Kihara’s self-portraits give us three separate views of the same subject, and seen
altogether they rupture preexisting codes and categories that prescribe fixed binaries.
I see Kihara’s work as especially play-full in its ethos; it is based on the as-if-ness
that Dissanayake attributes to play in which an opportunity for the viewer to discover
something occurs. It does so in two ways: (1) the image of Kihara’s semi-reclining nude pose
mimics long-standing archetypes in Western art history that concern the male gaze of the
artist upon the female other, including Titian’s Venus of Urbino (1538), Manet’s Olympia
(1863), and Gauguin’s Te arii vahine (1896). Like Olympia, Kihara’s confrontational gaze
that stares back at the viewer is disarming. S/he shows he/rself to the invisible gaze of the
viewer with the intention to be acknowledged as fully worthy of recognition. (2) S/he is
invites the viewer to consider the hidden possibilities of a body and a culture. In this way s/he
(loosely) reimagines the classic childhood game of “hide and seek.” Fafa’afafine: In the
Manner of a Woman is a compelling declarative statement about Kihara’s particular cultural
identity.
The image of the body (or the ban on its representation) plays a central role in many
social, religious and political ideologies. Nineteenth century colonizers of Samoa mandated
the covering of indigenous “exotic” bodies with Western clothing; at the same time they
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would exploit these bodies by taking naked photographs for ethnographic documentation. In
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this popular portrait genre disseminated the
colonial myth of the South Pacific female as uncivilized and sexually available. Kihara’s
staging of the photograph implicates how he/r self-portrait—with its assertive gaze out at the
viewer—challenges us to question the immanent double standard of the colonial
photographs. Employing the same representational tactics of her ancestor’s Western colonial
subjugators, Kihara creates images that communicate a new possibility: that of an in-between
gender, which disrupts the sex/gender binary. In doing this, Kihara subverts what Foucault
refers to as the “insistence of the rule” by which he means power.598 He writes,
Power is essentially what dictates its law to sex. Which means first of all that sex is
placed by power in a binary system: licit and illicit, permitted and forbidden.
Secondly, power prescribes an “order” for sex that operates at the same time as a
form of intelligibility; sex is to be deciphered on the basis of its relation to the law.
And finally, power acts by laying down the rule: power’s hold on sex is maintained
through language, or rather through the act of discourse it creates, from the very fact
that it is articulated, a rule of law.599

By making art that transgresses prevailing rules, Kihara actualizes Foucault’s mandate that
we build an “analytics of power” 600 that denies law as a template and protocol. S/he also
constructs a new visual language in Fafa’afafine: In the Manner of a Woman. Like Two
Virgins, Kihara’s image beckons a newer, kinder, more insightful Eden. He/r representation
of he/r body is an act that allows for a conception of “sex without the law and power without
the king.”601 In other words, the self’s existential power lays down independent directives.
Kihara’s work reclaims power that is centered on a value system of the equalitarian, an
equalitarian that extends beyond the sex/gender binary.
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I love Kihara’s photograph and I enjoy showing it to others to see their reaction, to
watch them think through what they are seeing. I recognize the love that motivated Kihara to
make this art, the expression of tenderness and pride for he/r South Pacific roots and for he/r
self as progeny of that abiding culture. It compels us to ask questions such as, “What if we
didn’t assume there are only two ways to be?” Using the very mark of her otherness as a tool,
Kihara reclaims the fafa’afafine body that stakes a claim for another kind of beauty and
identity that goes beyond the established “two.” It offers the viewer another perspective on
how we may regard subjects who live outside the binary of sex in community. Fafa’afafine:
In the Manner of a Woman is a work of art that beckons us in thinking love by generating
questions that contemplate otherness and sexual being, gender and history.
Kihara’s sly rupture concerning expectations of sex and gender is a powerful critique
of he/r culture’s traditions and its colonial past, whereas Breyer P-Orridge offers a
commentary on contemporary concepts of marriage and gender. Genesis and Lady Jaye were
legally married but their partnership is marked with actions that challenge the conjugal
template. In addition to the objective of creating the notion of the pandrogenous synthesized
Breyer P-Orridge, the couple took on this project as a testimony of love for each other and
their desire to truly become one. To do this they chose the avenue of sameness, as opposed to
the difference espoused by Irigaray. This mirroring can be seen in their photographic collage
Two in One We Go [Figure 5.8].
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While Breyer P-Orridge decided not to
remove or alter their individual genitalia,602 they
both underwent breast implants and plastic
surgery to their faces. They often dressed alike,
although Genesis seems to have a preference for
drag attire, while Jaye dresses in either
stereotypical male or female garb.
Freud surmises that in our confusion
about sex we have, “…an instinct to a need to
restore an earlier state of things.”603 Is Breyer PFigure 5.8. Breyer P-Orridge, Two into One We
Go (2003) Collage, size unknown. Image:
Artnet.com

Orridge’s collaboration an attempt to return to

some primordial state of being? In a previous era (and in a number of non-Western cultures
still the case) what couldn’t be understood in science was explained in myth. The primal
story recounted by Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium illustrates that human beings were
originally three sexes: female, male and androgynous. (See Chapter One.) The collaboration
of Breyer P-Orridge recalls Aristophanes’ ancient tale that serves as an account of lovers’
strong and irrational desires to merge into one to feel complete. On more than one occasion
Genesis describes this feeling with Jaye. In an interview with The Guardian s/he states,
“…You know that moment when you meet someone and think: ‘I want to eat you; be
immersed in you?’ It began like that… ”604
The blurring of Jaye’s and Genesis’ genders is a declarative socio-political subversive
act of subjectivity that tests the boundaries of what is perceived as masculine or feminine
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traits. Creating the Pandrogyne questions reality, something Butler takes on in her text
Gender Trouble. She discusses the notion of one’s anatomy as never fixed because of a
continual flux of possible variations for the human body. These include drag, cross-dressing
and bodies that are pre or post-operative, transgendered or transsexual. Butler writes,
When such categories come into question, the reality of gender is also put into crisis:
it becomes unclear how to distinguish the real from the unreal. And this is the
occasion in which we come to understand that what we take to be “real,” what we
invoke as the naturalized knowledge of gender is, in fact a changeable and revisable
reality.605

Butler insists that we be aware of what is plausible and what is authentic; this realization
generates discourse that will bring about political and social change with regard to the
erroneous notion that existing gender norms are a fixed universal truth.
Breyer P-Orridge is an ongoing performance, which contains a dialogue of difference
and speech acts606 that destabilize existing hegemonies, primarily phallogocentrism (the
privileging of the masculine in the construction of meaning.) This undermining of
constructed gender is Butler’s major project in Gender Trouble. The strategy Breyer POrridge and Kihara take on is self-defining, and self-recognition is an act that determines
gender and sex. Butler asserts gender identity as endlessly deferred, constituted vaguely
within time via a “stylized repetition of acts.”607 For example, the breast implants of Breyer
P-Orridge may be a way to consolidate a sharing of a sexualized maternal body, but could
also be removed at some point to reject that very same idealization. The subject is always
becoming, ceaselessly practicing being the person the subject wants to be.
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This notion of becoming is shared by Nancy who asserts, “To be born means
precisely never to cease being born, never to have done with never fully attaining to being, to
its status, to its stance or to its standing, and to its autonomy.”608 Nancy describes the human
subject as never fixed but always in flux at the same time the self moves toward death. The
thought of finitude is the thought of the sublime.609 This notion of the sublime is given in
Kant’s Critique of Judgment, where he asserts that the sublime (a subjective state of mind)
results in an aesthetic encounter with nature in which subjects are markedly affected in their
perception of formless and limitless power.610 As I understand Nancy, his concept of the
sublime is related to the other in terms of death and love, rather than aesthetics. Nancy
addresses these phenomena in terms of abandonment. He writes, “To be abandoned is to be
left with nothing to keep hold of and no calculation.”611 This same idea is connected to the
abandonment experienced in love.612 With Breyer P-Orridge it would seem—rather
poignantly—their merging is a way to stave off this unavoidable abandonment. Of course, it
does not succeed physically, but it does keep Genesis and Jaye together as conceptual art.
The absent is present as Genesis carries on the original intention of the project since Jaye’s
death in 2007. Breyer P-Orridge holds—to borrow a phrase from Irigaray—“a wisdom of the
relation with the other.”613 It is what Arendt calls a “thought-thing” that evokes questions
about two people who love and the breadth of that action. What begins as erôs becomes
thinking-with and being-with; it lives on as art, as punctum, love as action and expansion of
the self. Breyer P-Orridge is an open-ended living assertion of thinking love.
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Aesthetics of confession
Marcel Duchamp is said to have
remarked that he would like to grasp an
idea as the vagina grasps the penis. This
prurient aphorism brings to mind the
works of Tracey Emin,614 a contemporary
multi-media artist known for her sexually
charged images and explicitly personal

Figure 5.9. Tracey Emin, My Bed (1999), comprised of readymades, including double bed. Image: the-newshub.com

subject matter. Her works are pervaded
with ideas that reveal the female libido as a robust force, in the manner of Schopenhauer’s
will to life, a drive not concealed in the posturing of modesty or inhibition. He asserted the
sexual appetite as the most powerful and purposeful of the subject’s life, an expression of
self-preservation.615 For Schopenhauer the sexual act is not a trifle, it is the eternal wellspring
of love in addition to a concrete exhibition of physical gratification, or what he calls
“possession.”616 His theory is in a relationship with Emin’s art because her work espouses a
philosophy of sex rooted in the substance of one’s sexual experiences.
Emin’s most known work (and one that launched her career) is My Bed (1999) 617
[Figure 5.9] an installation consisting of her (actual) rumpled and soiled double bed618
surrounded by trash that accumulated following a few days she spent in it. At that time she
was undergoing a serious depressive episode set off by a failed romantic relationship. The
detritus includes blatant references to careless self-indulgent and wanton sexual acts:
condoms, KY Jelly, panties and sheets stained with various bodily fluids, vodka bottles, and
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cigarettes, among other such items. The work is autobiographical, a conceptual self-portrait,
but one that is hardly idealized or self-aggrandizing. Instead the work displays what many
would view as questionable personal choices, a period of low self-esteem and lack of selfcontrol. Critics have described My Bed as confessional, but what does that mean?
To confess is an action that consists of a form of disclosure about something
previously secret or unknown.619 It contains implications that are legal (the admission of guilt
for a crime) or religious (the divulgence of sins to a priest.) In the latter, confession is deeply
embedded in faith, particularly the Catholic sacrament of confession.620 In this private rite the
devout formally admit sins they have committed to a priest on a regular basis. Confession
serves to cleanse the soul of impurities in order to receive other sacraments such as Holy
Communion and to gain admittance to eternal life in heaven upon death.
Confession is also part of a modern literary genre in which a first person,
autobiographical self-disclosure is part of self-examination and self-awareness in the
expression of writing, as well as the search for—and construction of—identity, not
predicated on absolution. Antecedents to the literary confession are St. Augustine’s621
Confessions (397 – 400 CE) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s622 wholly secular Confessions
(1769.) In Tolstoy’s623 spiritual autobiography A Confession (1879 – 1880) he contritely
exposes his past sins against fellow men,
I cannot think of those years without horror, loathing and heartache. I killed men in
war and challenged men to duels in order to kill them. I lost at cards, consumed the
labor of the peasants, sentenced them to punishments, lived loosely, and deceived
people. Lying, robbery, adultery of all kinds, drunkenness, violence, murder - there
was no crime I did not commit, and in spite of that people praised my conduct and my
contemporaries considered and consider me to be a comparatively moral man. So I
lived for ten years.624
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These examples are all male authors, yet female writers have also contributed their share of
the confessional genre. Margery Kempe’s625 Book (1438) is a spiritual autobiography that
professes her experiences of torment by the devil, sexual pleasures and feelings of jealousy.
Sylvia Plath,626 whose collection of poems in Ariel (1965) was composed largely in the
months before her suicide. Its poems divulge the depths of depression she suffered for most
of her adulthood.
The literary confession is the private voice given a public forum;627 it is a form of a
“time machine,”628 or a type of subjective postmortem.629 It is a representation of experience.
In addition to the tradition of narrative text, confession is played out in popular
culture with so-called “reality” television shows that highlight drama and personal conflict;
the cast (who are typically not celebrities, but ordinary individuals like the viewers
themselves) often revels in details of their transgressions face-to-camera in a segment
referred to as the “confessional.”630 This trope is fashionable in television programming; it
offers unscripted and candid commentary in which anything may be confided by the
confessor. For the viewer there is the lure of (what appears to be) a lack of censorship, a
subsequent feeling of suspense that the cast member will offer some utterance of unmediated
“truth.” In this respect, the testimony of the confessor engenders something like a sense of
voyeurism in viewers, a way for broadcast companies to connect with and insure a viewing
audience.
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Figure 5.10. Tracey Emin, Everyone I Ever Slept With 1963 – 1995 (1995),
mixed media with hand appliqued text. Image: tate.org

Emin’s My Bed has much in common with the phenomena of reality television and
confessional literature. In a sense the artwork brought Western pop culture to the high-end art
market—à la Warhol—by exploiting a prevailing and widespread fascination with confession
in the late twentieth century. Warhol appropriated images from pop culture (movie stars and
politicians) as well as commercial consumer goods (soft drinks and soup.) Emin’s work
certainly connected with a number of audiences in the three cities it was exhibited. Reactions
and critical press varied from unbridled enthusiasm to embarrassed discomfort, and Emin
became regarded as the monomaniacal bad-girl artist of the late 90’s art scene.631 Her later
artworks corroborated her inclination to leave no private behavior concealed.
An even earlier work forthright with confessional content is Everyone I Ever Slept
With 1963 – 1995.632 [Figure 5.10] It was a readymade tent in which Emin had appliqued633
the names of individuals she had literally slept with, including family members, lovers,
friends, fetuses, and of note—herself. The total of names appliqued is one hundred and two.
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Yet it is a tent for one; and the viewer must physically crouch down to look into the
tent or actually crawl into the tent to examine the hand-stitched names in rectangular block
text affixed to the interior surfaces of the tent. This particular bodily engagement on behalf of
the viewer lends to a kind of intimacy that is congruent with the concept of the work: both as
a handcrafted labor-intensive piece and as an exhaustive recounting of an experience of many
varieties of closeness. Everyone I Ever Slept With creates an equalitarianism of relationship
that ranges from casual street sex to the uncommon—yet touching—idea of a pregnant
mother sleeping with her unborn children.
This kind of tenderness further demonstrates the equality of loves as asserted by
Nancy. Both Everyone I Ever Slept With and My Bed concern the action of sleeping, in which
the subject is always in a state of vulnerability, a similar defenselessness found in love.
Nancy determines that love by its nature contains susceptibility to “all the possibilities of
love.”634 He also asserts that love requires an unlimited generosity to these prospects since
there can be no hierarchy or a type of love that is ruled out.635 Emin’s Everyone I Ever Slept
With (1963 – 1995) in particular subscribes to Nancy’s philosophy. The carefully
embellished tent envelops all of Emin’s loves for the first thirty-two years of her life.
Whether that love was the spontaneous hustle of the sexual act on a city street, or slumber in
the intimate milieu of grandmother’s home; all is the same; nothing is privileged. As Nancy
asserts, “…All of love is possible and necessary.”636 With My Bed love is messy and
miserable yet love nonetheless.
Another consideration in comparing the two works is the implication of time. With
My Bed, the time span of its implied narrative is a few days following a romantic breakup, in
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comparison with the thirty-two years of Everyone I Ever Slept With. Both contain
indefiniteness for the viewer who experiences the works in unpredictable ways. Some of this
may depend on personal experience and the inclination (or disinclination) to think about what
Emin has done. Thinking love is being in a relationship with an artwork and the artist that
created it, even if this relationship is fleeting. On the other hand, there may be some viewers
who are profoundly affected by Emin’s work and for a long time will dwell upon it and ask
themselves questions about it. They may establish an abiding memory of it, even if they
never actually see it again. Memory then forms the basis for a relationship, or (perhaps)
memory is in itself a form of relationship the subject has with the self.637 Merleau-Ponty
asserts that, “…Any memory reopens time lost to us and invites us to recapture the situation
evoked.”638 Our memories are ours; no one else can take them from us.639 Our ability to
remember is what informs our very singularity. Merleau-Ponty sees this recovery as a portal
to the other or to the past.640 In this way—possessing a memory of an artwork—the
individual manifests a potential for love in her questioning. This love is shared indirectly
with the artist-maker such as Emin who exposes herself through the art. She gives viewers
access to her experiences, which are variously loving and cruel, sweet and embarrassing.
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Figure 5.11. Louise Bourgeois, Maman (1999), stainless steel,
bronze and marble, 9271mm x 8915mm x 10236 mm. National
Gallery of Canada, Ottowa. Image: Wikipedia.

***
Foucault points out that the act of confession (in the West) is a practice that
constructs truth, at least since the thirteenth century CE.641 He writes,
We have since become a singularly confessing society. The confession has spread its
effects far and wide. Its plays a part in justice, medicine, education, family
relationships, and love relations, in the most ordinary affairs of everyday life, and in
the most solemn rites; one confesses one’s crimes, one’s sins, one’s thoughts and
desires, one’s illnesses and troubles; one goes about telling, with the greatest
precision, whatever is most difficult to tell. One confesses in public and in private, to
one’s parents, one’s educators, one’s doctor, to those one loves; one admits to
oneself, in pleasure and in pain, things that would be impossible to tell anyone else,
the things people write books about.642

Foucault’s statement here helps to elucidate how this phenomenon has permeated popular
culture. While many contemporary visual artists (like Emin) create autobiographical works of
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art, Louise Bourgeois643 is noted to be the pioneer who established the genre of confessional
art.644 Richard Dorment, a writer for the British newspaper The Telegraph, seems to have
been the first to give Bourgeois that accolade while writing about her death in 2010.
His explanation includes mention of her work Maman [Figure 5.11] a three-story high
sculpture of a spider that is symbolic of the esteem she felt for her mother, a person she
considered the family protectress. Bourgeois made this statement about the work, which was
commissioned by the Tate in London,

The Spider is an ode to my mother. She was my best friend. Like a spider, my mother
was a weaver. My family was in the business of tapestry restoration, and my mother
was in charge of the workshop. Like spiders, my mother was very clever. Spiders are
friendly presences that eat mosquitoes. We know that mosquitoes spread diseases and
are therefore unwanted. So, spiders are helpful and protective, just like my mother.645

Does this quote contain confessional content? What determines Maman as confessional art is
not clear to me; but Bourgeois cogently attributes autobiographical meanings to this work
and other artworks as well. In the case of Maman, the sculpture is a creative expression of
familial love: storge. And while spiders have their positive qualities, not many viewers will
react to a giant spider form with such benevolent feelings. Maman actually betrays a striking
ambiguous aspect since real life spiders can be menacing, even poisonous (when used as a
trope in horror movies they are downright frightening.) Bourgeois surely would have known
that.
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While Maman is an arguable example of mother love,
it is well documented that Bourgeois carried within herself a
life-long ambivalence towards her father, who by her own
reports was a cruelly critical and domineering parent who
was unfaithful to Bourgeois’ mother. The disclosure of her
lingering anger has a confessional quality, because it is
perceived to contain an inability (or refusal) to forgive a
Figure 5.12. Louise Bourgeois,
Detail of Destruction of the Father
(1974), mixed media, 93 5/8” x
42 5/8” x 97 7/8” Image:
Radford.edu

parent; a trait that may be considered a personal
shortcoming—but it seems important to be clear what is
indicative of confessional art when compared to other types

of autobiographical expression.
A work completed by Bourgeois twenty-five years earlier than Maman that clearly
contains confessional content is Destruction of the Father. [Figure 5.12] This large mixed
media nonobjective work reflects a memory of a family meal that concludes with a gruesome
fantasy. Paul Gardner elaborates in his monograph on Bourgeois,
Destruction, which is alternately titled The Evening Meal, is a menacing installation
that lets viewers witness the end of a violent act. “At evening supper, she says
gravely, “the father is eaten up by the children.”646

Destruction of the Father shares with Maman an ominous appearance, but it is more arcane.
It is constructed of plaster, latex, wood, fabric and a red light. Its uneven bulbous and bumpy
forms possess a haptic quality that brings to mind the inside of a monster’s mouth (gums,
tongue and teeth) or the desolate environment of a primeval cave. The repetition of these
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forms both unifies the installation’s composition, at the same time lending unity to the idea
that incited it. Destruction of the Father’s milieu is at once haunting and visceral with
obvious references to digestion and blood (the work is drenched in red light which reflects
off the fabric in the manner of membranes). The idea of blood recalls physical violence but
also the blood tie between parent and child. In fact, Bourgeois casted pieces of animal limbs
(lamb shoulders and chicken legs) in plaster to create the sculptural forms before making
latex molds.647 She elaborates on the imagination of the work, which comes from a memory
of the family meal and a fantasy of revenge,
There is a dinner table and you can see all kinds of things are happening. The father is
sounding off, telling the captive audience how great he is, all the wonderful things he
did, all the bad people he put down today. But this goes on day after day. A kind of
resentment grows in the children. There comes a day they get angry. Tragedy is in the
air. Once too often, he has said his piece. The children grabbed him and put him on
the table. And he became the food. They took him apart, dismembered him. Ate him
up. And so he was liquidated. It is, you see, an oral drama! The irritation was his
continual verbal offense. So he was liquidated: the same way he had liquidated his
children.648

This fantasy of eliminating a parent at a family meal calls up Freud’s theory about the totem
meal and the primal father.649 In Freud’s postulation, eating the primal father is not merely
murderous; it is at the same time an act of identification and a manner of taking on his
power.650 It is an action underscored by ambivalence; in some ways it echoes the masterslave dialectic whereby matters of duty and dissension are at stake in a struggle for power. It
seems as if love—as we typically understand it—would not be part and parcel of Destruction
of the Father; instead, it is about anger or hatred. Yet again, we must remind ourselves that
the idea of love in art is not necessarily a sentiment of the sweet or tender; instead love it is a
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shape shifter. Its form is open to all possibilities, what Nancy calls “indefinite abundance.”651
In this way love in art is always a gesture of generosity even when the viewer experiences
unloving sensibilities.
The will to presence
A prolific artist, Emin’s artworks comprise photography and video, drawings of
masturbation, provocative or tender aphoristic texts set in neon, as well as handmade books
and blankets. Her works reveal to viewers the universal notions of erôs at the same time they
engender thinking love in a manner that is outside sexual desire. By way of example, one of
my favorite works by Emin is her first film titled Why I Never Became a Dancer (1995).652
Using a handheld camera and Super 8 film, it begins with Emin narrating a voiceover that
reminisces about growing up in the seaside resort of Margate653 during the 1970s. With her
recollection we see grainy jump shots of Margate that include close-ups, panoramic vistas
and aerial views of buildings, sidewalks and beaches. The montage also zooms in on
numerous other familiar sights of a shore town: seagulls, restaurant menus, signage as well as
the general honkytonk of a working class tourist village. She recalls the freedom of being in
her mid-teens in Margate where early experiences of sex were essential to her carefree
exploits.654 Her numerous sexual partners were young men; the sex was uncomplicated
(sometimes pleasurable and sometimes not) and furtive liaisons took place in alleys, parks or
on the beach. Emin considered sex at the time as education, adventure and escape from the
grim reality of her adolescent life.655
By the time she was fifteen years of age she had grown bored of casual sex and
turned to using her body in a new way: disco dancing—the pop culture craze sweeping the
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Western world in the late 1970s. For Emin dancing was a new source of independence and
freedom. In 1978 she entered a prestigious disco competition at a Margate nightclub in which
she believed she was favored to prevail. Winning the contest offered the chance to escape
Margate and go to London.656 As she was dancing in the big event, part of the clapping
onlookers begin to loudly chant, “slag” a local colloquialism (equivalent to the American use
of the noun slut.) Her harassers were a group of town men most of whom had had sex with
her in the years before. As their shouts overwhelmed the music, Emin felt defeated and
humiliated; she abruptly left the dance hall and Margate.
At this point in the film, the narration by Emin changes from reminiscing to the
present moment. Emin specifically names her abusers, and announces, “Shame! Eddie, Tony,
Doug, Richard! This one’s for you.” Disco music fades in replacing her voice, and the
camera cuts to a grinning Emin, wearing cut-off blue jeans and a red blouse, dancing
joyously around a bright airy London studio to the upbeat song “You Make Me Feel (Mighty
Real).”657
This closing scene of a happy prancing grown-up Emin is jubilant—in the act of
dancing she embodies joy. In the beginning of this chapter, I write about the aesthetics of joy,
which offers the possibility of thinking love by allowing the subject to deeply participate in
the world. In this way joy asserts a will to presence.
Another will is also evident in Why I Never Became a Dancer. It is a fantastic
example of what Nietzsche would describe as saying, “yes” to life: the will to power. This
will is a key concept in his philosophical arguments; he describes the will to power in terms
of individual resilience to life’s suffering. He claims, “A living thing seeks above all to
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discharge its strength…”658 In other words, in the face of the torment Emin endured as a
result of her juvenile sexual relationships and ultimate social humiliation, she triumphs by
overcoming them to become an artist, to create films that demonstrate her ability to (literally)
bounce back from emotional trauma. While largely confessional in nature, the work also
ultimately expresses Emin’s personal optimism and confidence. By sharing hope, courage
and resilience, Why I Never Became a Dancer offers a connection of love to the viewer as an
exemplar of what is possible in the survival of life’s hardships. This tenacity is the will to
power.
Nietzsche locates the greatest expression of the will to power in the creative aspect of
the self; an expressive drive that fuels the subject to overcome life’s inevitable difficulties.
Heidegger remarks that Nietzsche’s will to power is an attempt to answer the metaphysical
question of “What is being?”659 We should consider this question of being as it concerns
something beyond the idea of mere existence. For Heidegger all living things possess
existence; however, humans take on the significance of Being (with a capital “B”)—the
question asking, the contemplation—of what it means to live. While the specific question
“What is being?” cannot be answered,660 the thinking of being’s uncertainties is essential,
what Heidegger terms Being. In other words, the human being is concerned with Being.
Nietzsche saw Being as the action of becoming in which the will dominates.661 This
action—the will to power—is a subjective appraisal and reevaluation of how things should
be—what we think of as values. In the example of Why I Never Became a Dancer, Emin
asserts an “ought” for herself: to not let others determine her identity. This is what Heidegger
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refers to as “resoluteness”662; it is that decision by someone “to choose a kind of Beingone’s-Self”663 independent of anything that happens in one’s past. He explains,
…Will, as resolute openness to oneself, is always a willing out beyond oneself. If
Nietzsche more than once emphasizes the character of will as a command, he does
not mean to provide a prescription or set of directions for the execution of an act; nor
does he mean to characterize an act of will in the sense of resolve. Rather, he means
resoluteness—that by which willing can come to grips with what is willed and the one
who wills; he means coming to grips with a founded and abiding decisiveness.664

Emin’s artworks demonstrate just this resolute openness. In fact, I assert that (most) artwork
is made with such a demeanor: making art is a decision of action that involves to a greater or
lesser extent, an approach of openness or transparency that risks a disclosure of secrets at the
least and utter failure at the most. The unpredictability of disappointment is inherent to the
process since art is meant in some way to be experienced by others. Art is dependent on the
other. This simultaneously is an extension of the artist’s self and her vulnerability towards an
audience that is at all times based in uncertainty. Yet the possibility of dismissal does not
deter the artist from doing what she does. Eighteenth century French Romantic painter
Eugene Delacroix665 declares, “Finishing a painting demands a heart of steel: everything
requires a decision, and I find difficulties where I least expect them…. It is at such moments
that one fully realizes one’s own weaknesses.”666 And contemporary artist Jasper Johns667
admits, “ I assumed everything would lead to complete failure, but I decided that didn’t
matter—that would be my life.”668 The open resoluteness of an artist persists regardless of
personal shortcomings or consequences. It is an imperative to master the self; at stake is the
commitment to be an artist. Heidegger notes, “In willing we come toward ourselves, as the
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ones we properly are.”669 This authenticity of self is where he locates freedom. This includes
the freedom to love; the freedom to offer love in the act of art.
Heidegger clarifies that Nietzsche’s theory of will is one of feeling, one that arises
from the multiplicity of our emotional lives.670 Emin’s artworks are starkly impassioned.
They are based in her sexual experiences and in her search for connection with the other, for
love. Merleau-Ponty in the Phenomenology of Perception explains that one’s particular
sexual narrative is life’s foundation.671 He writes,
In so far as a man’s sexual history provides a key to his life, it is because in his
sexuality is projected his manner of being towards the world, that is, towards time and
other men. There are sexual symptoms at the root of all neuroses, but these
symptoms, correctly interpreted, symbolize a whole attitude, whether, for example,
one of conquest or one of flight.672

This idea of a “whole attitude” is apt in the case of Emin; as stated, her oeuvre is based on
her sexual life. It falls into the aforementioned example of conquest since she doesn’t flee the
opportunity to engage erotically with the other. Merleau-Ponty points out that just as we see
with the eyes and hear with the ears, we connect to other’s bodies via our own sexual
appetite.673 The body and its actions serve as a route to what is outside of our personal
existence. Seen this way, Emin’s deliberate erotic expression is an important connection to
others, yet not merely this way. We may understand Emin’s initiatives as Schopenhauer did,
as the will to live to create the next generation, or we may see it as a way of being present in
the world, a will to presence. Merleau-Ponty notes, “…existence realizes itself in the
body.”674
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Emin’s artworks may be understood as mannered, yet at the same time they consist of
recurring gestures that speak to her robust sexual energy in an uninhibited emotional
framework. Although Emin is not a performance artist, I read her work as presenting us with
a marked performative aspect, particularly that of narrative confession. In the same way that
Butler understands gender as comprised of a stylized repetition of acts,675 Emin’s
confessional art may offer a similar succession of undertakings that over time establishes a
distinctive character. While this identity is constructed through the art, it nevertheless springs
from personal experiences and convictions. Yet as construction it is similar to what Butler
determines as “a compelling illusion, an object of belief.”676 While Butler addresses the
concept of gender, all identity is manufactured over time. In the same way gender identities
are formed by various social mandates and prohibitions, Emin’s artwork functions similarly
in terms of a sexual identity. The works poke and prod sexual female taboos, expose the
socially shameful, exalt powerful urges of sexual appetite. The art she makes is constituted
by her reality—but as she herself acknowledges—a truth that is subject to change. For
example, in a 2010 YouTube interview concerning her 2009 one-person exhibition titled
Those That Suffer Love at White Cube Mason’s Yard, she remarks upon how her empirical
awareness of aging affects the work,
Being forty-six, now nearly fifty…I feel I’m losing a lot of my sexual energy or it
doesn’t matter to me. Ideas seem to be mattering to me a lot more. I’m really
frightened about this because sex is always what’s always gotten me up in the
morning. Ever since I was a teenager, sex is what’s made me go out there and search
the world, and just—you know—the ardor of life. And now without that what am I
going to do? I mean I still make love, and I’m in love, but it’s that sexual energy I’m
talking about. Some women could be seventy before they feel like this, but I'm
starting to feel like it now. Is it because I started having sex really young—did I burn
myself out? Or am I going to die young? I don’t know. Or am I just going to become
one of these totally spiritually bound people that no longer refer to lust or anything
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like that, and I just live on a different kind of plane? I don’t know, unless I am an old
lady. I have no idea. But at the moment that is the subject I'm dealing with. So Those
That Suffer Love is also my own loss of sexual energy and I'm referring to that.
Maybe it's a transient feeling or maybe its forever, I don’t know but that’s what I’m
dealing with. So it’s quite funny that people find the upstairs room really sexy when
actually what I'm doing is questioning that sex, or just saying goodbye to it.677

The questions she poses are touching in their openness and vulnerability. In this statement
Emin consciously opens herself up to ontological unpredictability. She also addresses the
notion that she is likely to change her artwork and her way of being in the world as a result of
becoming older. Over time Emin constituted certain beliefs about herself and her art is made
(and in a sense performed) in that mode of belief. The bottom line is that altogether nothing
is ever fixed, the body, gender, and meaning included—what Butler terms “social
temporality.”678
Emin provides a compelling example for the role of human will and aesthetic
contemplation in contemporary visual art. As described earlier, it reflects Nietzsche’s theory
of the will to power, a creative and transformative action that propels us to be more. For the
artist, the decision to create “is a way of life.”679 The artist brings forth something that did
not previously exist and provides its audience with new standards, “the ground upon which
all valuation of the future is to stand.”680 Because of this Nietzsche asserts art as the greatest
expression of the will to power.
***
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Nancy reminds us love cannot be contemplated at a distance.681 We are always
already in it. He also writes, “…that love is always present and never recognized in what we
name ‘love.’”682 Therefore we may consider that love is inscribed in our actions. Love acts:
journeying, wondering, viewing, embodying, crossing, joying, suffering, protesting,
avenging, negating, affirming, exposing, reaching, desiring, shaming, caressing, fornicating,
sleeping, forgetting, encountering, avoiding, playing, asking, enjoining, replying, ignoring,
altering, showing, hiding, losing, disappearing. Willing. Being. Thinking. Loving. All of
these verbs are associated with the artworks I have addressed in this chapter.
Love in art is not confined to the mind as thought or feeling. Love in art is a series of
actions that are embodied. We are looking or hearing or in some way experiencing the art to
begin thinking about it. What we think, how we feel and our actions are integrated into the
whole experience of art. Although the artist’s actions and intentions are different than the
viewer’s, it does not negate the bottom line of love. What may be different is the ethos,
which comprises the making of and appreciation of the work. (In addition to “aesthetics of
joy” and “aesthetics of confession” the subtitles in this chapter could have also included
“aesthetics of shame” or “aesthetics of gender”.)
In this chapter I establish the theoretical punctum of love in art that is felt with joy as
much as with pain. Described by Nancy as the verb of love, to joy is expressed and located in
art as one of myriad ways for an artist to reach for a limit, and like pain is an extremity of
presence. An aesthetic of joy in art contains the idea of the viewer decentered, another
avenue of participation in the being-with world. The same may be said of the aesthetics of
pain and confession. Emin’s video Why I Never Became a Dancer conflates the two and fully
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offers love in art to the viewer by way of enacting her heart-breaking experience and the joy
of overcoming. As such the work not only offers love but also is at the same time an act of
love.
Emin’s artwork illustrates quite cogently Nietzsche’s will to power—the yes to life.
The will to power’s most powerful expression is seen in creative works. We see this in the
collaborations of Ono/Lennon and Breyer P-Orridge, the photographs by Kihara, as well as
the sculptures by Bourgeois. To say yes to life is as love is to Being.
Schopenhauer—a major influence on Nietzsche—claims a reality behind what
appears to us. The world of ideas takes precedence over mere representations (what we can
see or touch) because reality is actually our will: an unconscious force found everywhere in
nature and necessary to our human survival. This Schopenhauerian will is outside time and
space, yet it drives us. These desires result in ceaseless ongoing conflicts and struggles that
we attempt to overcome. As mentioned previously, Schopenhauer makes one exception:
viewing a work of art momentarily suspends our default position of subjectivity to a state
(however brief) that is will-less, eternal and objective. Because art gives us this unique
opportunity of transcendence, Schopenhauer sees the artist as a genius, but to appreciate a
work of art also requires genius. He writes, “We must therefore assume that there exists in all
men this power of knowing the Ideas in things, and consequently setting aside their
personality for the moment...”683 At the same time, he acknowledges that an artist can appear
crazy in this ability, because in making art, they turn their back on what is necessary or
pragmatic in everyday life.
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I’ll return here to Emin’s My Bed, which from a functional standpoint may be
considered absurd, utterly unnecessary; the brilliance of it is that by taking her abject bed out
of context—by dislocating it—she allows us to see the domestic and sexual in an imaginative
way. She also shares a slice of personal life history, a situation of Being. In a Heideggerian
view, this is Art (with a capital “A”) because it brings forth a truth applicable to the realm of
Being and kindles us to think outside of our routine ways of reckoning the world. Nancy
states, “…We are always in our Being—and in us Being is—exposed to love.”684 Through
art, love is always offered to us.
Schopenhauer further asserts that nothing that happens in human life should be
excluded from art.685 My Bed consists of elements that reflect how the behaviors of humans
as sexual beings are linked in common kinship and how sexuality (no matter the predilection)
is a universal. Emin as artist reveals something about human nature; Schopenhauer believes
that this is art’s role.686 This revealing is an act of love in art by Emin.
An artist asserts her will to presence—and her will to power—and a viewer takes
notice. When—as the viewer of art—the subject puts aside her concerns and desires for a
moment in the manner of Schopenhauer, might this be a manner of love? I argue it is; we
may call this pure knowing. I’ve borrowed the term “pure knowing” for this chapter from
Schopenhauer’s argument because it seems to best describe (so far) what I am arguing as a
particular kind of love in art. The adjective pure alludes to the sense of authenticity.
Art possesses a wonderful ability to take us out of the everyday. I see this as an
expression of love that uniquely arises in works of art. It is the connection that Nancy
stresses in his theory of love, which is ironically at the same time an unknowing.
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Schopenhauer notes, “The artist lets us see into the world through his eyes.”687 Within this
aesthetic experience we have access to pure knowing,
The liberation of our knowing lifts us wholly and entirely away from all that
[will]…we are only pure subject of knowledge; we are only that one eye of the world
which looks out from all knowing creatures, but which in man alone can become
perfectly free from the service of the will.688

We are always in a state of knowing, which is always already there in being. All experiences
constitute knowing. In the presence of a work of art, whether visual artworks, a musical
concert, a performance of dance or a work of literature, we stand in an exceptional
relationship of focus. That moment or hour—whatever amount of time it lasts—transcends
the ontic, which is characterized by our multiple needs as we move through any given day.
This amounts to an almost endless list of preoccupations. Schopenhauer understands that it is
uniquely the work of art that temporarily liberates us from all such claims. It is in this
situation that the viewer knows something in a way that no other distraction provides. This
particular knowing is an act of love in art.
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Figure 7.0 Marlene Dumas, Waiting (for meaning) 1988. Oil on canvas, 50 cm x 70 cm.
Image: www.zastavki.com

Coda
“Love arrives, it comes, or else it is not love.”689

Within this dissertation I hope to have laid the ground for the phenomenon of love in
art as another configuration of love.
The reader will recall that Heidegger saw thinking about art as a “feast of thought.”690
In a lecture on Nietzsche as a metaphysical thinker, the idea of a feast comes up again, this
time in the context of abstract thinking. He quotes Nietzsche, “‘For many, abstract thinking is
toil; for me, on good days, it is feast and frenzy.’”691 Heidegger continues,
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Abstract thinking a feast? The highest form of human existence? Indeed. But at the
same time we must observe how Nietzsche views the essence of a feast, in such a way
that he can think of it only on the basis of his fundamental conception of all being,
will to power. “The feast implies: pride, exuberance, frivolity; mockery of all
earnestness and respectability; a divine affirmation of oneself, out of animal
plentitude and perfection—all obvious states to which the Christian may not honestly
say Yes. The feast is paganism par excellence.” …Feasts require long and painstaking
preparation. This semester we want to prepare ourselves for the feast, even if we do
not make it as far as the celebration, even if we only catch a glimpse of the
preliminary festivities at the feast of thinking—experiencing what meditative thought
is and what it means to be at home in genuine questioning.692

Love in art is a kind of frenzied feast, an embodied experience of presence that reaches for a
limit. Thinking love in art is a banquet of wonder for artists and viewers who come to the
table of questioning…or else it is not love.
The topic of thinking love in art has boundless potential. Where does it go from here?
One possibility is to consider love in art in terms of an ethics of care. This branch of ethics
emphasizes the moral locus of caregivers and subjects being cared for. An ethics of care
challenges deontological or consequentialist standards as well as disinterestedness as a
philosophical position. Instead, it is attentive to fostering connections among individuals and
values emotion. How is the work of the artist a form of care for the viewer? Another
possibility is to broaden the scope of thinking love in art to include consideration of artworks
and philosophies outside of the European tradition. For example, how is my thesis negated or
enlarged if examined through the lens of Indian or Chinese thinking and works made within
indigenous cultures?
For all my research and thought over the past few years, this dissertation topic cannot
be tied up with a neat bow. There are inherent problems because a theory of love in art is just
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that—a creative hypothesis. It cannot be proven; it is not truth.693 Yet I propose it should be
taken as seriously as other forms of love available to us. Perhaps this is an overconfident
undertaking because the topic of love is fraught with difficulties, a wholly speculative issue
that at the least overwhelms.
***
Marlene Dumas’694 enigmatic painting Waiting (for meaning) [Figure 7.0] is an
example that demonstrates how a work of art creates a situation of love that begins in wonder
for the viewer. It is a small painting that depicts a sparsely composed arrangement in which
a dark nude figure lays passively supine on an indistinct object covered by a white fabric
edged with pleats. In a foreshortened diagonal, the figure’s head is set back from the picture
plane, arms stretched behind its head, legs dangling at the knees. The milieu surrounding the
figure is nondescript with the “air’’ painted in shades and tints of blue-gray. Dumas’
paintbrush marks are economically applied and she leaves the details ambiguous. The sex of
the figure, facial features and whatever it lays upon are indeterminate. At first glance, I
thought perhaps it was a bed but lengthwise it is too short and height-wise very tall. Then I
considered a table or hospital cart of some kind. Finally I perceived with a little shock it
indicates a child-size coffin.
Is this painting an allegory? What does it signify? Who has died? Is the reclining
figure the parent of the child? Or is the figure a specter of the child who never had the
opportunity to grow up? Why is the figure nude? What about the title—who is waiting for
meaning? A child’s death is always irrational; how do we make sense out of the senseless?
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Why do we try? Must we wait for meaning or actively seek it? What does meaning mean?
These questions run through my mind as I wonder about this painting.
Love has happened in this work of art for me as viewer. The love found in art is not
desire nor is it unconditional; it will not complete me. As viewer of Waiting (for meaning),
my attitude is cooperative and collaborative; I offer my presence to the work for some
amount of time; in this way love in art has aspects of being friendly or devoted. My attention
is a form of care.
Upon first seeing Dumas’ work I began to wonder about it. Wonder is the action of
curiosity, contemplation or attentiveness. Plato asserts that wonder is the starting point of
thinking; I extend his idea to assert that wonder is also the starting point of thinking love in
art. This wonder is a movement in thinking hosted by the between in which questions begin
to form. To reiterate Arendt, “The wonder that man endures or which befalls him cannot be
related in words because it is too general for words.”695 The idea of speechlessness is
important to wonder; art often communicates in a manner that cannot be expressed via
spoken or written language. The wonder I am describing here is an experience possible in a
work of art for the beholder, occurring when mere words cannot explain the effect of the
artwork.
Thinking about art opens the eyes of the mind on behalf of the viewer; it is a crossing.
In this crossing the between is a space/time distinctive to the dynamic engagement with an
artwork; the between—or intermedius—is a liminal space of absolute potential that is elicited
by a will-full and conscious participation on behalf of the viewer towards the artwork (as
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object) or artist (as performer.) The invisible enterprise of wondered thinking elicits the
questioning essential to love in art.
In an essay written for the catalog that accompanied the exhibition Women Artists:
elles@centrepompidou, Avital Ronell writes about a colleague who takes a dissimilar route
in thinking about something,
To put it in shorthand, we could say that she is on the side of knowledge whereas I
am captivated by non-knowledge and the anxiety that it provokes in our existence.
My taste orients me toward speculation, theoretical inquiry of the risk-taking kind,
and obsessive questioning. Rarely am I result-driven, as in business, nor do I always
come up with an answer that might obliterate the question, put it to rest. I like to leave
the question where I found it, there, dead or alive, still somehow blinking.696

Ronell wryly evokes the visual of a question as a thing, stubbornly maintaining a semblance
of existence. The mental image of a question by some means subsisting indefinitely—no
matter what—resonates with me. I am reminded of Socrates with his endless and persistent
questions aimed at his interlocutors. It seems—like Ronell—he wouldn’t let those questions
just perish. Dumas’ painting realizes much the same thing: the question of what the painting
means and the question of meaning does not go away.
In the introduction to this dissertation I note that Lyotard saw questions as the
bedrock of thinking, at the heart of thinking. Questions are a manner of thriving, particularly
in the time and space that art opens up for thinking. Yet questions that are born from thinking
about art are largely unfinalizable, in the same way that Bakhtin insists upon the
unfinalizability of the self.
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Arendt notes, “By posing the unanswerable questions of meaning, men establish
themselves as question-asking beings.”697 Love in art factors into the futile but inevitable
search for meaning, in other words, what it means to be human. Ultimately the meaning of
Dumas’ painting is not realizable; in other words, I will always be waiting for meaning. Yet
while “waiting” I open myself to the experience of love found in a work of art.
***
My primary argument in this dissertation is that there is a particular love to be found
in a work of art. While I have just described the experience of the viewer, love is both felt
and expressed by the artist-maker albeit in a different shape than the viewer’s encounter.
While the artist’s thinking is genesis for the work of art, love generated by artists in
their work does not come from a lack, romantic desire or physiological drive, or from
vengeance. That is not to say these concerns (or another agency) are not present in the
liminal or unconscious realm of the artist’s self. Yet such issues are not the engines behind
love offered in their work; instead, love in art is an action performed by the artist. These
movements are the artist’s thinking-with and questioning-with along with the physical efforts
that create the art object or performance. This is what Heidegger calls poiēsis: a bringing
forth by the artist—a poetic midwifing. While I cannot speak for Dumas’ actions and
thoughts when she created Waiting (for meaning), I can imagine what they may be. Even if
we do not have the facts concerning an artist’s studio processes, we can be confident that
love is inscribed in her actions. This is because movements of thinking and questioning along
with creative work generated by the artist are an expression of care and concern within the
self-other relation. Bakhtin refers to the care and attention exercised by the artist as a
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deliberate undertaking of responsiveness; what he calls answerability. This idea is
represented in that the artist has a moral obligation to carry out creative work through a
practice of thinking joined with materials used in particular actions, and to share her work
with the viewer. Yet I maintain that if—for some reason—the work does not gain an
audience, it does not negate the love founded in its creation. Once made, a work of art exists
as always open to the possibility that someone other than the artist will experience it. Life
and world are unpredictable; love in art is a boundless generosity toward possibility.
In the creation of art, the artist open-heartedly thrives within care. In Dasein, we are
always already in care: care for our self, for others, for art. Heidegger sees this care as an
action of immanent responsibility, although we may be deficient in our expression of it on
occasion. This action is a willful diligence taken on by the artist as a manifestation of love in
art. Whatever the artist’s project, the unifying idea is the subject’s being-in-the-world, a
world that is immanently being-with others. Making art is a decentering activity since the art
made is typically intended as an experience of being-with.
***
Love in art is necessary in the same way all loves are essential. Bakhtin’s theory of
“art for life’s sake” emphasizes the relationship of being and art as mutually dependent; as
such it concerns the artist and viewer’s actions in the world. The intersection of art and life is
at once an expression of personal creativity and social standards.698 Dumas’ Waiting (for
meaning) embodies this theory, even if the viewer does not quite comprehend all the nuances
of the work.699 As Haynes explains in regards to Bakhtin’s notion of the “aesthetic event,”
the viewer must go beyond projecting the self into a work of art.700 In other words, while we
245

initially offer the self to the work of art through answerability, we withdraw and return to our
own unique position as recharged. Morson and Emerson note,
Properly performed, the aesthetic act in daily life involves a reassumption and a
reconfirmation of one’s own place after the other is encountered. Rather than fuse, we
produce something new and valuable.701

In thriving, the act of creating and creation itself is profusion, “…the creative is not a lack
but plentitude, not a search but full possession, not a craving but a dispensing, not hunger but
superabundance.”702 Love in art is not about merging, as with a lover, but about thriving and
expanding the self. It is a feast of possibility, of yes to life, of indefinite openness.
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